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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Does Democracy Promotion  
Promote Democracy? 
The Zimbabwean Case 
 
 
by 
 
 
MAVHIKI Ruvimbo Natalie 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
Why has the increase in election funding by both Western 
international organizations and governmental donor agencies not 
resulted in the deepening and consolidation of democracy   in most 
African countries? This study assesses this question with reference to 
Zimbabwe. Significant financial and technical commitments have 
been invested for the establishment and consolidation of democracy 
in Zimbabwe, but instead of democratic consolidation, Zimbabwe has 
oscillated from a de facto one party state to a competitive electoral 
democracy and then to an electoral authoritarian regime. What 
explains this puzzling phenomenon? Can democracy promotion 
promote democracy, and if not, what are the pre-requisites for 
successful elections and peaceful transfer of power? This project 
focuses on electoral democracy resulting in power transfer, where a 
successful election is followed by intra (within one party) or inter 
(between parties) transfer of power. In countries where elections are 
constantly held without an alternation of parties in power, can we say 
democracy promotion is ineffective or are there other factors that 
inhibit its effectiveness? In addressing these questions, this study 
argues that increases in election funding does not necessarily 
guarantee the advancement of democratization and good governance, 
although it finds that democracy promotion even where it does not 
result in power transfer does deepens democratic values. It does so by 
investigating the literature on the following variables presumed to 
affect democratization processes: democracy as a concept; democratic 
trends and its recession; democracy promotion’s motives, actors and 
strategies; democratization by elections in Africa; recipient practices; 
the role of opposition parties and their strength; the will of the 
recipient population; and the evolving problem of hybrid democracies 
given the rise of China and it's strengthening partnership and 
influence in Africa, all guided by electoral cycle processes. The 
study’s methodological contribution is a qualitative study of 
comprehensive empirical data of elections and democratic processes 
in Zimbabwe compared to those in Tanzania and Ethiopia. The study 
tests empirical generalizations on the development of democracy and 
African politics on Zimbabwe and evaluates various methodological 
approaches to the study of elections as they relate to Zimbabwe. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
Since the first African country, Ghana attained independence in 1953; African countries 
have gone through significant political reforms toward multiparty democracy. These 
political reforms were the result of domestic, but mostly significant international pressure 
— leading some authors to argue that democracy was exported by the West to Africa. 
Partly, as a result, there is a proliferation of hybrid political regimes in Africa. These 
hybrid regimes are increasingly ‘accepted’ as attaining a level of democracy, although they 
still exhibit authoritarian tendencies. In these hybrid political regimes, institutional 
arrangements that facilitate democratic progress such as regular elections are present, 
albeit they lack legitimacy as political and civil rights, human rights and the rule of law 
tends to be overlooked despite international efforts and pressure toward Western style 
liberal democratization.  
 
Since the reforms were largely externally influenced, depending on the level of external 
pressure, at least thirty African countries have vacillated between electoral democracy and 
authoritarianism (Appiah, 2015). Accordingly, forms of “political renewal” have taken 
place through democracy promotion initiatives by international institutions. Principally, 
Western governments and donor organizations have re-emphasized the importance of 
democracy promotion even when the results are disappointing; mostly because they 
consider persistent ‘re-introduction’ of pluralist procedures as important for the 
consolidation of democracy. As theorized by Lindberg (2009) and Bratton (2013) 
“repetitive elections even when flawed can eventually lead toward competitive democratic 
rule.” There is often a strong correlation between efforts spent promoting democracy and 
its advancement in the process of democratization (Hyde, 2014). Therefore, a country like 
Zimbabwe is an outlying case then as the amounts of funds poured in by Western or 
generally international donor agencies towards the creation of a democratic system do not 
match its democratic progress. This makes the question of whether democracy promotion 
promotes democracy problematic. 
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Democracy promotion initiatives have often had two purposes: democracy consolidation, 
and its deepening. Vertically, donors intend to strengthen political accountability ensuring 
that candidates fulfil their responsibilities in representing their voters or citizens at large. 
This is often through electoral processes — where elections are mechanisms to keep 
elected officials accountable, aided by pressure from opposition parties, media and Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs). Horizontally, they intend to strengthen relationships of 
accountability across government institutions and other stakeholders working with them. 
Hence the focus is mostly on the role of parliaments, judiciaries, anti-corruption 
commissions and their ability to keep a check on each other. Democracy deepening aims 
to avoid a transition back to authoritarian regimes; a cessation of elections; or worse still 
their erosion (where for instance, elections are still held but they are not necessarily free 
and fair, minority rights are infringed upon, potentially the government has tried to change 
the constitution or has imposed restrictions on other important institutions). Regardless, 
increasingly, countries in Africa (not just Sub-Saharan Africa but North Africa too) are 
sliding back to authoritarianism as democracy recedes (Diamond, 2015). The ‘transition 
back to authoritarianism’ argument is supported by the fact that despite billions of dollars 
being spent on democracy promotion, increased technical support from experts, the 
advancement of technological innovation to aid electoral processes and vast information 
on democratic processes, 65% of African countries are classified according to the 2014 
Freedom House rankings; as ‘partly free’ or ‘not free’ (Freedom House, 2015). 
 
So, does democracy promotion promote democracy? This question has not been 
adequately addressed, although it carries significant implications for public policy — both 
foreign and domestic. This study is an attempt to fill a scholarly gap on the study of 
democratization in Africa with a specific focus on Zimbabwe, but also informed by events 
in Tanzania and Ethiopia. Specifically, this study investigates whether the international 
practice of democracy promotion actually promotes democracy. The answer is not straight 
forward as the field of democracy promotion and democratization demands consideration 
of an array of issues including historical factors, local contexts, donors, recipients, 
legislature and processes of political awareness and participation. 
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The increase in the number of ‘free’ countries has been closely correlated with efforts 
spent promoting democracy (Hyde, 2014). Over the last decade, the United States’ 
invasion of Iraq has been used as an example of democracy promotion efforts. Often 
discussions on the subject lead to arguments around why powerful states promote 
democracy abroad. International relations scholars point to the issue of interests in 
geopolitical and economic gain, while many more examples of democracy promotion 
challenge this assumption. In 2003, the ‘need for the democratization of Iraq’ rhetoric was 
used to justify its invasion, but the issue of democracy promotion came up after ‘weapons 
of mass destruction’ were not found t (Hyde 2014). “Democracy promotion was used to 
sell the invasion after regional justifications had failed to materialise” (Hyde 2014). These 
developments kicked off debates and studies on democracy promotion. It is not to say the 
practice was non-existent before this time nor is it a representative case. 
 
Democracy promotion existed for decades as a key component of Western foreign 
policies. More than 40% of its recipients are in Africa (Freedom House, 2014). Democratic 
rule has become the most popular, legitimate and acceptable form of governance today. 
Hence, the burgeoning of hybrid political regimes where democratic rules are 
continuously synthesized with authoritarian, dictatorial or non-democratic governments 
to gain international legitimacy. States often hold elections for legitimacy, although 
denying their citizens real choice (Goldman and Douglas, 1988). Not doing so has often 
had negative consequences such as sanctions, side-lining, a reduction in investor 
confidence or even war -- although rarely.  
 
Definition of terms 
Democracy is defined as a system of arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote 
(Schumpeter, 1947). Or rather the rule of the people, where governments are chosen 
through free and fair electoral competition at regular intervals (Diamond, 1999) but 
resulting in the transfer of power from one party to another. Citizens periodically choose 
or even nominate in some cases a leader or government and authorize them to decide and 
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act on their behalf. This classification excludes any bureaucratic or military domains of 
power not accountable to elected officials.  
 
The study of electoral democracy includes analysis of or an acknowledgement of the need 
for minimum levels of liberties and the rule of law. These facilitate successful participation 
when enforced. Even across democracies (those with competitive elections amongst 
different parties), basic rights vary considerably. This puts the definition of electoral 
democracy as a “civilian, constitutional system in which legislative and chief executive 
offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage 
(Diamond, 1999, p. 10).” 
 
Democratic theory alludes to democracy as “a theory unassociated with any ideals nor 
ends… a political method, that is to say a certain type of institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political — legislative and administrative decisions” (Schumpter, 1976). 
Schumpter argues against the basic theory that democracy focuses on competition by 
potential decision makers for the people’s vote as the future and offers this modern 
realistic definition: democracy is an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpter, 1976). In this case, the competition for 
leadership is the distinctive feature of democracy and the one which allows us to 
distinguish between the democratic from the other political systems (Pateman, 1970). 
Everyone is in principle free to compete for leadership in free elections so that the usual 
civil liberties are necessary and Schumpter compares the political competition for votes 
to the operation of the (economic) market: voters like consumers choose between the 
policies (products) offered by competing political entrepreneurs and the parties regulate 
the competition like trade associations in the economic sphere (Pateman, 1970). Of the 
various forms of democracy, this project focuses mainly on the electoral form where 
donors support the conduct of a free and fair vote resulting in either an inter or intra party 
transfer of power.  
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Research background 
This research is guided by three main bodies of literature on democracy. Democracy 
promotion, democratization and democratization in Africa, and competitive 
authoritarianism which will be expanded in the following chapter.  
  
The historical origins of aid to promote democracy are difficult to pinpoint. However, 
Napoleon, Jefferson’s and Woodrow Wilson’s initiatives after World War 1 are considered 
the periods of its birth. Imbalances in economic inequality and under-development in the 
19th century resulting from wars, colonialism and failed systems of governance motivated 
rich countries to give money to poor and underdeveloped countries. Led by Britain and 
France, Western countries provided regular aid to their colonies in Africa, Latin America 
and Asia by the 1920s. They developed infrastructure such as roads, railways and ports 
and even after the colonies gained independence, foreign support continued to focus on 
economic development (Eyben, 2014). The intention was to assist lagging economies to 
catch up with the advanced economies.  
 
Eyben (2014) argues that the world had split into three, namely — the ‘first’ (Western 
democratic countries) the ‘second’ (Soviet Union and its Communist satellites) and the 
‘third’ (former colonies, which were now independent and organized themselves into the 
non-aligned movement in the early 1950s). The United States became the world’s biggest 
aid donor, starting with the Marshall Plan to help Europe rebuild after the World War. The 
assumption was that the old colonial powers would gradually phase out their direct 
financial aid as colonies became financially independent; and multilateral organizations 
like the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund would take over 
development work (Phillips, 2013). Later around the 1960s, aid programs began to 
crystallize with states assuring their commitment starting with the “0.7 per cent target” 
resolution, in which states set aside 0.7 per cent of their national income for development 
assistance. The commitment was easier to fulfil for states with former colonies like Britain 
and France but not for countries like Sweden which did not have similar obligations 
(Phillips, 2013). There was a general consensus though on the need for humanitarian aid 
(addressing basic needs like water, education and health). After the 1960s with efforts by 
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the World Bank, support extended to economic development, human rights, disaster relief 
and democracy support. The United States Agency for International Development became 
the first major bilateral donor to include democracy as part of its portfolio when it 
launched its Democracy Initiative in 1990 (USAID, 1991). 
 
In pursuit of a peaceful and prosperous international system, state and non-state actors led 
efforts to export democracy abroad. Commitments to advance an international 
“community of democracies” (Schraeder, 2002) under the Warsaw Declaration in year 
2000 by more than half of the globe reiterated the need for democracy assistance. With 
respect for sovereignty, mature democracies led by the US and Western Europe felt a need 
to export democracy abroad. Promoters believe that, ‘good intents are sufficient to have 
good intents’ as a justification for interventions. International organizations such as the 
European Union, the United Nations Development Programme, and United States Agency 
for International Development, Humanist Institute for Cooperation, Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency, Canadian International Development Agency, the 
British Department for International Development, Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and the National Democratic Institute share the 
same belief. They carried out countless democracy promotion activities each year in the 
newly emerging countries, including the young democracies. 
  
The ‘global community’ idea has altered political arrangements that would have otherwise 
been internal, into global causes. The internal affairs of states have increasingly been 
elevated to global causes as democracies find other democracies more reliable partners 
with whom common understanding, including trade and other exchanges are easier 
(Goldman and Douglas, 1988). “Most countries in the world have agreed to democratic 
principles and in many cases become actively involved in democracy promotion beyond 
their borders” (Hyde, 2014). This subject will be further investigated using the works of 
Michael Bratton and Richard Joseph on elections and democratization in post-
independence Africa, including how incumbent rulers secure more terms in office, the 
inadequacy of foreign donors pressing for greater democratization and the ‘uneven 
progress in developing democratic institutions’ (Diamond, 2014). 
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To effectively evaluate democracy promotion initiatives in Zimbabwe it is important to 
explore theories and literature regarding its background, motives, actors (donors and 
recipients), strategies and evaluations (success and failures) because over the past 25 years 
it has found its place on most Western foreign policies (Carothers, 2007). What were 
initially considered anti-Communist security policies before the 1980s developed into 
democratic principles entered not on ‘geopolitical strategic competition’ (Carothers, 2007) 
but on self-governance. In the 1990s developed nations began to contribute resources and 
expertise for democratization beyond their borders, especially into Africa. Since then 
“major established democracies, from Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden, to Australia, 
Canada, Spain, and others, have become active providers of democracy assistance” 
(Carothers, 2007). Other international organizations such as the United Nations, and 
European Union also extended their scope to democracy assistance.  
 
However, since democratization widely involves “interference” in a state’s internal affairs, 
its promoters received a lot of criticism as some considered it a neo-colonial agenda — 
particularly in Africa where the majority of states had been colonized and later taken up 
arms to gain their independence. Its ‘promoters’ happened to be the same that had 
colonized them. Hence it was a sensitive and controversial issue and it received a lot of 
resistance. “Over time, however, democracy aid opened many doors, and by the late 
1990s, one could almost expect or take as normal that in a democratizing country, outside 
actors would be involved in almost every sector and institution of political life” 
(Carothers, 2007).  
 
“While it remains emphatically true that, ‘elections do not equal democracy’ — that there is 
much more to having democracy and making it work than free, fair, and truly competitive 
elections — it is also the case that institutionalizing free and fair elections, with rigorous and 
effective electoral administration, is a crucial aspect of democracy. And over time, it will have a 
tonic effect on the governance problem in Africa”. 
Diamond (2009) 
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Lindberg proposes “Democracy by elections”. This project examines this theory and those 
of his critics. On the African case he states, “African states will become more democratic 
if they simply keep holding elections” (Lindberg, 2009).  
 
The current democratic impasse or back-sliding goes against Lindberg’s theory on the 
consolidation of democracy in Africa which states that the repetition of elections results 
in democratization. By 1980 more than 80% of Africa had gained independence from 
colonial rule. African states enjoyed democratic rule in the first two or three decades on 
average depending on the length of terms leaders could serve. Elections were generally 
conducted without much contestation as the same leaders ran for their second or third 
terms. Towards the expiration of these terms however, there was widespread reluctance 
by leaders to surrender power through democratic elections. In some instances, 
constitutions were altered to guarantee and legitimize the extension of presidential terms 
by increasing them. In other cases, steps were taken to avoid or control elections. In some 
cases, power was transferred to family members or trusted friends of the ruling elite. These 
developments dismissed the hopes of Huntington’s “third wave” of democratization.  
 
Evaluations of the on-going processes of democratic renewal in Africa must be considered 
against the background of the continent’s’ past experiences (Ihonvbere, 2003). Foreign 
domination, structural distortions, underdevelopment, weak state structures, dependence 
and the politicization of the national question complicate any democratic governance 
attempts. These conditions placed Africa on an uneven path to development. While the 
rest of the world focused on the growth of their economies and the development of their 
states, much of Africa was struggling with transition, including the change of 
administration, adjusting existing systems to fit new ideals, the pressure of fulfilling 
independence promises, intra-cultural differences, transitional justice issues and the 
ravages of wars — both internal and intrastate. This is to say that countries cannot be 
compared on their pace to democracy as the preconditions are not comparable, (a 
justification often given by authoritarian regimes to explain their lag in democratization). 
Sandbrook (1996) cautions nonetheless that, “Although these are ‘onerous conditions’, 
their impact on democratization requires some clarification assuming they do not prevent 
9 
 
a transition to democracy by means of reasonably ‘free and fair’ electoral contest. Such a 
contest can be successfully arranged even in a poor underdeveloped country suffering 
from ethnic / regional tensions, rampant clientelism and limited democratic experience" 
(Sandbrook, 1996 in Appiah, 2015). This is why Lindberg suggests “repeated democratic 
behavior even if the elections are flawed” to strengthen and consolidate democracy in 
Africa. These issues will be expanded in the chapter on Literature review.  
 
Rationale and significance 
There has not been much disagreement on the need for industrialized states to cooperate 
with developing countries on issues like the economy, trade liberalization, (economic) 
technical support, poverty reduction or food security. However, still contentious are issues 
around governance as Western ideas of development are not independent of good 
governance and democracy. The question has been — how to achieve democracy? 
Western states emphasize on the need for exercising human rights and free political 
competition -- an idea not all leading economic players share. Lately, it has become almost 
impossible to talk about African development issues without mentioning China which not 
only has become a key global player but one of Africa’s biggest ally. Its record on 
governance and democracy remains questionable when compared to the Western model. 
More and more China is cooperating with states shunned by the West especially 
Zimbabwe. Not only that, increasingly African states are adopting ‘look East’ policies 
which this study attributes to the relatively few demands China imposes (if any) for 
cooperation. What then does this mean for democracy promotion? Can the Chinese 
dimension reduce the pressure of Western democracy ideals and foster illiberal democracy 
(though elections take place, public participation and civil liberties are limited)? 
 
This project also investigates work on competitive authoritarianism; a concept developed 
after noting an increase in the number of repressive regimes that combine electoral 
democratic practices with authoritarian tendencies and are even sometimes mistaken as 
democratic regimes. This is necessary to explain the problem when it comes to 
investigating democratization in Africa. Often a country’s level of democracy is measured 
by the ability to hold transparent or less contested elections under a conducive 
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environment that enables competitors and voters to express themselves freely. The 
problem however is dictators or authoritarians have mastered this, as an avenue for 
securing aid. In turn, this dilutes or compromises future democratic standards. 
 
Such regimes have been labelled ‘pseudo democracies,' ‘hybrid regimes,' ‘iliberal 
democracies,' ‘semi-democracies,' ‘virtual democracies,' ‘electoral democracies,' ‘semi-
authoritarian,' ‘soft-authoritarian,' ‘electoral authoritarian’ or ‘partly free’ (Levitsky and 
Way, 2002). From studies carried out in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania, it is evident 
that most democracy promotion activities in Africa are nurturing such democracies. As 
donors increase pressure on authoritarian regimes to conform to democratic norms by 
various forms especially ‘conditionality’ (the carrot and stick practice), more and more 
competitive regimes are developing. They will experience prolonged periods of 
‘controlled’ transition (Diamond, 2014) as they use elections as a legitimizing tool and 
make it difficult for any institution to hold them accountable. This will be expanded in the 
theoretical framework based on the works of Zakaria (1997), Levitsky and Way (2002).  
 
Hypothesis 
The study proposes the following: first, increasing democracy assistance funding and 
support does not guarantee democratization. Second, the nature of donor or sponsoring 
organization determines the ‘successes’ of its programming (i.e., based on their nature, 
whether government supported e.g. USAID or DFID or ‘neutral’ like the UNDP – 
authoritarian regimes are more receptive to independent institutions. Based on their aims 
e.g. USAID might be more interested in regime change vs. UNDP which might be 
interested in building stronger institutions, the success of their programming would not be 
the same). Third, the recipient organization’s attitude or operations affects the 
effectiveness of democracy funding. Fourth, the strength of the opposition parties affects 
the potential transfer of power - if the opposition is too weak to defend its victory, power-
turnover is low. Lastly, pressure to democratize and the imposition of political conditions 
contribute to the burgeoning of competitive authoritarian regimes or pseudo democracies. 
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Main Question  
The research question is: Does democracy promotion promote democracy? Why has an 
increase in democratic assistance not resulted in faster and deeper democratization 
through successful elections and the transfer of power? Countries like Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Uganda, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and many others are consistent in conducting elections, yet 
have a long way to go to attain genuine democratic status. Beyond Africa, powerful actors 
such as Russia and China legally conduct ‘competitive elections’ that are not democratic. 
Even when elections are successfully conducted, political developments that follow are 
not always positive. Therefore, this project will start by explaining what entails a 
successful democracy while addressing what a democratic process could involve 
considering substance and quality, while aiming to understand the broader concept of 
democracy promotion. It also addresses questions such as: is democratization easier in a 
one party state? How does the nature of the donor organization affect successful 
democratization? To what extent does the strength and resilience of opposition parties 
affect the success of democracy promotion? And, how does the nature, operation or 
attitude of recipient organizations affect the success of democracy promotion?  
 
Overview of Methodology  
This is a case study of Zimbabwe with references to Tanzania and Ethiopia. It employs 
interviews as the main data source. When evaluating the effectiveness of any phenomena 
with the use of case studies — interviews are more effective as respondents can provide 
context specific data. It was necessary to conduct these interviews within the context in 
which the phenomenon occur (Silverman, 2013). So, 32 interviews were conducted in 
Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania 
 
Chapter outline  
The second and third chapters are dedicated to literature and theories on the concepts of 
democracy promotion and democratization in Africa introduced above. The second 
analyses electoral cycle events and main concepts of democracy assistance. The third 
focuses on empirical studies conducted on democracy promotion and democratization in 
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Africa and their findings. The fourth chapter focuses on democratization in Africa while 
the fifth outlines the methodological design that guided the study. The sixth chapter 
outlines the research findings before concluding the report and offering recommendations 
in chapter seven.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Electoral Cycle and Democracy Assistance  
Donors have contributed much to the development of democracy in Africa over the past 
three decades. Their contributions range from civil society support to raise citizen 
awareness and hold governments accountable; technical assistance before, during and 
after elections to ensure bias free elections; constitution making; training and mentoring 
for the strengthening of legislatures and judiciaries to check executive power; and 
advocacy for the establishment and consolidation of civil liberties including freedom of 
speech, association and assembly. For intergovernmental dialogue, foreign governments 
have put pressure through conditionality or the imposition of conditions for aid or the 
restriction of international liberties like international travel bans, freezing accounts and 
sanctions restricting international trade or transfers.  
 
This chapter outlines the various concepts and processes informed by democratization 
literature and studies based on the argument that democracy promotion does promote 
democracy -- but domestic and foreign challenges limit its effectiveness in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The chapter begins by discussing the concept of democracy; followed by an 
analysis of democracy promotion — including its motives, actors and strategies. 
 
Democracy and its trends 
Democracy 
As the main concept in this study, it is important to briefly analyze the concept of 
democracy, its pre-conditions and characteristics. Beetham (1994) suggests a bottom up 
approach — analyzing ‘democracies’ for common characteristics to define democracy. 
However, this approach is prone to fallacy as characteristics do not remain constant across 
democracies, political models differ and characteristics change over time. Although, ‘rule 
by the people, ‘popular control’, ‘political equality’ are democracy’s basic principles 
centered on popular sovereignty, where “public policy is to be governed by the freely 
expressed will of the people, and all individuals are to be treated as equals” (Hadenius, 
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1992 in Beetham 1994). Democracy is characterized by principles of majority rule and 
participation not excluding equality, freedom, consensus, coercion, competition, 
pluralism, constitutional rule and more (Satori, 1987 in Beetham 1994). Individuals are 
not equal and differ in tastes, preferences, outlooks and preferences but should be equally 
represented and free to select representatives of their choices and desires. Hence the need 
for a governance model that ensure their equal representation and participation (Beetham 
1994). Representation, guarantees their ability to choose desired representatives through 
a ‘free’ and ‘fair’ political process (election) after participating through the free 
expression of views (civil liberties or rights). Elections are the common denominator 
among modern democracies.  
 
Trends in democratic development  
Following the collapse of Communism, democracy rules supreme. Unfortunately, as the 
rest of the world has moved on to assessing the quality of their democracy and 
investigating ways to improve it, most of Africa remains in transition; or where transition 
had ended, democratic recessions have begun. Yet, development over the past three 
decades has been increasingly linked to democracy and good governance. The number of 
states transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule has increased, so has the 
response to the need to exercise political freedoms and get rid of dictatorial forms of 
governance. These developments have not come without setbacks however as Freedom 
House in their investigation of Freedom in the Word (a country-by-country report on 
global political rights and civil liberties) found that as of 2014 “the state of freedom 
declined for the eighth consecutive year in 2013” (Freedom House, 2014), particularly 
with developments in Arabic African countries like Egypt which experienced democratic 
reversals following coups. These reversals certainly do not mean democracy’s 
unpopularity nonetheless. 
 
Third wave  
An expansion of democratic ideals and practices post 1974 which Huntington (1991) 
termed the “third wave,” led by South America in the 70s and reaching South, East and 
Southeast Asia around the mid-80s. Transitions from communist and authoritarian rule to 
towards democracy in former Soviet states as well as Central America followed in the 80s 
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before the trend spread to Africa later that decade (Huntington, 1991). Since then, 
democracy has been considered the best form of governance, where “the multitude has the 
supreme power, and supersedes the law by their decrees” (Aristotle, 1988). This could 
explain why mature democracies see it worth promoting no matter the cost. This study 
focuses on the electoral form of democracy (electoral democracy) — a system for arriving 
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote (Schumpeter, 1947). Or rather the rule of the 
people, where governments are chosen through free and fair electoral competition at 
regular intervals (Diamond, 1999) resulting in an inter (between parties) or intra (within 
parties) party transfer of power. Citizens periodically choose or nominate a leader or 
government and authorize them to decide and act on their part. This classification excludes 
any bureaucratic or military domains of power not accountable to elected officials.  
 
According to Huntington (1991), the study of electoral democracy is normally married 
with an analysis of, or an acknowledgement of the need for minimum levels of liberties 
and the rule of law. These facilitate successful participation when followed. Even across 
democracies (those with competitive elections amongst different parties), basic rights vary 
considerably. 
 
The threshold of democratization 
Depending on one’s perspective (donor, recipient, government, opposition or civil 
society), the effectiveness of democratization efforts varies. Hence the need to highlight 
what successful democratization would encompass. Academics, policy makers, 
intergovernmental organizations, etc., have increasingly become concerned with the 
evaluation of democracy promotion, through the generation of data and the design of 
instruments to measure democracy (Munck, 2009). It is not enough to dictate or equate 
successful democratization to the ability to hold free and fair elections leading to peaceful 
transfer of power.  
 
There are three tasks: first, to select indicators (in this case free and fair elections and a 
peaceful transfer of power, with a basic insight into the state of civil liberties and the rule 
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of law). Second, to select a measurement level – Munck (2009) suggests a standard of 
assessment necessary to “maximize homogeneity within measurement classes with the 
minimum number of necessary distinctions”. This project employs Freedom House scales 
and rankings (from ‘free,' ‘partly free’ and ‘not free,' these will be explained later) to help 
in the categorization of states and help understand the ideal type of government 
(democracy) and measure the current state. 
 
In conceptualizing the subject, Munck (2009) adds the need to identify attributes that are 
theoretically relevant and creates a ‘logical structure of concepts’ serving as a guide. This 
study identifies contestation and participation as the main attributes of successful 
democratization or the threshold for democratization. The components of contestation 
here are the right to form political parties (multi-partism) and political freedoms such as 
freedom of the press. The components of participation are fairness and freeness of the 
voting process and other basic freedoms e.g. freedom of speech. I add another component 
(or a sub-component of the attributes), the transfer of power.  
 
 
 
Original source before editing Munck (2009) 
 
International IDEA therefore defines a full democracy as one where “basic political 
freedoms and civil liberties are respected, and tend to be underpinned by a political culture 
conducive to the flourishing of democracy. The functioning of government is satisfactory; 
media are independent and diverse; there is an effective system of checks and balances; 
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and the judiciary is independent and judicial decisions are enforced” (IDEA, 2015). It is 
the ideal form of governance popular in Western democracies including the United States 
(US) and United Kingdom (UK). Only 9 of the 49 Sub-Saharan countries fit this 
classification and have remained free for almost a decade with the exception of Senegal.  
 
The majority can be classified either as flawed or hybrid democracies (considered ‘partly 
free’ by Freedom House). Flawed democracies are states that hold free and fair elections; 
respect basic civil liberties (although with exceptions); however, with significant 
weaknesses in other democratic aspects, including problems in governance, an 
underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation (IDEA, 2015). 
IDEA also defines hybrid democracy as one where “elections have substantial 
irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair; government pressure 
on opposition parties and candidates may be common; serious weaknesses are more 
prevalent than in flawed democracies — in political culture, functioning of government 
and political participation; corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak; 
civil society is weak; typically there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the 
judiciary is not independent.” These definitions fit a good number of African cases but 
cause the researcher to question whether classifying them as ‘democracies’ (although in 
hybrid nature) is accurate, as doing so only worsens the ailing state of democracy as will 
be expanded in the section on competitive authoritarianism; hence the decision to label 
some of them ‘authoritarian’. It is easier to categories 20 of the 49 Sub-Saharan countries 
classified as ‘partly free’ in Freedom House’s 2016 ratings fit this classification. However, 
there is an overlap as some borrow characteristics from hybrid and authoritarianism. 
 
Authoritarian regimes lack “political pluralism and many are outright dictatorships, 
though some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but have little substance; 
elections, if they do, but are not free and fair; there is disregard for abuses and 
infringements of civil liberties; media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups 
connected to the ruling regime; there is repression of criticism of the government and 
pervasive censorship; and judiciary is not independent” (IDEA, 2015). Another 20 of 49 
states fit this classification. It is important to note, authoritarians in their quest for 
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legitimacy oscillate between these classifications further complicating contemporary 
definitions of democracy. This study believes, the classification will continue to widen in 
developing countries given the need for international legitimacy and financial support. 
Only three countries, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Mali have improved from 'not free' to 'partly 
free' — a positive development but unsatisfactory of 49. Yet 7 countries Djibouti, Uganda, 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Gambia, Central African Republic and the newest South Sudan have 
moved from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’. Diamond (1999), looking at the rate at which 
African democracies have lost energy, self-confidence and effectiveness, parallel to US 
political polarization concludes the ‘Democratic Zeitgeist’ is over and it is not just a crisis 
but a democratic recession. Clearly, new strategies and a renewed sense of purpose are 
necessary for democratization in Africa.  
 
History of democracy promotion 
Imbalances in economic inequality and under-development in the 19th century resulting 
from wars, colonialism and failed systems of governance motivated rich countries to aid 
poorer countries. The world had split into three, namely — the ‘first’ (Western democratic 
countries) the ‘second’ (Soviet Union and its Communist satellites) and the ‘third’ (former 
colonies and countries that had come under imperial influence, which were now all 
independent and that formed themselves into the non-aligned movement in the early 
1950s) (Eyben, 2014). The US became the world’s biggest aid donor, starting with the 
Marshall Plan to help Europe rebuild. US foreign policy and programming began to 
include governance aspects — specifically the need for democracy, as leaders like 
President Reagan who considered it a way to conscientise the world on values of justice 
and freedom. International relations scholars considered it a security rationale, where 
“economic and security assistance would bolster friendly governments, whether 
dictatorial or democratic against the spread of Soviet influence” (Carothers, 2011). So, aid 
became a democracy promotion tool in the 60s. Prior to this, US foreign policy had been 
dominated by a ‘pragmatic anti-Communist’ objective as the US competed with Soviet 
Union for influence and the loyalty of third world governments (Carothers, 2011). The 
US also wanted to combat the spread of leftist movements and regimes. Later President 
Kennedy emphasized on the responsibility of the US “to do good in the world” given its 
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unique capacity, duty and destiny and his government was convinced that with proper 
application of energy and resources America could help the third world nations rise out of 
poverty and move from dictatorship to democracy.  
 
African countries burdened with the legacy of colonialism, wars, poverty and internal 
power struggles (civil wars) were in desperate need of support for development. Thus, 
state building, strengthening of public administration, including administrative 
capabilities of these ‘fragile and inexperienced’ states motivated leading economies to 
provide aid — both food, medication, infrastructural development and loans. Informed by 
“Modernization theory,” developed countries believed in developing preconditions for 
democracy first, as economic development by raising middle class citizens with high 
literacy rates and other socioeconomic features; potentially leading to democracy 
(Carothers, 2011). The belief was economic and political developments are interlinked 
and development is a ‘linear process’ which could end up in an American style social, 
economic and political system. 
 
In Africa, economic aid was the engine aimed at fighting the growing influence of 
communism and reduce poverty as “helping countries grow economically would prevent 
empty stomachs from making revolutions and would foster democracy… timely injections 
of aid would launch under developed countries into economic take-off” (Carothers, 2011). 
Coupled with South Asia’s needs, a Kennedy Cooper revolution (1959) pushed President 
Kennedy’s administration to increase foreign aid by 33 percent and strengthened the 
institutionalization of foreign aid through the creation of USAID and Peace Corps. 
According to Carothers (2011) the ‘aid-democracy’ link was largely ‘indirect’ targeted at 
political institutions and processes not ‘democracy assistance’ as it is now. Donor agencies 
introduced programs to increase the technical capacities of recipient administrations as 
well as reduce former executive dominance mechanisms, by advocating for free market 
reform to urge countries to dismantle many of the top heavy administrative structures set 
up by these earlier governments.  
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Still, realizing the administrative quandaries of the African populace in the 1960s — 
among others, poverty, inequality, poor education, erratic health systems and other 
socioeconomic challenges under dictators; US policy community, congressmen, scholars 
and aid officials began to question the US’ indirect democracy promotion approach 
through economic aid (Carothers, 2011). They feared that the elite would continue to 
benefit at the expense of the masses and could potentially use the aid to fortify existing 
domestic imbalances for domination. However, a major shift took place in 1961 under 
‘Title IX’ of the Foreign Assistance Act, which redirected foreign aid directly towards 
democracy promotion through internally driven processes. USAID emphasized aid 
programs to ensure the maximum participation of locals in development processes. So, 
developed states and their agencies broadened their mandate and increased financial 
grants for democracy support through democratization projects, led by the US, EU, its 
member states and the UN. In the early 90s, Northern donor governments, led by USAID 
began to link development assistance to the promotion of democracy, human rights and 
good governance (Diamond, 1999).  
 
International democracy promotion 
International democracy promotion (IDP) refers to external relations and development 
cooperation activities which contribute to the development and consolidation of 
democracy in third world countries, or rather, all measures designed to facilitate 
democratic development (Burnell, 2007). According to Levitsky and Way (2005), IDP 
originates from the Western state’s desire for international ‘leverage’ and ‘linkage’ based 
on the idea that “power is a continuum or graduation of relationships and not a short term 
process” (Burnell, 2007). Although, there are two main rationales for IDP - first, the idea 
of universal value, in which every human being is entitled to freedom (Sen, 1999) and 
mature democracies have a ‘moral obligation’ to spread, secure and defend the order of 
democracy. Second the instrumental value where democracy should be spread among all 
other ‘good things’ through the development of effective policies according to the 
European Council of Ministers (2006). Another rationalist explanation arising from the 
US-Iraq invasion is based on interests as the US is purported to have invaded Iraq on the 
premise of democracy promotion but for economic and power gains. Hence the 
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theorization of IDP by international relations scholars in recent history as arising from 
states’ material and power interests.  
 
IDP has been considered in political science literature as a ‘soft power’ mechanism 
involving a great deal of persuasion and non-coercive influence through political 
conditionality, threats or diplomatic pressure on recipient states by donors. ‘Hard power’ 
on the other hand is an extreme mechanism, often understood through forceful or military 
intervention — a less popular strategy of IDP given the sovereignty, independence and 
autonomy of recipient states. Democracy promotion’s justification derives from the need 
and responsibility to protect individual freedoms, by those in a position of power. This 
research focuses on the ‘soft power’ mechanism of IDP to understand its effectiveness in 
democracy promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa with a particular focus on Zimbabwe; 
specifically focusing on electoral democracy, where transfer of political power to the 
‘people’s choice’ through elections is the aim. Aimed at investigating whether Western 
democracy promotion promotes democracy, this study explores challenges to 
democratization in Zimbabwe.  
 
State development over the past decades has been increasingly linked to democracy and 
good governance. Democracy essentially has become the bedrock and only acceptable 
standard for most political systems; and political elites continue to put an emphasis on the 
importance of a fair, transparent, representative and legitimate form of government for 
access and acceptance in the global political and economic arena. Failure to do so, results 
in isolation, underdevelopment, vulnerability and lack of support and legitimacy. It is 
therefore not surprising that the need to attain the ‘Democratic’ status is greater than ever. 
The response to the need to exercise political freedoms and get rid of dictatorial forms of 
governance has been positive, therefore more and more states are transitioning from 
authoritarian to democratic systems of government. These developments have not come 
without setbacks however: Africa remains the only continent lacking in the advancement 
of political systems and in attaining the democratic status as well as protecting basic rights 
for its people and improving their livelihoods. 
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From a ‘normative’ perspective, mature democracies realized that one’s exclusion from 
political participation is equivalent to human deprivation in the economic realm; and 
political participation became somewhat a right. Everyone had to be able to participate in 
the political sphere. Exclusion from participation was considered equivalent to economic 
deprivation, according to the Marshal’s view (Aruka, 2015). ‘Instrumentally’, democracy 
was considered a means to greater development ends. A large body of political scholarship 
believes that democracies are at least more interested in providing goods and services for 
their citizens than autocracies: that is in the form of education, health and social welfare 
(even if their outcomes are not as good e.g. autocratic regimes in some cases). In an effort 
to introduce political reforms, Western governments have supported their foreign 
ministries and development agencies to extend their focus to the global south. Millions of 
dollars are set aside annually to fund development projects which include democracy 
promotion. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) alone spends more 
than US$700 million annually on democracy-related programs, i.e., elections, 
parliamentary support, judiciaries, political parties and CSO support (Carothers, 1999).  
 
According to the democratic peace theory, fully fledged democracies should have a 
normative claim in promoting democracy externally; they should also have a ‘genuine 
strategic interest’ in promoting it (Wolff and Wurm, 2011). From a realist perspective both 
actors win. As from a ‘utilitarian perspective’, the donor is guaranteed of a peaceful and 
secure environment as a result of the lowered risk of war in a ‘democracy’; their trade and 
investment is also secure assuming there is rule of law in the recipient state. Lijphart and 
Bowman (2008) investigate motives of democracy aid and attribute it to the democratic 
peace proposition — “Democracies are more peaceful especially in their relations with 
each other than non-democratic systems”. Similar to Kant’s (1975) Perpetual peace theory 
that assumes “the rational citizen is generally interested in peace because war endangers 
his life and welfare. If the political system allows for the translation of this preference into 
foreign policy, the respective state will refrain from any offensive use of force or at least, 
will prove less prone to violence and war than other political regimes" (Wolff and Wurm, 
2011). Hence, Woodrow Wilson’s aim “to make the world safe for democracy” as it is 
more desirable to have the world democratic for peace and security. Democracies are also 
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assumed to have markedly better bargaining capabilities and superior institutional 
resources than autocratic states, and these strengths make them less likely to be the target 
of attack by other states (Herman and Kegley, 1996). 
 
From a policy perspective, democracy aid is an important issue on the donor agenda 
(Resnick, 2013). Most agencies insist — along with everything else that promoting human 
rights, good governance and democracy are an important part of their efforts; hence the 
formation of ‘democracy units’ in a number of agencies. How then have these been 
implemented in Zimbabwe and parts of Africa? Are there any contradictions or shortfalls 
that exist between their democracy and governance work and other types of development 
interventions that have resulted in the slackening of democratization? According to 
Crawford (2001), in addition to the promotion of civil and political rights, democratic 
government and an accountable and efficient public administration — as a policy, 
democracy promotion is aimed at positively supporting projects aimed at strengthening 
the respect of human rights and democratic practice through aid. On the other hand, it 
withholds or restricts aid where perceived violations of human rights or democratization 
reversals exist (conditionality). At the same time should donor governments be engaged 
in such activities (Crawford, 2001)?  
 
Donors  
Though scholars continuously attribute the success or blame the failure of democratization 
efforts on domestic factors, foreign actors have an equal responsibility. The effect of 
donor’s actions or interactions with local actors on democratization efforts have been 
neglected by democratization scholars, the same is true in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Brown (2005) attributes the muting of democracy promotion success in Sub-Saharan 
Africa to local structural impediments that limit the effectiveness of donor conditionality, 
and the lack of a necessary understanding and commitment on the part of donors for 
successful political reform.  
 
Democracy has been promoted by a variety of actors including governments, political 
party foundations, multi-party institutes, international non-governmental organizations, 
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political institutions and other international aid agencies. Popular among these are 
international donor agencies such as the Department for International Development 
(DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation (SIDA), the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), the Humanist Institute for Cooperation (HIVOS); international organizations like 
the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN); specialized development 
institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI); and political party foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. 
 
Political finance concerns emanating from restrictions imposed by local governments on 
the financing of political activities by foreign agencies have caused donors to try to 
empower political institutions technically. Aimed at strengthening key political 
institutions necessary for democratization, international governments led by the US in the 
90s have channeled significant amounts of money through their democracy promotion 
arms such as NED and NDI. Countries like Sweden have created more specialized 
political agencies like SIDA and the Electoral Assistance and the American International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems. UK’s Westminster Foundation for Democracy and the 
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy are examples of other specialized 
government-funded organizations. German political party foundations such as Konrad 
Adenauer and Friedrich Ebert are also popular democracy promoters. Not forgetting 
international institutions like United Nations bodies which have governance programs 
through facets like the United Nations Development Program championing democracy. 
 
Civil Society  
In African countries, donors primarily work or partner with local Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) directly or 
indirectly who sometimes work as intermediaries between them (donors) and the 
government depending on the cause. Optimistically premising that democracy can emerge 
anywhere with the right knowledge and institutions, support is also provided to 
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governments, parliaments, parliamentarians, the judiciary political parties, electoral 
commissions (state and independent) and media institutions — a bottom up approach. This 
assistance is not meant to be provided over a long period but a relatively short one, 
thereafter recipient countries are expected to have acquired necessary tools to 
independently govern democratically.  
 
The role of CSOs as that of international donor agencies has become important. Their 
activities in shaping political developments have grown compared to their former focus 
on socio-economic issues. National and international NGOs have developed into full-
fledged institutions and their role commands attention according to Carothers (2000). For 
this project, the study of civil society is key as it considers them as the main recipients of 
democracy funding and assistance as well as partners of international donor agencies. 
CSOs are either viewed as “a unique repository of values, virtue and voluntarism” or as 
worrying effects of proliferating nongovernmental organizations as “governments are still 
the only legitimate source of order and authority and that too much of a good thing on the 
side of citizen empowerment could turn out to be a source of domestic political gridlock 
and international impotence” (Carothers, 2000).  
 
Foreign donors support CSOs through assistance programs where they receive training, 
advice and financial support. Carothers adds that, looking at the role of CSOs in shaping 
America throughout its history makes it hard not to believe that promoting civil society 
abroad is a worthwhile endeavor; at the same time, it is natural to ask how much the aid 
in this field is actually accomplishing (Carothers, 2000). This study also aims to contribute 
to the effectiveness of donor support to civil society and its effect on democratization.  
 
Led by the United States — bilateral aid intended for democracy promotion also focus on 
developing local civil society for democratization. With the realization that elections alone 
were an initial step to unfeigned democratization, Of the factors affecting the effectiveness 
of democracy promotion initiatives, Recipient NGO attitudes and practices are key factors 
in determining the effectiveness of democracy promotion. This research believes business 
practices in Zimbabwe’s CSOs significantly affect the success of democracy assistance. 
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According to Carothers (2000), governments are no longer the only legitimate source of 
order and authority, CSOs have risen as median authorities between government and 
citizens, advocating for political accountability and freedom.  
 
Democracy assistance literature tresses the civil society strategy from American 
Tocquevillian traditions — grassroots activism (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000) as 
American strategies are naturally inclined to mobilization from grassroots that often 
develop leftist ideas. CSOs act as potential sources of pressure for reform that could reach 
entrenched power holders. Donors find them appealing as they are small enough that, 
modest amounts of aid are significant to them compared to that needed for judicial reform 
for example (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000). Though normally repressed by tyrants, CSOs 
are a positive force for democracy and are considered effective for democracy 
consolidation (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000). 
 
According to Ottaway and Carothers (2000), democracy requires civically aware citizens 
who combine understanding of and confidence in the political system with healthy 
skepticism about the performance and good faith of politicians and it is valuable and 
important for democracy promoters to work from the bottom-up rather than just top-down 
in developing and transitional societies. Democracy promoters consider CSOs an effective 
strategy as they are not government affiliated; genuinely reform oriented; and autonomous 
to the state (although they may interact regularly). Some scholars disagree with the 
effectiveness of CSOs for democratization as they question civil society’s relationship to 
political society or its neutrality (particularly with opposition parties) considering their 
linkage. However, donors consider civil and political society as separate realms (Ottaway 
and Carothers, 2000). 
 
Donors also favor groups that interact with the state through advocacy work and those that 
do not explicitly compete for political office as they can actively promote democracy and 
follow internal democratic procedures. So, White (1994) defines civil society as, “An 
intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organizations 
which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed 
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voluntarily by members of the society to protect or extend their interests or values”. In 
Africa, donors concentrate on a narrow set of professionalized organizations: NGOs 
dedicated to advocacy or civic education directly relating to democratization such as 
election monitoring, voter education, governmental transparency, and political and civil 
rights generally; structured with designated management, full-time staff, an office and a 
charter or statement of mission, sometimes called ‘democracy groups’, with very small 
membership (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000).  
 
CSO support is based on the classic concept that, active civil society is central to thriving 
democracy, there is however a gap in literature examining the effectiveness of these 
democracy groups particularly in authoritarian or dominant party states. CSOs while 
making sustained efforts to influence government decisions act as “virtuous incarnations 
of the people” (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000) and democracy’s watchdogs. CSOs can also 
drive political change and can be involved in partisan politics or open political struggle. 
They also work with general citizens in active mobilization through social movements for 
democratic transition (McAdam et al. 1996) e.g. in South Africa (Landsberg and Ottaway, 
2000) found, a social movement brought down apartheid. However, they criticize donors 
for confusing NGOs and Civil Society and mention that because of the different nature of 
missions, (NGOs - humanist and CSOs - political); also that both actors function 
differently according to their locale — this can affect funding decisions and the failure of 
missions. Hence “In the future, it is essential that providers of civil society aid abandon 
their notion that civil society is mostly about NGOs and instead strive to understand how 
civil society is already structured in each recipient country and assist accordingly” 
(Ottaway and Carothers, 2000). They also found that, in Peru, Romania, South Africa and 
Philippines, donors have successfully promoted democracy resulting in regime change 
through CSO support. 
 
Ottaway and Carothers (2000), review the impact of the civil society based approach by 
donors on three levels — the micro level (whether CSOs have met their immediate 
objectives); meso-level (whether more and stronger advocacy NGOs amount to a stronger 
civil society); and macro level (whether a stronger civil society has actually helped 
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produce greater political liberalization or democratization). It is important to note that the 
sharp distinction in Western literature between NGOs and CSOs is not as clear in reality 
in the three African countries investigated for this study (Zimbabwe, Tanzania and 
Ethiopia). The two terms are used interchangeably, however based on the distinctions this 
study is interested in CSO activity and not NGO. There is significant interaction between 
both groups however key is that NGOs although smilingly apolitical sometimes receive 
funds from politically aware foreign agencies and in themselves, integrate politics and 
democracy activities in their programming. There is a gap however in studies investigating 
CSO activities which can significantly affect their effectiveness in democracy promotion 
which this study investigates.  
 
Forms of democracy assistance 
The extent of democracy promotion by international actors has increased through official 
democracy rhetoric by the government, diplomatic actions towards other countries and 
democracy funding (Bouchet, 2014). Political aid programs have become progressively 
sophisticated as democratic campaigns by Western governments gather force and 
effectiveness (Goldman & Douglas, 1988). To evaluate democracy promotion 
effectiveness, it is important to understand its mechanisms or basically understand how 
democracy is promoted. Donors or democracy promoters generally focus on legal 
frameworks, governance issues, election monitoring and observation, technologies, 
transparency, campaigning and international pressure when working in non-democracies. 
This section explains each procedure and outlines the role of donors in each process 
guided by the electoral cycle.  
 
The Election Cycle Components 
 
“While it remains emphatically true that, elections do not equal democracy‟— that there is 
much more to having democracy and making it work than free, fair, and truly competitive 
elections - it is also the case that institutionalizing free and fair elections, with rigorous and 
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effective electoral administration, is a crucial aspect of democracy. And over time, it will have a 
tonic effect on the governance problem” in Africa” 
(Diamond, 2009) 
 
To objectively evaluate the effectiveness of democracy promotion strategies in Africa, it 
is important to understand the relationship between elections and democracy. Why are 
elections a key component of democracy promotion, and what effect do elections have on 
democracy? Lindberg (2006) presents a positive analysis of African elections and its 
prospects of democracy based on an empirical analysis of observable election data 
compiled on the democratic quality of elections and the liberal democratic institution. He 
examines 16 variables on 232 African elections, to investigate the relationship between 
elections and democracy, and shows elections improve the quality of democracy. 
Lindberg (2006) states that, elections are neither the end of a transition process towards 
democracy nor merely formal procedures. This project sought to understand why foreign 
donors continue to fund elections that are almost always contested and what value if any 
they had to democratization. Lindberg’s findings address this query.  
 
According to Lindberg, the mere inception of multiparty elections in a country instigates 
liberalization. Participatory and contested elections are an institutionalized attempt to 
actualize the essence of democracy. Elections are the legitimate procedure for the 
translation of the rule by the people into workable executive and legislative power 
(Lindberg, 2006). Although, alone they are insufficient to constitute democracy, “Yet no 
other institution precedes participatory, competitive and legitimate elections in 
instrumental importance for self-government” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997).  
 
Below is a summary of Zimbabwe’s main political donors supporting activities facilitating 
or contributing to both political participation and contestation as indicated by interviewed 
respondents and available literature: 
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Donor Focus 
EU 
Democracy and Human rights especially 
in “difficult states” 
DFID 
Elections, Governance policy, Public-
sector reforms 
USAID 
Human Rights, Parliamentary 
Strengthening, Civil Society 
SIDA Human rights and Public administration 
DANIDA Human rights and conflict prevention 
AFD Governance and Justice 
HIVOS Human rights, Media, Civil society 
 
 
Electoral democratic processes follow a specific cycle of events which acted as a guide in 
the methodological design of this study as well as the literature review. Contrary to 
popular belief, electoral processes do not solely include Election Day or polling day 
activities but three periods — pre-election, election and post-election periods. Almost all 
major democracy promotion organizations are involved in most of these stages directly or 
indirectly. Organizations like NDI pride themselves in successfully promoting democracy 
in over 74 countries; being engaged with hundreds of parties promoting electoral integrity; 
organizing over 100 international election observation delegations; and playing a leading 
role in establishing standards for international election observation by 2003 (NDI, 2003). 
This diagram summarizes electoral cycle events guiding the operations of election 
stakeholders. It also summarizes how electoral democracy is promoted in Zimbabwe.  
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Source: IDEA, 2011  
Democracy promotion in Zimbabwe  
 
Legal Framework 
The pre-election period is the longest involving five main clusters of activities: the legal 
framework, planning and implementation, training and education, voter registration, and 
election campaigns. As part of the legal framework, donors support local organizations to 
advocate and lobby for an inclusive constitution or the introduction or review or electoral 
laws. Often this process begins with a review of the existing constitution in the custody of 
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local legal bodies. Political parties, rights groups and various stakeholder often present 
petitions to certain clauses they would want included or excluded from the constitution 
and essentially the need for a new constitution if any. A Referendum is then organized — 
this is an event similar to an election where the electorate directly votes on this proposal 
to change the constitution.  
 
Almost all actors including political parties and citizens are active from the grassroots to 
lobby for the vote and they vote without government interference however in most cases. 
Sometimes the vote is prescribed by the law and considered an expression of direct 
democracy. When the Referendum is voted for, in most instances, the constitution goes 
through a drafting process to introduce the new legal provisions and a draft constitution is 
produced. The draft is often presented before the electorate, then parliament and discussed 
again by the various stakeholders. Depending on the outcome, it is reedited or printed for 
presentation to the electorate. The changes in the voting system lobbied for by political 
parties, CSOs, NGOs, government and others become legislation and are then introduced 
and adopted in the new election process. The process can be lengthy requiring significant 
financial investments and is widely funded by international donors.   
 
Boundaries guiding the electoral process are then drawn as proscribed the new legislature 
and an election commission or electoral body is elected or nominated to oversee the 
implementation of the election process. The nomination of commission members is 
normally contested by local CSOs in non-democracies as they are usually nominated by 
the presidency hence accusations around their bias or lack of objectivity against opposition 
groups. At this point, electoral codes of conduct are discussed and agreed to by political 
parties and CSOs on regulations as stipulated by the constitution or electoral laws to guide 
their actions along the cycle. 
 
Planning and Implementation  
Stakeholders then initiate the planning process: this is the entrance point for most political 
aid donors. CSOs and political parties (particularly opposition) begin their planning and 
budgeting for presentation to donors. Donors assess proposals and announce decisions 
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depending on the needs and time. Recipients based on the funding or financing available 
begin to plan and implement their projects. Election calendars are generated outlining 
activities that also follow this election cycle as normally at this point, all actors are aware 
of the election date and plan accordingly. Participatory aspects of the democratic process 
normally come first e.g. advocacy and community outreach programs, conducted either 
by CSOs or government bodies.  
 
Unfortunately, in most developing countries, democratic activities take place around the 
same time before every election. This is a contributing failure to democracy promotion as 
will be explained in the findings (Ake, 1996). This is because, local governments do not 
devote specific funds for them and funding from foreign donors follows the same suit. 
However, looking at the amount of labor required for successful monitoring and 
observation before and during an election, it is understandable that, most stakeholders 
begin major recruitment processes at this point. It is necessary to map the whole country 
and investigate locations of past and future polling constituencies, wards and stations — 
based on findings from the previous election. The Commission through local governments 
recruits locals to do so. Based on this information, a list of provinces, cities, 
constituencies, wards and polling stations is finalized and gazetted for the electorate.  
 
Commissions begin recruiting Election day staff at each level, the majority being Polling 
agents responsible for monitoring voter activities on the day, including Voter’s Roll 
Inspectors, Biometric inspectors, Polling booth staff and Station leaders (responsible 
authority at that polling station). It is important to note that, as is the case in Zimbabwe 
and assumably most Sub-Saharan countries, because the Commission is a national or 
government linked body, most election staff are recruited from within government 
structures especially government school teachers. This has an effect on the objectivity of 
the process as will be explained in the findings. The Commission is mostly funded by the 
government and ‘neutral’ donors — principally international organizations e.g. the United 
Nations; Regional bodies e.g. Southern African Development Community (SADC); or 
Regional organizations with a particular focus on elections e.g. the Electoral Institute for 
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Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) who also provide Parliamentary support 
(Linz,1994).  
 
CSOs and NGOs on the other hand begin their recruitment processes around the same 
time. Lists of contacts are shared within their networks or partner organizations with 
contact details of potential volunteers — who in most authoritarian states are sympathetic 
or aligned to opposition parties. Positions include Long Term Observers (usually one 
person per constituency who is almost permanently observing political developments in 
his or her area and reporting to the deploying organization); Short Term Observers 
(recruited in the run-up to elections providing updates to the deploying organization on 
political developments their specific wards); Constituency Observers (normally one 
observer per constituency, responsible for responding to polling station observer’s needs 
on election day also observing and compiling reports on politically related incidents on 
Election day e.g. violence, victimization etc. as stipulated in the Code of Conduct, for the 
deploying organization); and Polling Station Observers (normally the biggest number 
deployed individually to specific polling stations on Election Day to report on polling 
incidents, times and activities). Collectively, about 5000 observers can be deployed by a 
single CSO on Election Day. The financial implications are high requiring external 
support especially in a country like Zimbabwe with at least 50 key CSOs involved in 
democracy and elections; with election budgets averaging at least US$ 1 million per 
organization. Due to economic hardships, members do not prioritize the payment of 
membership fees, leaving foreign donors to bare the costs.  
 
Political Parties also recruit Party Agents from their structures to carry out the same duties 
as Polling station observers, compelling reports and incidences noted during the voting 
process. However, depending on the country’s Political party’s financing laws, it is well 
known that most opposition parties are financed by foreign donors while the ruling party 
uses state funds to finance their election activities. Donors in authoritarian states like 
Zimbabwe face challenges of publicly financing opposition parties as they risk being 
accused of funding regime change. 
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These recruitment processes often parallel procurement and distribution processes of 
election materials — often the most expensive part of the electoral process, apart from 
recruitment and voter registration. Donors through their local election advising units 
advise on essential equipment and budgets, as miscalculations could affect the entire 
electoral cycle. With an emphasis on time and quality, CSOs and Election Commissions 
are educated on drafting procurement plans as part of donor electoral assistance 
programmes. Procurements of materials and expertise are guided by agreed methods 
guided by outlined legal and institutional frameworks. Based on the UNDP Electoral 
Assistance Implementation Toolkit (2010), election stakeholders should inform and agree 
with the Electoral Managing Body and donors on procurement requirements that must be 
followed and purchases of IT systems or new voter registration systems, should start as 
early as possible to maximize the time for system testing, procedural development, 
training, etc. as procuring major systems at the last minute maximizes costs, minimizes 
benefits and undermines sustainability. 
 
Based on UNDP’s toolkit the main areas of procurement include Election administration 
(hardware and software, vehicles, communication tools, printing services); Voter 
registration (hardware and software, means for printing and distributing registration 
forms, voter cards and data processing, other materials depending on the type of voter 
registration used — generally there are three types: manual and then computerized, use of 
an optical mark reader and then a scanner, or digital from the field to the database); 
Election day activities (means for printing and distributing ballot papers, ballot boxes, 
voting screens, indelible or invisible ink, tamper-proof materials, forms); and Results 
tabulation (software, results and media center hardware, other communications 
equipment). Logistics and security arrangements are made around the same time. Quoting 
Carothers (2009), democracy promotion has become a multi-million-dollar industry. 
 
Training and Education  
The operational training for election officials (government and NGOs) then begins along 
with civic education and voter information programs. These critical democratic 
procedures represent an eminent challenge to Africa’s democratization as they are meant 
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to be all year round but they are left to the election season. There is a gap in existing 
literature on democratization on this challenge, however the researcher believes to fully 
understand challenges of democracy promotion more studies are necessary on the 
shortcomings of civic education. According to the Electoral Knowledge Network’s 2013 
Civic and Voter Education guide, the electorate is informed of the “respective roles and 
responsibilities of citizens, government, political and special interests, the mass media, 
and the business and non-profit sectors, as well as the significance of periodic and 
competitive elections. It emphasizes not only citizen awareness but citizen participation 
in all aspects of democratic society”. Education and information can be shared by 
educational institutions, CSOs and national bodies.  
 
Voter Registration  
The Election Commission announces voter registration times and locations and based on 
the voter’s information, old voters verify registration details while new voters register with 
local wards. Voter registration is an essential component of any election and has been 
subject to manipulation by incumbents where the Voter’s roll is not updated; deceased 
voters’ information exists; or registered voters’ information is false or missing. Since 
Voter’s rolls are in the custody of the Election Managing Bodies, institutions have 
limitations ensuring its status, however CSOs and Political parties encourage electorate to 
check their names and confirm their wards before the election. The researcher believes 
Voter registration is just as important as Election Day as it determines the how successful 
the process will be. Democratic processes can be conducted to their best but without a 
clean Voter’s Roll: Democracy promotion will not promote democracy. As will be 
illustrated in the findings, Opposition Parties, Donors, CSOs and Observers have 
overlooked this process, hence their failure to unseat Authoritarians, who then they 
become increasingly desperate for power, employ sophisticated methods to shortchange 
democratic procedures.  
 
Nikuv International Projects, an Israeli firm manipulating voter registration, countering 
‘unfavorable’ results and ‘neutralizing’ opposition votes (DailyMail, 2013) is popular for 
servicing African incumbents with records manipulation software. The Chinese 
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government has also been accused for assisting in limiting access to information by 
providing jamming equipment to silence independent radio stations (DailyMail, 2013) for 
the transmission of election information. Internally governments use state machinery 
especially soldiers and police to register more than once in barracks to ‘double vote’. This 
has been a common complaint in a number of African countries, however there seems to 
be a gap in existing literature on such challenges.  
 
During or after registration, Election officials particularly Observers and Election 
Candidates - requiring access to polling stations and voting centers require Accreditation. 
Observers receive accreditation cards indicating an Identification number where 
necessary, full names, their capacity e.g. individual or organization and the affiliate 
organization name and the validity period. Accreditation is normally conducted by the 
Electoral managing body who in authoritarian states can employ government affiliated 
security or intelligence officials to vet observer names. Questionable individuals or 
organizations can be denied the opportunity to register directly or indirectly. The process 
can be clouded with a lot of bureaucracy to frustrate potential observers. Some major 
challenges however in developing countries are accreditation costs and the need to be 
affiliated. Smaller Opposition parties and CSOs operating with limited funds might field 
a limited number of observers as a result. Hence, foreign funds play a major role in 
sponsoring accreditation to ensure representative cross-country observation. The need to 
be affiliated limits independent observers who might have information on vote 
manipulation activities that they intend to verify or interested parties. This all contributes 
to the failure of successful democratization. 
 
Electoral Campaign  
At this point political parties begin to coordinate their campaigns in terms of time, routes, 
contacts, classifying constituencies (swing states or strongholds). Parties share nomination 
results with their constituencies and may educate voters about Election Day at this point. 
Government institutions including election managing bodies and CSOs educate parties on 
party finance and penalties attached if their breach. Opposition parties based on the 
national campaign finance laws approach foreign donors for technical and financial 
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support (Shugart, 1998). Although laws are stricter in authoritarian states, donors are 
accused of illegally financing opposition parties while rolling parties are accused of 
diverting government funds to do the same. Electoral codes of conduct and guidelines of 
media access are shared. Donors are actively involved in advising and funding opposition 
parties here. Depending on the time stipulated by the election commission, campaigns 
stop sometime before Election Day.  
 
Voting operations, election day and results verification 
The election period then begins on Election Day where voters go to their respective voting 
centers and cast their votes within the time stipulated by the electoral managing body. 
Normally anyone in line before the end of the voting period is allowed to vote. Depending 
on the number of voters, exceptions can be made and voting periods can be extended to 
the next day. Votes are then counted at the polling station in the presence of all observers, 
and results are written down and depending on the regulations — they may be posted 
outside the polling station for the public. Ballot papers are secured and transported. The 
verification of results is done normally at the collation center (provincial level), where all 
polling stations submit their ballot papers. Results are compiled and tabulated in the 
presence of observers and winners are announced by the Electoral Commission. 
Complaints and appeals are also launched if any and recounts if necessary are done.   
 
Post election  
The shortest and sometimes longest period — the post-election period begins where 
political parties and CSOs hold press conferences to update stakeholders (especially 
donors) on election day progress and their decisions to accept or dismiss official results. 
Afterwards audits and evaluations are done within stakeholders, where parties, CSOs and 
even donors report on activities and finances and appraisals are done. In preparation for 
the next election, voter lists are updated; institutional strengthening and professional 
development take place; legal reforms are made; and archiving of election documentation 
and research are done. At all these stages Donors are involved in advising, planning, 
strategizing and financing.  
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Democracy promoters also use other non-election related strategies to promote democracy 
including the establishment of international strategies as well as political conditionality 
and international pressure.  
 
International standards 
International actors additionally have the ability to enforce and change international 
standards. Traditionally the consolidation of global treaties or agreements on electoral 
rights in international and regional inter-governmental bodies has helped in keeping 
governments in check. These standards might be difficult to maintain given limitations 
around state sovereignty and also because developing nations especially African states 
have constantly been against the imposition of standard practices by developed or Western 
states. However, the Electoral Integrity Project (2014) found that appropriate standards 
for regulating aspects like campaign finance and campaign broadcasting are important and 
donors use these to foster accountability and transparency. 
 
Conditionality and International pressure  
Of the various forms of democracy promotion, political conditionality seems to be the 
most contentious democracy promotion strategy although sometimes the most effective 
and impactful. 
Economic conditionality popularized in the 1980s had dominated aid policy in multilateral 
and bilateral lending where recipient states had to adopt Structural Adjustment Programs 
introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). The 
relationship suggested donor superiority and dominance over recipients — mirroring 
power inequalities (Nelson and Eglinton, 1992). In the early 90s, most Western donors 
announced that future aid allocations would be commensurate with the extent to which 
beneficiaries had democratized. “They used a combination of the carrot (increased 
development assistance) and the stick (aid sanctions) to promote democratization in 
African countries” (Cheeseman, et al., 2013). Considered a rational choice mechanism by 
political scholars, conditionality maximizes the interests of the dominant state (donor), 
but if not packaged and delivered well can potentially reduce its effectiveness and the 
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speed of negotiation. Issues of state sovereignty are threatened by negative political 
conditionality and authoritarian regimes in particular are not receptive or willing to trade-
off, as they intend to maximize their gains. Colonial history complicates this strategy in 
relation to Africa as states might perceive the ‘stick’ an insult from former aggressors who 
might have otherwise ‘put them in the situation they are in’.  
 
As will be highlighted later, Hackenesch’s (2015) studies of negative conditionality in 
authoritarian Ethiopia and Rwanda by the European Union indicate, reducing or totally 
suspending development assistance - pending political or economic liberalization does not 
normally have an effect on the authoritarian regime, but on its people. Besides their pride 
and perhaps ratings internally, the costs are not too high for the incumbent. Where the 
leader has monopolized the state, it is a reason to stay in power and ‘protect’ its gains. We 
see this in the case of Zimbabwe where after suspending aid to the government and 
instituting ‘smart sanctions’ against its governing elites, by freezing their bank accounts 
abroad and denying them and their families visas to travel to Europe or North America; 
the government was angered and tightened its grip on the state (Grebe, 2010). In some 
cases, withholding of aid has been more effective in advancing democracy. For countries 
heavily dependent on aid or for leaders who cannot imagine a future without aid, political 
conditionality works. Malawi and Kenya have had such examples of leaders who bow to 
international pressure, resulting in democratic transfers of power — these cases will be 
explained in detail later (Crook, 1989).  
 
Countries with higher levels of democracy and good governance can be positively 
reinforced however with the ‘carrot’. Brown (2010) highlights this kind of ‘preferential 
treatment’ through the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which provides extra 
assistance to countries that meet a certain number of criteria. Political indicators include 
civil liberties and political rights, as well as voice and accountability. The MCA funds 
provide incentives for developing countries to reach the eligibility threshold on these and 
other indicators (Cheeseman, et al., 2013). Present day Kenya and Tanzania are cases of 
successful positive conditionality. The effects are obvious — economic development 
through increased trade, political alliances allowing for cooperation against forces like 
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terrorism and more. Economic conditionalities can provoke economic discontent spilling 
into demands for political reforms as was the case in Benin and Zambia in the early 1990s, 
where structural adjustment and economic austerity provoked trade unions and civil 
society on to the streets. This study contributes by investigating how much international 
pressure Zimbabwe and its government has been put under and the effectiveness of these 
sanctions on easing repression for political change. 
  
42 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Literature review  
Scholars until a decade ago had complained that democracy promotion had been largely 
neglected in the study of politics and international relations (Carothers, 2000). The field 
of democracy promotion had largely been dominated by development policy scholars who 
concentrated on the effectiveness of their strategies and the evaluation of development 
programs and their implementation. This has changed as what Wolff and Wurm (2010) 
refer to as a “democracy promotion industry” advances. “Academic research has begun to 
catch up with the growth of foreign and development policies explicitly aiming at the 
international promotion and protection of democratic regimes. Yet, what is still a largely 
unexplored desideratum is the challenge to theoretically grasp ‘democracy promotion’ as 
an aim and strategy of democratic foreign policies — that is, to embed empirical research 
on democracy promotion in theoretical perspectives on international relations” (Wolf and 
Wurm, 2011). This section explores key contributions by such scholars. It looks at various 
studies conducted mostly in Africa, on democracy promotion and the motivations, place 
and significance of democracy promotion. 
 
Western democracy promotion  
Democracy promoters implement strategies they perceive pro-democratic often based on 
their country’s experiences or donor's successes (Youngs, 2010). Nonetheless, 
democracy’s possibilities and challenges are relative and differ from one case to another. 
Similarities might exist where states have similar histories or are experiencing transition 
at the same time -- hence requiring different strategies (Dowding et al. 2001). This is 
because the US, for instance, promotes democracy in variegated cases from Zimbabwe to 
Peru, Tunisia to Mongolia, with varying political systems. The problem is, promoters tend 
to use similar approaches in all cases (Carothers, 1997). Carothers evaluated US 
democracy promotion strategies and found that US assistance programming is based on a 
set list of institutions and processes the US believe are the constituent elements of 
democracy or ‘desired endpoints’ for replication. Programs are designed to address gaps 
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between idealized endpoints and the actual socio-political state — “although US 
democracy assistance rests on a less clearly established model of democratization, it can 
be characterized as one of institutional modelling” (Carothers, 1997).  
 
Democracy promotion is not as successful today as strict modelling of US practices is 
risky in Africa where most governance systems were inherited from colonial Britain, 
France or Portugal. Copying the US judicial system for instance might not work. An 
alternative would have been to use recommendations from academic literature based on a 
variety of cases, however Carothers (1997) found, US projects use little if any reference 
or borrowing of concepts to academic writing. Academic studies explain internal causes 
and dynamics of transition processes but do not examine how external assistance can be 
applied to affect a political process according to Carothers. Moreover, “Even if academic 
studies do contain useful ideas for the practitioner about democratization, they present 
competing theories which the practitioner has little basis for choosing between”, Diamond 
notes that democracy is in recession and unpopular but Lindberg states there is a growing 
appreciation for democracy just that states are at different levels of transition and it might 
take long for one but less for the other. But according to Carothers “practitioners have a 
low tolerance for the political science jargon and …. Most US officials simply do not have 
the time to delve regularly into academic literature: their hours at work are filled with a 
series of pressing, short term bureaucratic tasks that render very difficult the possibility of 
trying to find and read the academic literature that might be relevant to their work”.   
 
Carothers (1997) found three positive strengths of US strategies: first, its undeniable 
common sense appeal as the strategies can be easily explained to a wide variety of persons 
e.g. “An accountable, competent legislature is a foundation stone of democracy: country 
Y’s parliament is weak, there we will help strengthen it”. The challenge is, the ‘blanket-
solution’ strategy cannot be guaranteed of success in all constituencies. Second, its broad 
based — inclusive nature, where they “need to do a bit everything on a fairly long menu 
of potential programme areas”. However, the ‘jack of all trades but master of none’ 
problem could potentially affect their effectiveness. Third, their strategies have the ‘useful 
quality of implicit certainty’ as promoters can go anywhere and quickly settle on a set of 
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democracy programmes (Carothers, 1997). But what about cases where they fail to adapt 
to local circumstances?  
 
Contrary, Carothers (1997) identifies four important weaknesses. First, that US strategies 
over-specify democracy ideas, applied everywhere but not universal. Carothers says this 
narrow minded or ‘hubristic belief’ — “America is the most democratic country in the 
world” in itself limits democracy assistance’s effectiveness. This challenge is endemic in 
other Western democracy promotion strategies though, like the German belief that the 
social-market approach is best for the third world or the British Westminster approach. 
Existing literature nonetheless does not explain whether a combination of all strategies in 
the same country at the same time is realistic.    
 
The second challenge is the missing link to power, as current democratization strategies, 
Carothers (1997) found “ignore the power relations that underlie and determine a 
country’s political life”. The basic functioning of political institutions depends on who 
shapes these sectors. Particularly in Africa, as will be expanded later; change can be 
extremely difficult. If the government or citizens have no will to change, despite donor 
efforts, transition maybe difficult. Verweij and Thompson (2006) highlight external 
actor’s tendency to prescribe plural and ‘clumsy’ solutions for complex problems in 
developing countries and end up ‘treating the symptoms rather than the causes’; yet the 
deeper causes of the failings are not considered. 
 
Third, Carothers (1997) found that with democracy in recession, promoter’s basic 
systemic strategy of ‘democratization as a naturalistic process’ in which “a political 
opening leads to elections and elections are followed by a period of consolidation in which 
governmental institutions are rationalized and democratized while civil society is 
strengthened and diversified” does not often occur today. Democratic transitions have 
stagnated or slid back and a ‘basic’ strategy of elections will not work. Carothers adds, 
without the will to reform and real space for CSOs to operate successful democracy 
promotion will not promote democracy. While this is true, successful democratic openings 
are being witnessed today -- are they not a reason to continue trying? 
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Carothers’ forth criticism is similar to that of the ‘democracy promotion — political versus 
development’ debate like Knack (2014) a Senior Research Economist for the World Bank 
conducted a multivariate analysis in a large sample of recipient nations over the 1975-
2000 period on the effectiveness of foreign political aid for democratization. Knack found 
that successful democratic reform must be linked to development cooperation and long 
term measures e.g. education and increased per capita incomes are necessary to improve 
socio-economic standards believed to adversely affect democratization. Carothers (1997) 
underscores the political-economic divide in Africa confirming Knack’s findings that 
social and economic development contributes to democratization, namely that promoter’s 
strategies should not be disconnected from economic concerns. He suggests agricultural 
programmes to give peasants a stronger stake in their land and if privatization programs 
that create new classes of small business owners could possibly empower citizens to freely 
participate in democratic processes. 
  
Cost to donors 
Wolff and Wurm (2011) caution democracy promotion might not be as effective in 
promoting democracy as donors have to look closer into the costs and benefits of 
democracy promotion as it also offers “important reasons to refrain from engaging in 
democracy promotion” (Mesquita and Downs 2006). They found that, because 
democratization is a complex and conflict ridden process, six challenges must be 
recognized. These are important to this study as they might explain some of the challenges 
to democratization problems in Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole. First, there is a time 
consistency problem: as democracy promotion is a “middle to long run endeavor and 
(potential) rewards do not come quickly, but costs are immediate” (Wolff and Wurm, 
2011). Most Western democratic leaders serve two terms at most and rationally want to 
leave a legacy. Promoting long term agendas might not serve that goal. This could explain 
why most democratization initiatives focus on electoral democracy as the results are short 
term than the process of deepening democratization.  
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Second, the results of democracy promotion are ‘not only delayed but highly insecure’. 
Actual costs to donors often exceed the intended as the introduction of new forms of 
governance requires time. After electoral victory, old systems have to be replaced by new 
ones and they are not guaranteed to succeed. Carothers (2002) and Schmitter (1995) in 
their research on democratization found that, “Democratization processes can have 
diverse outcomes and a stable liberal democracy is only one and perhaps rather unlikely 
result”. Third, potential rewards have to be weighed against potential costs that evolve 
from the risks inherent to the democratization process. Wolff and Wurm, (2011) argue 
that, external democratization has to come to greater benefits than those of international 
peace, trade and cooperation as the “value of democracy is heavily disputed for countries 
undergoing a process of regime change or remaining ‘stuck’ in a grey zone between 
autocratic and democratic rule” (Wolff and Wurm, 2011). This study hopes to find — if 
regime change in a foreign country offers direct and significant rewards to its sponsors. 
This shall be addressed later.  
 
Fourth, following this argument Schmitter et al. (1999) state “the net impact of external 
Democracy Promotion and Protection (DPP) upon democratization is likely to be only 
marginal in determining the outcome, and hence singularly difficult to measure and 
predict”. Since democratization is largely an internally driven process (depending on the 
willingness of domestic actors), the utilitarian approach might be wrong to assume 
external actors have the capacity to achieve with tangible results external regime change. 
So despite IDP efforts, if the recipient population is not willing or desperate enough to 
change, democratization will be challenging. Following this argument, Monten (2005) 
raises the fifth challenge of relative power where the success of foreign efforts “depends 
on drastic asymmetries in relative power capabilities between ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ 
countries”. If the donor is significantly more powerful over the recipient, the likelihood of 
a successful transition is higher. Lastly, the free-rider problem in international cooperation 
for democracy support can be a challenge. Normally several donor agencies contribute to 
the democratization of one country at once; the successful democratization of one country 
becomes a global public good any country can benefit from (democratic peace argument 
— by cooperating politically and economically, by not being threatened anymore). Hence 
47 
 
smaller donor agencies for example, wait for bigger ones to fund the programs first but 
claim credit for its success. So, Wolff and Wurm, (2011) suggest donors make selective 
incentives (side payments) or emphasize on close international coordination (burden-
sharing) that largely inhibits free riding. 
 
Democratic recession  
However, democratization scholars attribute the failures of democracy promotion to 
democracy’s recession. This means that, in spite of efforts and commitments made by 
donors and government agencies to democracy promotion globally, if democratization and 
democracy is not thriving, it is difficult to persuade the rest to accept it. Though 
acknowledging the moral obligation that advanced democracies have to spread democracy 
abroad, governance issues in recipient countries further complicate efforts. Democracy is 
at a “fragile and dangerous juncture” according to Diamond (1999) who conducted studies 
in Africa on challenges to democratization efforts. He suggests that, although Freedom 
House ratings do not indicate an improvement in freedom ratings, electoral democracy 
remains popularly preferred and people are demanding political accountability as never 
before, and there is much to celebrate. According to Diamond facilitating the 
extraordinary transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes and values requires 
serious commitments to support democrats and civil society to make a concrete impact 
through democratic and transparent elections and a stronger, more vigilant civil society.  
 
"Without international assistance of the kind that the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED) and other donors provide, many democratic nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, 
and independent media could not survive”. 
(Diamond, 2007) 
 
Sub-Saharan African countries that had democratized after independence are either in a 
period of stagnation as democratic systems are overthrown or quietly suffocated while the 
surviving ones function badly or are suppressed. Basic democratic values are respected in 
principle e.g. elections are held according to periods stipulated by constitutions; citizens 
can participate in referendum processes; they are allowed to demonstrate, assemble, 
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discuss; and courts are open to independent adjudication processes. However, the level of 
objectivity, freedom of bias, honesty and efficiency in all these processes has been highly 
questionable. Most political processes have become a formality and are under the control 
of a few powerful individuals mostly aligned to the ruling party; hence the label 
‘competitive-authoritarian regimes’ in recent political science literature. Diamond’s 
(2007) findings also indicate a lack or decline of trust in political and governmental 
institutions as citizens are disillusioned by corruption, mismanagement, and the abuse of 
power. Strands of hope from elections are loosened when former opposition parties turn 
out to be the same once in power.  
 
“There is a specter haunting democracy in the world today. It is bad governance — governance 
that serves only the interests of a narrow ruling elite. Governance that is drenched in 
corruption, patronage, favoritism, and abuse of power. Governance that is not responding to the 
massive and long-deferred social agenda of reducing inequality and unemployment and fighting 
against dehumanizing poverty. Governance that is not delivering broad improvement in people's 
lives because it is stealing, squandering, or skewing the available resources”  
(Diamond, 2007). 
 
According to Diamond, developing countries (in Africa, Asia and South America) 
experience different levels of democratic decay yet reflect a common problem — “where 
power confers virtually unchecked opportunities for personal, factional, and party 
enrichment, hence it is difficult if not impossible to sustain democratic rules of the game. 
The democratic spirit of elections drowns in vote-buying, rigging, violence, or all three”. 
These pathologies cannot be simply ‘cured with more medicine’ (democracy assistance), 
like corruption which is an endemic problem (deeply embedded in the norms and 
expectations of political and social life there) a “technical fix or political push” will not 
solve (Diamond, 2007). He suggests that donors directly aid local civic and political 
organizations to counter corruption and rule of law for revolutionary change. Diamond 
warns that, this strategy nonetheless can only work where there is political will to govern 
with a different logic: that values the provision of public goods. Furthermore, democracy 
promoters can only support but not drive the revolution; meaning bold diplomatic changes 
in methods and global institutions are imperative. Diamond likens the ‘titanic struggle’ of 
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International Democracy Promotion (IDP) to the battle between communism and freedom 
which can be won with a significant reduction in corruption to resuscitate democracy. 
 
Freedom house scales have been criticized by democracy scholars like Carothers and 
Diamond (2015) for lacking a workable, valuable methodology for evaluating the annual 
status of freedom and democracy. Diamond notes a methodological and substantive case 
for reworking their data suggesting the addition of transparency and the rule of law to the 
existing political rights and civil liberties based on his findings in Africa. He found, 
government integrity and accountability have been slipping since around 1999 due to bad 
governance — assaults on civil society; growing constraints on civil liberties; shrinking 
space for internet freedom and political pluralism. However, measuring transparency and 
the rule of law would be a difficult task given difficulties in agreement for standards of 
measurement. Constitutional progress had been made to formally limit presidential terms 
— mostly to two. However, 10 out of 49 Sub-Saharan countries today still have no 
presidential term limits, on average at least two decades after independence.  
 
Where term limits exist as ascribed by the constitution e.g. Equatorial Guinea, Angola, 
Cameroon, Uganda, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Chad, Eritrea and Gambia, these countries are 
all led by long serving leaders who constantly defy presidential term limits (Gyimah-
Boadi, 1991). President Museveni of Uganda just won the highly contested presidential 
elections and has been in office since 1986 on 5-year term limits after contesting the 7th 
time on a constitution that clearly stipulates a 2 term maximum. When asked during an 
interview why he is running yet his time is up responded “there are no term limits in 
Uganda…this is why the people keep voting for me” (Museveni, 2016). The issue of 
presidential terms has caused public protests in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo 
and in 2014 led to the ousting of Compaore - long-time leader of Burkina Faso (BBC, 
2016). Some have a long way to go when considering electoral democracy like The 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya and Burkina Faso where less than 37% of the 
voting age population on average are registered to vote. Ironically Zimbabwe, Uganda, 
Angola, Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic and Mozambique have over 80% voters 
as percentage of the voting age and yet still hold most of the least accepted elections. 
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Where democratic progress has been made e.g. through the encouragement of 
participation in exercising rights to vote, citizens are robbed of their choices. Ghana the 
oldest independent African country is still not considered a full democracy almost six 
decades now.  
 
When democracy promotion was popularized in the 80s and 90s two categories of 
countries existed the ‘post-breakthrough countries’ (significant political opening) and 
‘pre-breakthrough countries’ (still authoritarian) (Carothers, 2007). In post-independence 
African states, democracy promoters simply encouraged the transition dynamic while 
assisting pre-independent states to transition, hence donors made significant progress 
there. Today nonetheless, a fraction of post-breakthroughs has maintained their 
democratic status with many remaining in the grey-zone between consolidated democracy 
and full dictatorship; some like Zimbabwe are semi-authoritarian “resisting or distorting 
reform processes to block democratic progress” (Carothers, 2007). 
 
The problem is that in the post-independence period, most if not all Sub-Saharan states 
held competitive democratic processes guided by well written constitutions. But getting 
into their third terms, power struggles led to a decline in democratic standards. This was 
the case in two of the three cases investigated in this study - Zimbabwe and Tanzania. The 
two served as examples of democratic accomplishment in the 80s and 90s but have since 
been criticized for failing to uphold quality governance and democratic processes. 
Ethiopia having experienced internal revolutions and wars has developed into a full-
fledged authoritarian state. Quantitatively, these cases contribute to global democratic 
recession but specifically democratic recession in Sub-Saharan Africa as summarized by 
Freedom House in the graphs below. This takes place at a period when on average 
developed economies have increased commitments for democracy promotion abroad 
averaging US$ 2 billion per annum according to USAID. Why then have such 
commitments not led to the advancement of democracy? Does democracy promotion 
actually promote democracy? Or can democracy work in Africa?  
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Source: Freedom House (2014), Sub-Saharan Africa Fact Sheet 
 
Democratisation by elections 
Part of this project’s aim was to investigate why donors continue to fund democratization 
in cases where progress is slow. However, Lindberg (2006) in his quest to investigate the 
role of election in democratization in Africa found that it is not how many times elections 
fail to unseat authoritarians or result in extreme political transformation but that repetition 
of elections (even when flawed) builds a democratic culture and its repetition deepens 
democracy. As mentioned earlier most African countries are in their third decade of 
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electoral practice, but their regimes remain the same and freedoms in their societies 
continue to wane. Lindberg states that electoral activities create “incentives for political 
actors by fostering the expansion and deepening of democratic qualities in society” 
(Lindberg, 2006). As leaders are continuously held accountable through elections, they 
are stimulated or induced to change. Although this researcher believes this is only relevant 
for leaders with a will to change. For those without, elections act as a reinforcement 
mechanism or validation process and only encourage polarization and tension with those 
who oppose them. This is not to deny that elections have power to transform societies, but 
there are exceptions. Certainly the practice of election processes listed above ensures that 
citizens keep candidates in check.  
 
Hope lies in the survival of electoral democracy decades after its establishment in Africa’s 
former colonies; as Lindberg (2006) theorizes “complete breakdowns of new electoral 
regimes, when they occur typically happen short after first elections, by the second or third 
elections regimes are highly likely to survive.” The fact that authoritarians continue to 
allow electoral conduct means there is hope for democratization. As more and more CSOs 
are formed and continuously demand the respect of constitutional guidelines and respect 
for the will of the people. Lindberg (2006) adds that a series of elections not only 
contributes to increasing the democratic quality of a regime but also broadens and depends 
civil liberties in the society, so elections are a set of factors with causal effects — “the 
process of holding an uninterrupted series of de sure participatory, competitive and 
legitimate elections not only enhances the democratic quality of the electoral regime but 
also has positive effects on the spread and deepening of civil liberties in society”.  
 
Related to Rustow's (1970) argument that democratic behavior produces democratic 
values and not the other way round, Lindberg supports constant efforts made by the 
international community to pressure non-democratic regimes to accept democracy as the 
only mode of governance claiming the process of democratization is not about how long 
it takes but how deep it is established and consolidated in a society. Creating incentives 
and disincentives such as elections fosters democratic behavior that in turn leads to a more 
democratic culture. The results in better quality democracy and a culture of accountability 
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and participation; hence the theoretical argument — “repetitive elections even though 
flawed are one of the causal factors in democratization” (Lindberg, 2006). From 
Lindberg’s findings, democratization policy point of view, democracy promotion does 
promote democracy and validates the international community’s focus on elections for 
democracy enhancement. Elections are an effective mode of effecting democratization or 
‘positive changes’ (Lindberg, 2006). The benefits are incremental and if continuously 
implemented will result in political transformation, consequently refuting claims on the 
inefficiency of democracy promotion institutions for democratization. This study assumes 
it is for this reason that donors continue to fund democracy even when the progress is 
unimpressive.  
 
Lindberg therefore concludes, “Elections do not signal the completion of the transition to 
democracy but rather foster liberalization and have a self-reinforcing power that promotes 
increased democracy in Africa’s political regimes” (Lindberg, 2006) meaning, Zimbabwe 
will become democratic if it continues to uphold electoral practices. The fact that elections 
have not resulted in power transfer does not mean democracy promotion has failed. To 
this study’s previous assumption that after a certain period, donors might need to realize 
elections have failed to democratize a society, African ‘political renewal’ (Gyimah-Boadi, 
2004) takes different paths and varies in the time it takes. Lindberg (2006) therefore 
suggests the need for international community to sustain support to transitional countries 
over an extended period — typically 12-15 years. This means the dramatic political 
reforms we are witnessing across the continent signal an appreciation for transformation 
— which is an important platform based on Lindberg’s findings.  
 
According to Ihonvbere (2003), Africa’s democratic transition cannot be compared due to 
its unique background and past experiences, its post-colonial account of ‘brutal 
dictatorships, predatory regimes, military juntas and one-man 'misrule’ have negative 
consequences coupled with ‘conditions of dependence, foreign domination, structural 
distortions, underdevelopment, weak state structures and the politicization of the national 
question’ does not make governance in postcolonial societies easy (Appiah-Thompson, 
2015). This is true, but how can the efficient democratization of former Asian countries 
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like India, Japan and Malaysia be explained; or African countries like South Africa and 
Namibia? And, how adequate is history to explain the inability to conduct agreed 
processes free of fraud. Before investigating democratic quality, the occurrence of ‘free 
and fair’ elections in Zimbabwe has been rare. Countries experiencing ethnic or regional 
tensions, rampant clientelism and limited democratic experience are able to hold 
successful electoral processes, in a poor an underdeveloped country (Sandbrook, 1996). 
Being so, history is not an excuse, although theorists like Carothers states that elections 
are largely insignificant to democratize.  
 
Lindberg (2006) cautions that the role of elections in democratization does not mean 
elections are the only important factor in expanding civil liberties and democracy; 
however, they have so far not received adequate recognition in the literature. Thus his 
creation of a comprehensive empirical data set of all elections in Africa from 1989 - 2003, 
chronicling democratic qualities of the elections and testing generalizations made in 
earlier studies on the development of African politics. His desegregation of more than 40 
African cases and his evaluation of different methodological approaches to the study of 
elections there leads him to challenge existing pessimism on the state of democracy in 
Africa, as he claims scholars of African politics study single cases and make 
generalizations that democratization has failed but his wholesome study shows renewal 
and progress. Lindberg also argues that existing studies on transitions to democracy and 
election in Africa have fallacies inherent in their focus on ‘founding elections’ and not 
recent ones and that those are cannot adequately explain the current state of democracy. 
His findings show ‘first elections’ were not necessarily founding but steps in transitioning 
towards democracy and these elections indicate their reinforcing and self — improving 
quality. But, the gap in Lindberg’s findings are: if democracy takes root after a sequence 
of three electoral cycles, what about countries like Zimbabwe almost in their tenth election 
but experiencing deepening authoritarianism. Instead this study finds that repetitive 
electoral practice can lead to competitive authoritarianism.  
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Competitive authoritarianism  
The repetition of elections can have unintended effects where elections enhance 
authoritarianism as argued by Levitsky and Way (2010) and incumbents “combine 
electoral competition with new forms of autocratic rule”. Developments in Zimbabwe and 
at least half of Africa contradict the assumption that a country’s movement from strict 
authoritarian rule means a transitioning towards democracy. As will be explained in the 
findings, this study finds that democracy promotion through its quest for repetition for 
perfection through elections might be facilitating and deepening the problem of 
competitive authoritarian regimes. Answering the research question: yes, democracy 
promotion does promote democracy, but is increasingly promoting a different political 
model - competitive authoritarianism.  
 
Often a country’s level of democracy is measured by the ability to hold transparent or less 
contested elections under a conducive environment that enables competitors and voters to 
express themselves fully. The problem is authoritarians have mastered this as an avenue 
for accommodation on the global political arena and importantly (in developing 
countries): as an avenue for aid. In turn, the practice dilutes or compromises future 
democratic standards (mentioned earlier - e.g. competitive authoritarian or pseudo 
democracies). These terms all limit democracy to elections which is not an adequate 
representation, but are nonetheless important in understanding the development of 
democracy in Africa. From the studies carried out in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania, it 
is evident that most democracy promotion activities in Africa are nurturing such 
democracies. As donors increase pressure on authoritarian regimes to conform to 
democratic norms by various forms especially ‘conditionality’ (the carrot and stick 
practice), more and more competitive regimes are developing. Non-democracies will 
experience prolonged periods of ‘controlled’ transition (Diamond, 2014) as they use 
elections as a legitimizing tool and make it difficult for any institution to hold them 
accountable. This idea is investigated based on the works of Zakaria (1997), Levitsky and 
Lucan Way (2002). 
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Elshtain (2007) on the other hand agrees that the commitment to democracy and human 
rights must not waver but states; its “tensions and complexities” must be discussed 
“critically and candidly”. Linked to the problem of hybrid democracies, Elshtain’s study 
of democracy promotion found — democracy promotion based on Western democracy 
translates to a triumphant ‘majority vote’ above all others — a scenario potentially 
yielding plebiscitary authoritarianism and is the case with emboldened African 
authoritarians. Another challenge she says is the practice of coupling democracy with 
human rights and internal measures that divide and check power which is ‘worse’. 
Democracy assigns a great deal of power to the leader and “power in human hands will 
ever be abused” since, when promoters emphasize on the “will of the people,” Elshtain 
says,” will" in politics tends to promote intolerance and turns the opposition to enemies; 
so it is better to speak of “interests, concerns, ideals, even dreams” instead. She however 
adds that democracy not a sacrosanct principle but the best devised for freedom, human 
dignity and fairness so far hence the need to spread it. 
 
“As China continues to grow at its pace and hard-liners retain control over Chinese policy, by 
midcentury China will oppose democratisation around the word, control information about 
China available globally through censorship of the Internet and influence over mass media and 
intimidate critics by means of cyberattacks and the withholding of economic favours"  
(Pilsbury, 2015) 
 
The rise of China, its increasing global influence and its strengthened partnership with 
African authoritarians further complicates the future of Western democratic consolidation 
in Africa. This study also proposes that the more China increases its influence under 
authoritarian rule and prospers, the more it is a model for other authoritarians and the 
lesser the value authoritarians place on Western democracy. Furthermore, the more 
developed democracies impose conditions for development cooperation the lesser they are 
attractive to authoritarian states. The more China cooperates with the outlying or isolated 
authoritarians (under severe sanctions), the lesser the pressure for democratic reform. Or 
rather, as Western support becomes less important so will the need for authoritarian 
regimes to democratize. Also as developing economies advance (such as BRICS’ Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa), they become stronger in their defense for 
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sovereignty and are less receptive to international pressure to democratize (Zakaria, 2003). 
And, as the West loses its hegemony to China, the lesser will be its influence on 
authoritarian states to democratize. The more the pressure to conform to Western 
democratic values, the greater the growth of hybrid regimes or pseudo democracies. 
 
Democratization in Africa  
Nevertheless, Lewis (2015) studies of democracy assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
indicate a remarkable process of democratic progress. He claims there is “abundant 
evidence across Africa” highlighting subsequent transitions in Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and briefly in Mauritania (Lewis, 2015). Lewis in 
opposition to the notion that democracy is in recession as argued by Diamond and 
Carothers attributes democratic success in these countries to Western democracy 
promotion efforts. Lewis confirms there is a missed picture to an extent and different 
trends of readings of the evidence that democracy promotion promotes democracy. The 
third wave of democratization that traversed the globe also landed rather forcefully in 
Africa in the 1990s after the subsidence of the first wave, but it continues to face 
democratic pressures. According to Lewis, early pressures for democratization were 
exerted in no small degree by foreign donors partnered with powerful domestic forces. He 
found that in all these successful cases of democratization, besides international pressure 
and economic distress were some of the domestic factors that acted as major contributors. 
Lewis (2015) adds that poor performance by authoritarian regimes instigates citizens to 
rise up and demand regime change. However, what is missing is an explanation for cases 
like Zimbabwe where incumbent’s poor performance and international pressure does not 
result in regime change.  
 
The subject of democracy is often pessimistic when discussed or investigated in the 
African context, however Diamond (2015) adds to Lewis argument highlighting recent 
developments in countries like Nigeria where democracy is revived (a development 
formerly thought impossible) as a result of societies uniting, rising and organizing 
themselves from grassroots to renew democratic possibilities and promises and 
successfully organize elections with foreign support to unseat long standing leaders and 
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parties. Nigeria’s incumbent government lost to opposition after several electoral attempts 
and peacefully handed over power. Outside Africa, dictatorships and corrupt kleptocratic 
leaders have been replaced by democratically elected candidates as seen in Sri Lanka and 
Taiwan. Meaning there is hope against evidence of a recession that democracy could have 
a new lease of life in countries where citizens were increasingly pessimistic. Diamond 
(2015) on progress in Nigeria suggested that the world be open to and strategize about 
ways to achieve renewed democratic progress and unexpected breakthroughs with a 
renewed sense of commitment and purpose in terms of promoting democracy. He stresses 
the importance of global factors and the role of the US and other major democracies in 
helping to create a facilitating global normative climate for democracy — and 
international pressures: diplomatically, economically, assistance through aid and 
democratic programming to advance democracy’s Third Wave.  
 
According to Lewis (2015), it is incontrovertible that there has been a degree of 
institutionalization of some forms of electoral democratization across Africa and attributes 
these successes to democracy promoters who have been undervalued in democracy 
literature. Many governments have had multiple electoral cycles, diversification of 
political parties increased in competition. He found that, with this political opening has 
also come (even in some hybrid regimes and in some regimes which are still regarded as 
authoritarian) an opening of political space across Africa. Lewis, 2015 found that, there is 
more room for civic organizations, political associations, for unguarded speech, social 
media and independent electronic and print media. Furthermore, donors have led the 
facilitation of a broad opening of political discourse. Africa has a large emerging middle 
class which is rising to demand a voice and there is stronger civil society than before in 
most of Sub-Sahara Africa. Lewis (2015) identifies positive changes in media coverage 
led by a social media transformation which gives a certain cover to people and a certain 
degree of anonymity as well as an explosive growth of telecommunications which has 
been a vehicle for expansion of discourse.  
 
There is a downside however as Lewis findings indicate stagnation and backsliding on 
some democratic elements. Lewis states that, despite IDP efforts, it is equally undeniable 
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that democratic performance and its institutions in particular have not necessarily 
followed suit. Highlighting problems of executive discretion and clientelism which are 
still widespread and dominant not just in authoritarian states but in many electoral regimes 
too; Lewis (2015) found, legislatures are often self-interested and self-dealing and not 
very good transmission vehicles for aggregating popular interest or moving much 
legislation — although they are adept at increasing their own salaries. Political parties 
have evolved in many of these countries into dominant parties that compete but scarcely 
have any fear of losing or diminishing their role, representing few elites (Lewis et al. 
2013).  
 
Lewis found — on democratic performance, governance problems are both qualitatively 
and quantitatively mixed as indicated by the Afrobarometer (a comparative series of 
national public attitude surveys on democracy, markets and civil society in Africa and 
Public opinion), indicators from Freedom House on African politics. He highlights three 
challenges to democratization in Africa. First, the problem of accountability where 
particularly in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa - an abundance of transparency is clouded 
by limited accountability, where we know much more today than we did 10 or 15 years 
ago about corruption, malfeasance, misuse of public finances, closed door deals and how 
things go wrong behind doors of official power: thanks to a “constant stream of 
information through various local transparency organizations or initiatives” including 
multiple parties and civil society, although, a few have been prosecuted, ousted, jailed or 
in other ways held accountable (Lewis, 2012).  
 
So local transparency without accountability is a severe challenge to democratic progress. 
Second, economic growth without inclusion and prosperity is linked to inequality, or what 
he considers ‘elite democracies’. This is a problem because some segments of society are 
excluded from development due to a lack of corresponding spread of economic gains in 
tandem with the political equalization conferred by citizenship and the vote (Lewis, 2015). 
Lewis equates unequal democracies to highly corrupt, extractive and dominant 
democracies and reiterates Carothers’ concerns that such local issues are difficult for 
external actors to solve. Linked is the third problem of public goods, where basic services, 
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infrastructure, broad qualities of the rule of law which he says are better served in many 
Sub-Saharan countries than they were under authoritarian regimes, but are still grossly 
inadequate to provide basic education, public health, essential foundations of 
infrastructure for sustained economic growth.  
 
To the question of whether there is a democratic recession in Africa Lewis et al. (2012) 
state that, there are very mixed signals. They believe, though Freedom House ratings show 
somewhat of a recession evident in declines in Central and Eastern Africa since 2003, 
advances in Southern and West Africa have been made. Similar to Lindberg’s (2006) 
claims that “even when elections left a lot to be desired in terms of freedom and fairness, 
the process of repeated competitive elections tended to generate momentum for greater 
democratization”; Lewis found that, despite some ‘quantitative’ subsidence in the quality 
of democratic performance in the last five years (Freedom House, 2014), by the same 
token according to Afrobarometer scales, public attitude data showed both a frustration 
with poor performance but a resilience in commitment to democracy. Concluding that 
domestic and foreign assistance’s continued persistence on democratic norms, coupled 
with continued resilience of electoral regimes and democratic preferences (as reflected in 
the opinion data across the region) has resulted in successful turnovers in Zambia, Malawi, 
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal. Lewis (2015) also applauds peaceful and successful 
legal successions after the death of leaders in Zambia and Malawi which a decade ago was 
a common cause for war.  
 
Still, the countervailing role of civil society; emerging and rising middle classes in many 
of the better performing African countries; and a constructive role of diasporas is very 
encouraging. Van Donge et al. (2012) believe the ‘degree of shifting norms’ on the 
continent as expressed through regional initiatives such as the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the African Union (AU) and others gives hope that there 
is change and locals realize and are in charge of their initiatives for change. They 
recapitulate international actor’s efforts have significantly contributed to Africa’s 
democratic progress but setbacks are mostly internal and can mostly be solved by 
domestic efforts (Hackenesch, 2015). 
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Compliance for change  
On the other hand, on conditionality as a strategy to encourage political reform in 
authoritarian states; from an international relations perspective, democracy promotion 
strategies have been explained by three main theories — compliance, international 
socialization and conditionality. Compliance has been a key factor often connecting 
policies and issues of human rights with democracy promotion. The increasingly 
multipolar nature of politics involving state and non-state actors allows states to include 
issues championed by non-state-actors (NGOs mostly) for use as conditions to advance 
political transitions. The Reagan administration considered democracy a pre-condition for 
human rights and developments to date take human rights as a pre-condition for 
democracy. Pressure is put by Western donor agencies on recipient governments insisting 
on the upholding of human rights causing a “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
Here donors and transnational advocacy networks have most influence in an ascending 
order on agenda-setting, state discourse, institutional procedures, and state behavior, 
giving them power to influence change.  
 
Compliance is linked to the idea of international socialisation, a rationalist approach to 
explaining the need for states to adhere to liberal international human rights and 
democracy norms through a process of reinforcement, whose effectiveness depends on the 
balance between the international and domestic costs and benefits of compliance over an 
extended period of times (Schimmelfennig, 2004). Conditionality, though considered to 
have failed to produce sustained compliance in anti-liberal regimes, has been a key 
strategy in maintaining international pressure in democracy promotion. Of the 
international dimensions of democratization, negative political conditionality is most 
common, seen as imposition of sanctions or rewards. Whitehead (2001) categorizes 
methods of democracy promotion into three-incorporation, invasion, and intimidation and 
conditionality involves the third. Because coercion does not require the consent of the 
domestic actors, it is not surprising that powerful states employ it as a democracy 
promotion strategy. 
 
Nonetheless as Magen and McFaul (2009) suggest, this research rather than focusing on 
the international relations theoretical aspects of democracy promotion focuses on the 
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‘logics, targets and pathways of influence’ by international donor agencies. They however 
help explain the variances and commonalities in donor practices based on their interests. 
A common question is: to what extent can external agencies influence the processes of 
democratization in aid recipient countries (Crawford, 2001). How legitimate is the 
practice of conditionality? Should donors impose conditions? Furthermore, scholars like 
Knack (2004) based on his findings on economic aid and democratization states that 
economic aid is a better strategy for democracy promotion and coupled with political 
conditionality is guaranteed to advance democratization. An interesting perspective when 
studying third world cases. Controversially, donor states have enacted laws to stamp their 
commitment to democratization through legislature, bills, and acts — “tying aid to 
performance on political standards”. Western donors especially the US often condition 
general budget support on performance evidenced by the US administration’s addition of 
Section 116 to their Foreign Assistance Act, conditioning aid particularly to the respect of 
human rights (Knack, 2004). 
 
Authoritarianism and conditionality  
The European Union (EU) has actively been involved in African democratization 
processes since the early 2000s through the provision of financial and technical 
inducements as well as disincentives like sanctions. Hackenesch (2015) in her studies of 
EU democracy promotion initiatives in Africa found, it had made considerable efforts in 
establishing elections, growing and nurturing democratic culture, fostering civil society, 
supporting multi-party democracy and pressurizing incumbents to change. Nonetheless, 
the Union’s efforts through the imposition of political conditionality as well as those of 
other international actors there, were limited by power for external actors’ force reforms 
in dominant party systems. “Conflicting donor interests and insufficient donor 
coordination have been blamed in previous studies for limiting successes of 
conditionality” (Crawford, 2001) while research on authoritarian regimes has long 
concentrated on the domestic factors of authoritarian longevity while neglecting the 
effects of political conditionality in authoritarian regimes (Hackenesch, 2015). Scholars 
like Wright (2009) who claim general development aid contributes to democratization in 
authoritarian regimes with a large ruling coalition inspired Hackenesch’s investigation of 
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the efficacy of negative conditionality (especially sanctions) in authoritarian regimes, with 
particular attention to recipient states of Ethiopia and Rwanda. The dominant party 
systems in these cases have occasionally been forthcoming in engaging with EU on 
democratic reforms since 2000 despite their dependence on EU aid. Hackenesch also 
investigates Cornell’s (2012) findings that democracy aid seems to have a positive effect 
only in single-party regimes; no effect could be detected for dominant party systems.  
 
The EU has not resorted to sanctions in Rwanda and Ethiopia but combined development 
aid, democracy aid and dialog to support political reforms (Hackenesch, 2015). She found 
positive changes in Rwanda’s attitude and response to international demands as early 2000 
but has readily done so to date and sometimes “proactively” by engaging with the EU. 
Ethiopia however has “remained highly reluctant to engage on political reforms and only 
became more forthcoming in 2011” (Hackenesch, 2015). The differences in the 
willingness of African authoritarian regimes to effectively engage and implement foreign 
political changes lie in the “interplay between the government and (potential) opponents” 
according to Hackenesch (2015). This interaction created opportunities for the EU and 
other donors to support democracy and counter authoritarianism. Where authoritarians 
cannot permit higher levels of political liberalization and uses high-intensity coercion, EU 
sometimes exerts pressure “however, at times when the government has more leeway to 
engage and to allow for political liberalization, the EU has difficulties using the 
opportunity to promote reforms” (Hackenesch, 2015).  
 
The EU has shifted it democratic promotion strategies from aid and conditionality as 
sanctions were simply ‘reactive instruments’ through responding to complex problems of 
human rights abuse and political closure. Its policies have shifted to ‘respond to imminent 
political crises, support slight political openings and prevent degradations in political 
liberalization’ (Hackenesch, 2015). The Union claims to have successfully used ‘aid 
negotiations’ with authoritarian regimes to raise the prominence of political reforms. 
Progress on democratic reforms is now a key criterion in deciding on the allocation of aid 
through the European Development Fund (EDF), according to the Cotonou Agreement 
signed between the Union and African, Caribbean, and the Pacific Group of States (ACP) 
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in 2000. Conditionality therefore sets ‘direct incentives’ for reforms as theorized by Beck 
& Conzelmann (2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU’s strategies to promote democratic reforms. Source: Hackenesch, (2015) 
 
Hackenesch (2015) also found budget support strategies of democracy promotion allow 
for dialog between donor and recipient on reforms and incentivizes for change. There is a 
considerable amount of literature indicating the effectiveness of incentives for change in 
developing countries, which depending on the circumstances have an impact on dominant 
systems. Failed political conditionality has provided a number of lessons to donors who 
now increasingly see aid as a leverage to induce or support governance reforms in 
recipient countries according to Molenaers (2012). EU’s 2006 governance incentive 
tranche provides additional financial incentives for authoritarians to engage in and grow 
democratic governance cultures added to their “increase in aid” (Hackenesch, 2015). As 
mentioned earlier, political science scholars criticize donors uncoordinated approach to 
governance issues emanating from conflicting interests hence the EU’s ‘aid coordination 
dialogs’ among donors for effective democratization. Hackenesch (2015) as well as 
Schimmelfennig et al. (2005) theorize that, conditionality or international pressure are 
only effective where the regime is willing to engage the donor and that active engagement 
with recipient governments is imperative.  
 
Hackenesch, (2015) concludes, the EU and other donors face tough choices when 
engaging with dominant party systems which have strongly entrenched themselves in 
power. EU’s combination of development aid, democracy aid, and dialog for democracy 
promotion has received varied responses in both Ethiopia and Rwanda forcing them to 
adjust their strategies. “The Rwandan government willingly and at times proactively 
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engaged with the EU on political reforms, the Ethiopian government was quite reluctant 
and sometimes even unwilling to engage”. When authoritarians face intense international 
pressure, “Target coercion at the broader society and use high-intensity coercion” and are 
unwilling to engage on political reforms. However, when faced with intra-party defections 
they tend to be under pressure and willing to engage with the EU on political reforms if 
incentives are high (Hackenesch, 2015). The findings also indicate - the EU is “ill-
equipped” to respond to this dynamic and take advantage of rolling party splits and their 
weakness to resist aid. This is an important aspect for this study as Zimbabwe is faced 
with mass culling party defections while faced with international sanctions. Hackenesch, 
(2015) suggests, “Policy-makers and academics pay more attention to periods when the 
ruling elite splits or when members of the ruling elite defect and when governments use 
low-intensity coercion to minimize challenges to political survival” this is the period 
Zimbabwe is in and this study will fill this gap with the Zimbabwean example as she found 
implications for the effectiveness of political conditionality have rarely been explored. 
Hackenesch’s attempts are positive developments in explaining the effectiveness of 
conditionality for democracy promotion strategies in authoritarian systems but academic 
studies on cases where all the criteria are met but the country remains closed given 
differences among dominant party systems are lacking.  
 
Accordingly, the next chapter is an analysis of democratization in Africa as well as a 
contextual investigation of Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania (case selection). 
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Chapter 4  
 
Africa  
The earlier chapters explored the various dimensions, concepts and academic 
interpretations of democracy and democracy promotion. This chapter looks into 
democratic progress in the context of Africa and includes an empirical analysis of 
developments in Zimbabwe.  
 
After experiencing what Larry Diamond refers to as its "second liberation" opening up 
new prospects for democratic development on the continent (Diamond, 2007), electoral 
democracy in Africa started gaining popularity from the late 1950s as countries engaged 
in struggles for independence. However, even before that countries like Senegal in 1848 
already conducted elections for parliamentary representatives to the French parliament 
due to their successful assimilation into the system. The democracy concept was a form 
of tutelage by the colonial masters in preparation for independence. It is important to note 
that these elections just before and not long after independence were considered peaceful, 
free and fair. 
 
Shortly after their independence, most African states remained democracies, enjoying 
high levels of public participation, respect of fundamental freedoms and free; but by the 
late 1980s few democracies remained. By the time mature democracies declared their 
commitment to democracy promotion as part of their aid packages to African countries, 
cracks in their political systems were becoming visible though some African democracies 
remain resilient. According to a report by the World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (WIDER) in 2013, despite its enormous natural resources, Sub-Saharan Africa 
remains the most aid dependent region to date with four times as much foreign aid as a 
share of gross national income as the next most dependent region - North Africa and the 
Middle East (Resnick, 2013).  
 
Later, democratic establishments, at least in terms of electoral politics and constitutional 
changes of government had become common. Many countries (those that had gained 
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independence early) were into their second or third round of multiparty elections, while 
others struggled with authoritarian rule and even autocratic tendencies in some of the new 
democracies. Weak state institutions, lack of experience with and commitment to 
democratic procedures and intense political rivalries (often ethnic) led to the premature 
death of democratic structures in Africa (Cheeseman, et al., 2013). Repeatedly, success 
stories of democracy assistance efforts have been ruined by authoritarian backsliding, 
military coups and the resumption of civil wars. Some new democratic regimes over the 
last three decades have been replaced by single-party regimes and some have been 
overthrown internally mostly through coups setting stage for military dictatorships. This 
has resulted in several intra and interstate wars. At this point the future of democracy was 
seriously questioned. Clearly, the trajectory of this wave of democracy in Africa has been 
quite complex and uneven (Diamond, 1999).  
 
Even the few democracies in Africa are still fragile, particularly electoral democracies. 
After their independence, a number of African countries in the 1990s transitioned from 
one party state to multi-party regimes becoming ‘electoral democracies’. They held 
regular elections that were considerably ‘free’ and ‘fair’; multiple parties could compete; 
and opposition parties competed on relatively equal playing fields. Unfortunately, since 
this positive development, at least 13 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have gone back to 
one party regime (Resnick, 2013). About 10 or 12 elections are still considered electoral 
democracies by Freedom house which shows that after the improvements of aggregate 
scores from 2004 to 2013 by country, at least two countries decline each year on average 
in freedom trends in Sub-Saharan Africa (Freedom, 2014). Only nine out of 49 Sub-
Saharan African countries and none in North Africa could be classified as ‘free electoral 
democracies’ in 2012 (House, 2012). This is a sad indication that two decades of 
democracy promotion have had little visible impact in Africa, especially since two of those 
nine had been democratic since independence and donors played little or no role in the 
democratic transitions of most of the others.  
 
Debate on Africa's democratization processes and prospects has entered on four 
interrelated issues: the relative roles of internal and external factors, historical and 
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contemporary dynamics, structural and contingent factors, and economic and political 
dimensions. Those who stress the primacy of internal factors behind the democratic 
transitions tend to underscore the strength of domestic political protests and prodemocracy 
movements engendered or energized by the failures of development, the economic crises 
of the 1980s and 1990s, and the disintegration of the postcolonial state's legitimacy and 
capacity. Additionally, the imposition of structural adjustment programs and political 
conditionality’s by Western bilateral and multilateral financial institutions after the end of 
the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe are considered a factor 
(Encyclopaedia, n.d.). Nonetheless, the West's commitment to democracy promotion in 
Africa has been questioned, arguing that it is more rhetorical than real and is motivated 
by donor interests rather than recipient needs.  
 
After 1990, most of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa legalized opposition parties 
and held competitive, multiparty elections (Diamond, 2007). Nonetheless most of these 
elections have often not met the minimal democratic criteria of freeness and fairness. 
Suffering from incumbent dominance, institutions like legislatures and judiciaries do not 
have a large check on the activities of the executive. With rooted political advantages, 
incumbents are re-elected 85% of the time — much higher than in other developing 
regions making it difficult for opposition parties to get onto the national political arena 
(Resnick, 2013). Incumbent parties have exploited institutional advantages to deny the 
opposition any chance of winning power in the new multi-party regimes (Diamond, 2007). 
Diamond refers to them as "pseudo-democracies" similar to Richard Joseph’s “virtual 
democracies” (Joseph, 1998). 
 
Why focus on Africa? 
It was important to focus on Africa, as of all continents, Africa has the largest constituency 
of authoritarians to date. The international community and donor agencies have 
particularly focused on Africa as a region desperate for freedom and justice given the long 
record of challenges emanating from bad governance. Authoritarianism continues to 
dominate politics decades after independence. Following the independence of most of 
Sub-Saharan Africa around the 90s, there was great optimism that new ‘local’ political 
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leaders (nominated through democratic process in some instances after war) would carry 
the democratic culture on and allow for the transfer of power among their electorate. 
Besides, learning from the experience of other states that had gained independence earlier, 
post-independence leaders were expected to implement free and just governance ideals. 
Western governments had maintained their presence in a several administrative and 
advisory structures in government after leaving and were expected to help encourage 
Western values: briefly ‘demo-optimism’ was high (Lindberg, 2006).  
 
Not long, ‘demo-optimism’ turned to ‘demo-pessimism as political liberalization was 
replaced by authoritarianism resulting in a need for term extensions creating what Joseph 
(1997) refers to as ‘virtual democracies’. Equality of participation and free competition 
— the main characteristics of legitimate elections (Lindberg, 2006) are almost non-
existent in Zimbabwe. Africa presents unique test cases for democracy — constituently 
conducting elections (common democratic standard, but remaining undemocratic or 
deepening in the opposite — authoritarianism). Despite huge efforts made internally by 
advocacy groups, CSOs, NGOs, opposition parties, etc., and that made by external actors 
especially powerful-influential states, regional bodies, international organizations, etc., 
progress has been very slow. Significant financial commitments, expert technical support 
and energies are constantly availed; but it seems, as Chabal (1998) states — debate on 
democratization in Africa is like ‘a dialogue of the deaf’. In cases like Tanzania where 
optimism remains high, common weaknesses in a reluctance to let the ‘will of the people’ 
prevail freely.  
 
Academically, case by case evaluations of whether the ever growing field of democracy 
promotion is actually promoting democracy have been lacking. Where efforts are made, 
Lindberg (2006) identifies weaknesses as he claims, political scientists working on Africa 
pay too little attention to careful conceptualization of dependent variable, clear 
delimitation of hypotheses about the relationships between cause and effect or rigorous 
measurement and compilation of comparable data. In addition, Lindberg found, studies of 
political change in Africa suffer from “inadequate theoretical specification, 
methodological rigour, and most important, insufficient collection of data suitable for 
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comparative analysis — not enough cumulative work has been done”. Hence this study 
aims to fill this gap by contributing with an in-depth study of Zimbabwe, a popular case 
for democratization’s failure resulting from authoritarian rule. 
 
Democracy development in Africa  
The effective enforcement of legal participatory and competitive democracy affects 
democracy's development. Experiences in Africa indicate democracy involves 
incremental processes that require commitment especially from internal parties, resulting 
in high political payoffs. The challenge with democracy’s ontologies is their ability to co-
exist with non-democratic characteristics for long periods of time. Basic electoral 
democracy (the practice of constantly holding elections at periods stipulated by the 
constitution, with a degree of accommodation for multi-party competition and a seemingly 
equal opportunity to participate or have their voices heard), can and has existed alongside 
grave violations of human rights, strategic manipulation and the disenfranchisement of 
electorates. Hence on the outlook, democracy exists though deficient and holding 
incumbents accountable for non-democratic practice is difficult. This is the situation with 
Africa’s long standing rulers and the state of governance. The issue is, democratic 
practices are constantly withheld but significantly lacking in quality hence Levitsky and 
Way’s (2010) ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ or Zakaria’s (2012) ‘iliberal 
democracies’. But then again, Lindberg (2006) insists “holding formally participatory and 
contested elections is a necessary condition for those elections to be democratic and the 
political system to be a representative democracy”. 
 
Just as it is important to draw a line between democracy and development aid, it is 
important to distinguish between electoral and liberal democracy to understand the 
opportunities and limits of democratic development in Africa. Liberal democracies take 
pride in having elected officials with power and authority, prevailing over the military and 
police. Their independent judiciary upholds the rule of law. Resultantly, their citizens 
enjoy political and legal equality. Individual and group liberties are respected. No one is 
above the law. People are free to organize, demonstrate, publish, petition, and speak their 
minds. Likewise, “Newspapers and electronic media are free to report and comment, and 
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to expose wrongdoing. Minority groups can practice their culture, their faith, and their 
beliefs without fear of victimization. Executive power is constrained by other 
governmental actors. Property rights are protected by law and by the courts. Corruption is 
punished and deterred by autonomous, effective means of monitoring and enforcement” 
(Diamond, 1999). These are indicators of liberal democracies reiterated in most literature 
on democracy. They form the premise on which this study states that Zimbabwe and other 
Sub-Saharan African countries have a long way to go.  
 
According to Diamond, to understand the prospects for Africa’s democratization, we must 
have a clear conceptual framework for measuring the real extent of that progress. It is also 
important to examine the relationship between the extent of democracy and the likelihood 
of its consolidation (Diamond, 2007). Based on the Western model, upon attaining a 
‘democratic’ status, a state is broadly valued and considered legitimate and later 
consolidated. Diamond cautions that this is not to suggest, however, that a rapid transition 
to liberal democracy is everywhere realistic, or the only path to democratic progress. This 
research shares the optimistic view that, democratization could be developmental 
(happening at different times in different ways). Could it be that Africa has taken the 
longer route? Considering the fact that it took now mature democracies centuries to 
establish Westphalian models of democracy? Sklar (1996) talks of democracy emerging 
in fragments or parts by no fixed timetable or sequence, then the presence of one fragment 
of democracy can provide space, experience, initiative, or inspiration for the emergence 
of others. Diamond adds that, based on this consideration every increment of democratic 
progress is significant and should be encouraged (Diamond, 2007). But then again, what 
about repressive regimes? Is the relapse part of its democratic development?  
 
Based on the hypothesis stated earlier, elections alone might not effectively democratize 
a country but their repetition is certainly hopeful, just as the existence of opposition parties 
and civil society groups that organize and educate the people. Democratic practices at least 
in the case of Zimbabwe have gradually eroded the hegemony and domination of ruling 
parties. Bratton and Van de Walle in their work on Democratic Experiments in Africa 
highlight such important implications as holding of frequent election (Van de Walle & 
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Bratton, 1997). “By the same token, although electoral democracy may have many 
illiberal features, the ability to turn the ruling party out of power is a crucial threshold for 
democratization, especially given Africa's harshly authoritarian experience. Most liberal 
democracies that do emerge in Africa will probably do so after passing through (or even 
slipping back to) some period of "merely" electoral democracy” (Diamond, 2007). 
 
“Of sovereign states with a population of over five hundred thousand, elections and a 
variety of other democratic institutions are nearly universal” (Hyde, 2014). In her survey 
on global trends of elections; as of 2012, most countries held elections at least once in ten 
years except for six countries - China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and the 
United Arab Emirates who did not hold national elections from (2003-2012). This might 
be considered a remarkable trend. Nevertheless, not all election holding countries in the 
world are democratic. Some nations hold elections periodically but do not meet 
democratic standards by any means, as is the case with North Korea (where elections are 
tools of authoritarian control). So what does the constancy of elections mean for 
democracy? Can elections also be used as a tool for autocratic rule? Unarguably, 
democracy assistance efforts make it more and more difficult to manipulate or short 
change election results, the law and human rights and get away with.  
 
The state of democracy in present day Africa is very unstable. In as much as progress has 
been made with a sizeable number of democracies, authoritarian systems are still strong. 
Encouraging though is the fact that as the model is increasingly becoming unpopular; their 
domestic support bases are shrinking and face a more vigorous opposition. Where the 
opposition lacks in strength, an enthusiastic and dynamic civil society makes up for it. 
Some electoral democracies like Senegal and Ghana remain strong, unlike some 
remaining repressive authoritarian regimes such as that of Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, 
Cameroon, Sudan, Chad, Rwanda and The Gambia. The continent is still troubled facing 
the breakdown or disintegration of the state altogether, proving that East-Asian 
developmental dictatorships styles are almost impossible in Africa. 
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Diamond contends the pessimism in today’s literature, insisting “the roots of Africa's 
developmental crisis—and the hopes for its renewal, and are political and institutional” 
(Diamond, 2007). He believes that it is imperative to strengthen state structures, and 
implement procedures for greater transparency and accountability in governance. He 
suggests careful and creative institutional designs to give political leaders and groups, 
incentives to behave in ways that will enhance democracy, lawfulness, stability, and trust, 
rather than destroy them. This research believes it is from this standpoint that donors have 
undertaken democracy promotion initiatives targeting institutional change and increasing 
awareness and pressure from civil society.  
 
The state of democracy in Africa 
Democracy’s third wave though carrying in intensity has been felt unevenly across Sub-
Saharan Africa. Their consolidation has varied to great degrees although falling short of 
Western democracies. In 46 sub-Saharan African countries, multiparty elections have 
been held consistently on an average on five year terms. Constitutions have been written 
and revised to guide political processes that are generally abided to although manipulated 
in some parts. Since the 1990s, there has been general stability although unrest continues 
in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo. Authoritarians have been displaced 
in some parts though continue to hold power in Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Sudan, Chad, 
Rwanda -- although conducting regular elections. Elections continue to incorporate and 
provide participation alternatives for the electorate. Political parties provide opportunities 
for interested individuals to participate, challenge and provide alternatives. Legislative 
Parliaments are consistently elected to represent electorates, formulate laws, and supervise 
government and the judiciary. Again, these vary to great extents as Sub-Saharan Africa 
has four categories of governments: consolidated democracies (e.g. Ghana, Zambia, 
Botswana, South Africa and Mauritius); semi-democracies (e.g., Tanzania, Nigeria, and 
Benin); hybrid — authoritarian regimes (e.g., Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Uganda); reversed 
transitions or collapsed regimes (e.g., Somalia). Domestic and international pressure for 
democratization (1989 - 94) in about 41 Sub-Saharan countries led to political transitions 
through elections; 65 multiparty presidential elections were held (1989 - 2000) in 42 
countries (Rakner et al. 2007). Similar to Freedom House’s 2015 rankings of political 
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rights and civil liberties in Sub-Saharan Africa, ranging on average 2.9 (Freedom House, 
2015), quantitatively democratic progress has been positive. The promises of democracy 
in terms of political accountability, economic development and peace (Rakner et al. 2007) 
have not been fulfilled, hence the dominant pessimism in democracy scholarship.  
 
Zimbabwe 
After attaining independence from British rule in 1980, fell under one party rule — led by 
Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). 
Since then regular elections were conducted without much contention and according to 
analysts, they met democratic standards. This might be because: as Brown mentions “a 
democratic façade — and sometimes not even that — was all that was required to escape 
pressure to democratize” (Cheeseman, et al., 2013). Until 1998 when the first viable 
opposition party was formed — the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by 
Morgan Tsvangirai, multi-party competition was almost non-existent, with the exception 
of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) which was later co-opted through a 
power sharing arrangement. The entrance of the MDC gave confidence to three other 
smaller parties who filed their candidacy for the 2000 parliamentary elections, where 
ZANU-PF won with a slight margin against the MDC. Until then voter turnout had been 
low; however just before the 2002 presidential elections, more than five million 
Zimbabweans (mostly new voters) registered to vote. Simultaneously, several NGOs were 
formed primarily for the protection of civilian rights and the promotion of democracy 
(including community outreach programs and awareness of electoral processes). A 
number of international agencies began their operations in the capital aimed at promoting 
democracy.  
 
The next Presidential election was held in 2002 where Mugabe won with 56% against 
Tsvangirai’s 42%. These were the closest presidential elections in Zimbabwe’s history. 
The conduct of the election was heavily condemned by the Commonwealth and other 
international observers, the MDC, media and Western governments; while the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) pronounced them ‘free and fair.’ Followed by the 
2005 parliamentary elections where ZANU-PF won 59.6% against MDC’s 39.5%. The 
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MDC denounced these elections as "sham," claiming the elections were marked by 
massive electoral fraud. It further claimed it would have won 90 seats (more than 60% of 
the vote) if the elections had not been rigged.  
 
International agencies in preparation for the 2008 elections began training election 
observers, strengthening the capacity of local NGOs and raising funds for democracy 
assistance. This was besides an NGO bill enacted in 2004, but not signed into law, 
prohibiting local NGOs from receiving foreign funds. In autocratic systems like 
Zimbabwe, even a proposed law like this one prohibiting the operation of foreign 
organizations adversely affects the institution’s activities and disadvantages their intended 
beneficiaries. Inflation became uncontrollable, industries closed; unemployment 
increased, making the country ungovernable. Zimbabwe became heavily reliant on foreign 
aid. An economy once considered the ‘bread-basket of Africa’ crumbled. Nonetheless, the 
situation was advantageous to opposition parties as its citizens were in dire need of a new 
administration.  
 
Another round of elections was held in March 2008 to elect the President and Parliament. 
Yet again, the MDC was critical of the conduct of the electoral process and accused the 
government of manipulating the election. The electoral commission withheld the results 
for more than a month. Their actions were heavily criticized by CSOs and the opposition 
— which futilely sought an order from the High Court for the release of the results. 
Hitherto, Tsvangirai was projected to have won based on parallel vote tabulations (i.e., a 
collation of results displayed at polling stations around the country). He however did not 
have an outright majority to avoid a re-run, but his party declared he won by a narrow 
majority.  
 
Human Rights Watch declared the elections "deeply flawed” (CNN, 2008). After a 
recount, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) officially announced that Tsvangirai 
had won with 47.9% against Mugabe with 43.2%, requiring a run-off. The opposition 
initially refused to participate in the second round but eventually agreed. The period 
leading to the run-off was marred with reports of human rights abuses, like attacks on 
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opposition supporters particularly in the rural areas and abductions of opposition 
supporters and leaders. Both parties blamed the other for perpetrating violence, but 
international organizations blamed ZANU-PF for the attacks. The opposition withdrew 
from the race because of attacks on its supporters; leaving Mugabe to contest alone. He 
won with an outright majority, but had lost the majority in the House of Assembly (a first 
in Zimbabwe’s politics).  
 
An interim government was later negotiated leading to the formation of the Government 
of National Unity (GNU). A stalemate broke the arrangement ahead of the 2013 elections 
— which were considered the worst by democratic standards, due to accusations of a 
flawed voter’s roll; a disorganized ‘special vote’ process (particularly for security forces 
to be deployed out of their areas on election day); fake voter slips and ‘bused in voters’ 
(not residing in the areas they vote, to vote twice). The opposition lost and split affecting 
its strength and significance. All these developments took place in the eyes of international 
donors who immensely contributed for the success of each process. 
 
While an increase in financial support for democratic elections is assumed a key factor in 
speeding the democratization process as proposed by scholars like Lindberg (2006), it has 
not had the same effect on Zimbabwean politics — this will be expanded in the findings. 
With increased trends of donor funding for electoral democratic processes, 
authoritarianism continues to grip the state. DFID, USAID, the EU and the UN have been 
leading supporters in Zimbabwe’s democratic transition. Voice of America in December 
2010 reported “Western Donors Pledge US$ 500 Million in 2011 Aid to Zimbabwe” 
quoting an international group of donors who were “cautions that the pace of reforms and 
credible preparations for elections will determine the level of interaction between donors 
and the unity government” (VOA, 2010).  
 
The Zimbabwean State newspaper in April 2013 also reported that “Our investigations 
revealed that between march 2009 and April 15 this year, ZESN received a total of 
US$ 5,043,044, 69 from the UNDP, Canadian Embassy, Norwegian Embassy, The 
Ministry of Foreign affairs, Netherlands, The Royal Danish Embassy, The Electoral 
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Reform International, Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa, Freedom House, the 
National Endowment of Democracy among a litany of donors who have nefarious 
electoral interests in Zimbabwe.” The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) is 
one of the leading democracy promotion networks of CSOs and this banking information 
was gathered from its bank transactions. For a country whose GDP is only 13.49 billion, 
this is evidence that huge investments have been made for its political transition. 
 
The Zimbabwean participation and contestation trend is summed up here: 
 
No opposition — no multi-party democracy  
No opposition — better democratic standards 
No opposition — less external assistance 
Opposition entrance — increased external assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher assumes that, during the time that Zimbabwe was predominantly a one 
party state (assumed to be democratic), election malpractices existed and maybe 
contentious issues were diverted. However, the entrance of a viable opposition party led 
to increased international attention, magnifying all democratic misconduct. Or are 
democratic standards easier to meet in a one party state than a multi-party one? The 
formation of more local NGOs paralleled increased political funding, why? Without much 
Standards 
Funding 
1998/9 2013 1993 
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political aid, why was there less disagreement on democratic standards than after the 
entrance of the MDC? Is money a precondition for successful electoral democracy?   
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Chapter 5 
 
Methodology  
 
Case study  
Since most studies on democratization in Africa are largely theoretical or comparative — 
assessing the effectiveness of democracy assistance strategies in different countries over 
a period of time; it was important to have an in-depth study or detailed exploration of 
democracy promotion activities in Zimbabwe. Existing studies on democracy promotion 
and democratization showed a linear effect of their cause and effect relationship, though 
it did not adequately explain Zimbabwe’s democratic stagnation and backsliding. The 
study sought to understand the larger phenomenon of democratization resulting from 
democracy promotion through closely examining Zimbabwean political developments. 
The descriptive nature of a case study also enriches our knowledge of democratization in 
an authoritarian state.  
 
Coppedge (2012) in his book on democratization and research methods suggests this 
research makes use of qualitative research because its theories are probabilistic, since 
there are always exceptions due to unknown causes that cannot be demonstrated 
systematically. Also because its theories are partial as in most social science works, as “no 
political outcome has just one cause…and none determines it alone” Coppedge (2012). Its 
theories are also conditional because of the different periods of events, places, 
relationships and conditions. This case study also tests competing explanations of 
democratization in other regions and generates explanations for political developments in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The process of democratization is influenced by various factors including a country’s 
history, actors and circumstances and these particularities can only be fully understood 
through a case study. Zimbabwe like most Sub-Saharan states has received significant 
financial and technical support for democratization but has failed to conduct free and fair 
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or minimally contested elections, improve civil and political rights, or transfer power after 
three decades of electoral democratic practice. This is unique and deserves special 
attention as it has been a topical authoritarian case, widely covered in the news but there 
is limited scholarly work on why the political crisis has taken long.  
 
Although it is not a cross case analysis, other cases of similar democracy promotion 
strategies in Africa are used to help explain commonalities and differences to strengthen 
the hypothesis. The challenges faced by different African countries are difficult to 
generalize and the contexts and people differ. Donors likewise, do not operate uniformly 
across Africa. 
 
So, following visiting research opportunities availed to the researcher in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania during the period (May - August 2015), the researcher took these as 
opportunities to enrich the study by conducting interviews with relevant actors in the two 
countries after a month’s study in Zimbabwe. At that time, general and presidential 
elections were taking place in both Ethiopia and Tanzania respectively hence the decision 
to observe electoral processes there too. Ethiopia hosts the African Union (Africa’s 
continental union involved in democratic processes such as election observation under the 
African Union Commission’s Program for the Promotion of Democracy and Democratic 
Elections as enshrined in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
(African Union). It is worth noting that the African Union has deployed observers to 
monitor Zimbabwean presidential elections over the decade and consistently declared 
them ‘free and fair’. 
 
All interviews were conducted in capital cities: Harare (Zimbabwe), Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia) and Dare Salaam (Tanzania) where all offices of the key informants are located. 
Preliminary assessments indicated the possibility of entry into the three countries for 
interviews. 
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Sampling  
Without access to a solid sampling frame for the population Bryman (2001) suggests 
snowball sampling, also due to the sensitivity of issues involved. Purposive sampling was 
first used to select the first respondents guided by the research objective. Based on contacts 
already established, the researcher depended on referrals to relevant individuals and 
organizations willing to participate. An actor network mapping exercise aided by common 
actors in the theoretical analysis had been conducted prior to the field study. The sample 
size was pre-estimated to 30 respondents, however 32 were then interviewed and this 
catered for representativeness. 
 
Design  
Investigating the effects of a phenomena and evaluating programs requires the use of 
qualitative interviews according to Rubin and Rubin (1995). In-depth qualitative 
interviews help to explain why and how concepts are created and evolve and explore 
topics at length, hence their use in this inquiry. Experts in the area were sought to solicit 
personal experiences and generate practical and informed recommendations for future 
policies e.g. how a leader holds period elections but remains authoritarian.  
 
This research employed the qualitative approach because Zimbabwe’s democratization 
processes are contemporary developments. Democracy promotion is a fairly recent 
phenomenon only popularized in Africa over the last three decades and research 
methodology scholars like Hamel et. al (1993) recommend the use of case studies for its 
inquiry. Yin (1984) also suggests that the study is conducted in a natural real life context, 
hence the decision to hold face to face interviews in the same context. Resultantly, the 
study aimed at forming explanations and theories grounded in the collected details and 
evidence. With the understanding that, qualitative interviews are both academic and 
practical tools, the study aimed to come up with a grounded theory or explanation of 
democratic processes in Zimbabwe from key informants (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
 
Opportunities for each interview were sought via email, telephone and verbal 
conversations, where the researcher introduced herself by name, her capacity as a graduate 
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student at Lingnan University in Hong Kong, the study as a course requirement, who had 
referred her (or where prior contact had been made, in what capacity and where), available 
times, the interview duration, the importance of their participation and contact details.  
 
Structure and approach  
Interviews  
The structure and approach of the interviews varied depending on the respondent, nature 
of relationship, starting discussion (entrance point) and the general flow of the 
conversation.  
 
“Elite interviewing can be used whenever it is possible to treat a respondent as an expert about 
the topic in hand”. 
Leech (2002) 
 
Elites here include CSO leaders, donors, diplomats (African Union), ministers and 
informed individuals. As qualitative research relies on detail and thick descriptions 
(Rossman and Rallis, 2012), the researcher aimed for depth in responses from 
respondent’s experience and opinions. Hence the choice of subject experts. Unfortunately, 
the researcher was unable to interview leaders from the ruling party despite personal visits 
to their offices, emails and phone calls over a month. Hence the decision to interview 
referred leaders of various ruling party groups and activists.  
 
Unstructured and semi-structured interviews 
The researcher did not limit the interviews to a semi-structured nature — which often seek 
to find more specific information and are focused. In some instances, the interviews were 
unstructured, where the researcher suggested the subject for discussion however with 
specific questions in mind. Most of the interviews nonetheless combined both approaches 
(structured and unstructured), often starting from unstructured moving on to more focused 
questions. 
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The unstructured interviews began on two main levels: prior or no previous knowledge of 
the respondent. Both questions meant the interviewee did most of the talking. For the 
structured approach, the interviewee consistently posed specific questions.  
 
With the semi-structured interviews, though formal, the interviews did not have a limited 
set of questions. The researcher formulated the questions derived from questions raised in 
the literature review section. Due to the flexibility of the interview, the researcher allowed 
for different questions, following what the interviewee would have said, while guiding the 
interviews as she intentionally introduced, a limited number of questions at a time for in-
depth exploration by the respondent. The researcher encouraged respondents to reflect on 
experiences or think about the subject and questions were modified as the researcher saw 
fit, depending on the flow of the conversation questions were sometimes modified to 
specific organisations and roles. Interviewees were not given questions before to increase 
objectivity and allow for natural responses.  
 
The capacity of the interviewee was a major factor as the researcher found out during the 
first two interviews (an aspect rarely covered in available social science research 
literature). With elite interviewees, the interview approach is often different or changes 
faster from unstructured to more focused questions. Considering that two of the donors in 
Zimbabwe and one from the AU were diplomats and did not have much time for the 
interview and the researcher felt compelled to stick to set questions and control the 
conversations for effectiveness. However, depending on the interviewee, the interview 
could take longer. Hence, their interviews took the least time ranging from between 15 - 
30 minutes. With other respondents, interviews were more relaxed with controlled 
flexibility between structured and unstructured questions. The approaches were based on 
the fact that, the researcher listened to every response determining the next question, 
following previous responses. Conversations followed logical structures and the 
researcher and interviewee take turns talking.  
 
The empirical findings of this study in Chapter six are drawn from thirty-two expert 
interviews conducted firstly in Zimbabwe with ten CSO leaders, two ministers, five donor 
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representatives, five informed individuals; in Tanzania with, two CSO leaders and one 
donor; and in Ethiopia with, two donors, three representatives to the African Union and 
two CSO leaders. Respondents are referred to by their positions or broad field (e.g., CSO 
or Donor) and where the responses include public information, the researcher mentions 
the affiliate organizations where necessary.  
 
Interview questions 
All research questions referred to the research focus (democratization by Western 
democracy promotion) and main concepts (contestation and participation) from reviewed 
literature. Since most were elite interviews, the study followed Rossman and Rallis’ 
(2012) recommendation for “broad based topics to allow respondents to use their 
knowledge and imagination”. Questions in Ethiopia and Tanzania focused on Sub-
Saharan Africa generally and not limited to Zimbabwe, although due to the research 
question, respondents focused on Zimbabwe. The following questions were asked: 
 
General (most respondents) 
● What is your understanding of a successful democracy? 
● What is your understanding of political contestation and participation?  
● Do you think democracy promotion has been successful in democratizing Zimbabwe? 
● Since democracy was not a major issue after independence until the 90s, is 
democratization easier in a one party state? (Zimbabwean respondents) 
● Does opposition party strength affect the success of democracy promotion? 
● Does the nature of the donor organization affect democracy’s success? (Institutional e.g. 
UNDP vs. Government supported e.g. USAID)  
● Does the nature, operation or attitude of recipient organizations affect the success of 
democracy promotion?  
● Two decades after — do you think there is hope for democratization in Zimbabwe / Africa? 
Donor specific  
● How have you been promoting democracy in Zimbabwe / Africa? 
● What kind of organizations or initiatives do you support? 
● Has there been an increase in your organization’s financial commitment to democracy 
promotion in Zimbabwe / Africa? 
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● What are the challenges in democratizing Zimbabwe / Africa? 
Diplomat specific  
● What kind of pressure has your government put to ensure democratization in Zimbabwe / 
Africa? 
● Are there any international measures put in place to guarantee the compliance of states to 
democratize? 
● Are there any diplomatic steps you are taking to encourage democratization in Africa?  
Civil society  
● How can donors ensure successful democratization? 
● Has there been an increase in funding to your organization for democracy promotion 
activities? 
● How much have you received in the past year (range)?  
African Union 
● Does the AU get any democracy assistance from Western agencies?  
● From your experiences having observed Zimbabwean electoral processes for two decades, 
what do you think are the major setbacks to its international acceptance?  
 
Data analysis 
Most interviews were voice recorded so data analysis began with transcribing interviews 
from voice to text, noting key facts. The facts were interpreted for linkages between the 
research questions (Soy, 1997) before being purposely sorted under different categories 
— mainly ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors and linked to ‘contestation’ and ‘participation’. 
Facts were also cross-checked for inconsistencies against existing data before being 
categorized by frequency in responses. 
 
Ethics  
The study was designed to be conducted in ways that honored its participants hence an 
initial consultation of ethics in social science research. An ethical guide was sought from 
the university on studies involving human subjects — which the researcher signed. Ethical 
considerations were taken, mainly based on two issues: the sensitivity of the research in 
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its context or setting and the different cultural settings in which the interviews were 
conducted. Verbal consent was sought at the beginning of each interview for permission 
to voice record the conversation and a verbal reassurance that information would be 
confidential was given.  
 
Private and confidential  
This qualitative study involved contact with ‘real’ subjects so it was important to mention 
that the respondent’s identity would be confidential although some of their statements 
would be quoted or paraphrased when documenting. The researcher at the beginning of 
each interview informed respondents, their names, organizations, roles and settings would 
not be disclosed to a third party including the written report. The challenge was when 
other high level diplomats and donors wanted to know who else the researcher had spoken 
to. The researcher however politely declined mentioning names but used broad categories 
such as “other donors” and emphasized the confidentiality clause — which, according to 
the researchers’ observations made them more willing to participate.  
 
Security  
The researcher often asked herself “what could happen as a result of this action” during 
the field study. Qualitative research when investigating sensitive issues such as the 
effectiveness of ‘regime change’ strategies in an authoritarian setting may be potentially 
harmful. Considering the level of security surveillance in both Zimbabwe and Ethiopia by 
Central Intelligence Officers (Zimbabwe) or Secret Police (Ethiopia), it was important 
that the researcher carefully thought of private or secluded interview settings. Interviews 
were conducted in quiet hotels, restaurants, offices and even cars. This was for the safety 
of the researcher as well as her respondents. Since the study involved opposition ministers 
and CSO representatives (often linked to opposition) and both being highly surveilled, the 
researcher when planning the interviews asked where the respondents were comfortable 
meeting e.g. “Would you like to suggest where we could meet for the interview”, “Do you 
have a preference on where we could meet”, “Would you be fine with me coming to your 
office” or “Is it safe to talk in your office” (particularly for opposition respondents and 
well-known critics of the regime). Often, respondents in Zimbabwe ‘chuckled’ (as 
surveillance is a known government tactic).  
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In both Dares-Salaam and Addis Ababa, the researcher having little knowledge of the city 
and due to security concerns, used personal contacts to hire a ‘permanent’ driver who 
drove her and waited outside during the interviews. Where interviews were conducted a 
distance away from the town center, the researcher was joined by a known contact for 
security. This was especially important however in Harare, where the researcher 
previously had security concerns after being followed to her residence. During one 
interview with a donor representative, a group of about eight Zanu-PF youths (identified 
by the car they drove as well as party regalia they were dressed in), came and sat at a table 
next to the researcher and respondent during the course of the interview. Because this was 
a secluded restaurant, not very popular for political party meetings — the researcher and 
respondent felt they were being surveilled. So research questions were modified to a more 
general discussion as evacuating the premise would raise suspicion. In another instance, 
the researcher had to conduct an hour long interview in the respondents’ vehicle (in a 
parking lot) as the respondent had suspected the researcher was being followed and needed 
to go to a ‘safe’ place. Similarly, in Addis Ababa, police men approached the owner of 
the researcher’s rented accommodation saying they had “seen a foreigner around” and 
wanted to “know what she was doing” and “for how long” she was going to be in the 
country, before they asked to take her passport to the police station for a copy. Research 
in authoritarian states requires ethical considerations on both the part of the researcher as 
well as the respondent.   
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Chapter 6  
 
Findings  
Does democracy promotion promote democracy? Based on the assessment of the 
democratic threshold here of participation and contestation, as well as information 
gathered during the field research: Yes, democracy promotion promotes democracy, but 
there are several internal (domestic) and external (international) factors that limit it. This 
section summarizes the research findings from collected responses as well as the 
researcher’s interpretation of arguments made in the democratization literature. The 
findings are divided into two, internal (domestic factors affecting democratization in 
Zimbabwe) and external (international or foreign factors affecting democratization in 
Zimbabwe). 
 
Internal factors  
 
Nature of the state  
The imposition of top-down political institutions that prolonged colonial rule in Africa 
created a new form of neo-colonial dominance. Sub-Saharan African polities remain under 
the control of dominant political parties led by authoritative and uncompromising 
individuals who control not only the means of production but weak political institutions. 
In Zimbabwe, after independence, power was centralized in the executive and opposing 
parties or institutions legislated out of politics. Though their power diminished, judicial 
and legal institutions remained but closely surveyed. The civic capacities (collective 
action) of both citizens and non-state actors representing them were reduced while 
“constitutional concentration” (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990) increased giving the executive 
with excessive constitutional power. Democracy’s greatest threat in Zimbabwe is the state 
and its power.  
 
Zimbabwe is a one party state that suppresses multi-party or competitive politics; does not 
allow for the formation of independent political institutions; and has a dominant executive 
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systematically controlling electoral, judiciary, legislative, media and private institutions; 
while bureaucratically defining and overseeing the implementation of state policies. This 
centralization of power, while necessary as a developmental ethos for national unity in 
post-independence Zimbabwe, is no longer compatible with open public participation.  
 
This research found, the nature of Zimbabwe’s present state markedly affects its 
democratization. Democracy is more than the consistent conduct of elections or the 
creation of democratic institutions and the rule of law. It is about quality institutions that 
ensure and genuinely safeguard the independence, effectiveness and objectivity of those 
institutions. Zimbabwe has become a competitive authoritarian regime that combines 
democratic rules with authoritarian mechanisms, combining coercive and distributional 
strategies with state machinery executives to incapacitate opposition groups and maintain 
power. 
 
Democracy promotion has been difficult in Zimbabwe because formal democratic 
institutions such as elections, judiciary and law enforcement are principal sources of 
government’s exercise of political authority (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Government often 
contravenes democratic regulations, seemingly legitimately; the president and 
parliamentarians are elected in relatively ‘free’ and ‘fair’ environments when following 
formal Election day procedures; citizens outwardly participate equally; rights and 
freedoms seem safeguarded; and electoral authorities appear independent with real 
authority to govern divorced from state control or influence (Mainwaring et al. 2001) yet 
in reality these institutions are closely aligned to the incumbent and advantage him. 
 
Systemic factors limit the influence of opposition parties, civil society groups and foreign 
donors on the inception and protection of democracy in Zimbabwe. The manipulation of 
the electoral system, the terrorization of opposition parties, the incarceration and 
expatriation of opponents that threaten executive security in power are facilitated by the 
control of state institutions by the executive. This study divides the state into two: its 
institutions and the political leader. On institutions, findings on the challenges to 
democratization are grouped into electoral institutions, security (police and military) and 
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judiciary, while findings on the leader focus on his will to change. Other internal and 
external factors raised by respondents and gathered from available literature are also 
highlighted. Nonetheless, this study found that, state institutions and the law are the main 
challenges to democratization in Zimbabwe. 
 
  
STATE 
Nature of the 
state 
(Competitive 
Authoritarian) 
AID 
ELECTORAL 
DEMOCRACY  
● Civil society 
● Opposition  
1. Institutions  
● Electoral Management 
Bodies 
● Security 
● Judiciary 
2. Political leader  
● Will to change 
91 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Lindberg (2006) and other aid advocates insist elections are 
a key or the most significant aspect for democratization in Africa. To facilitate 
successful elections, they call for international funding and technical support through 
CSOs, opposition parties and structural institutions like parliament. They believe a 
strong correlation exists between aid, elections and democratization. This study however 
finds; the effects are not so linear or straightforward since elections in Zimbabwe are the 
domain of state institutions. The state limits it with bureaucracy, dominance and lack of 
transformative will. This study also finds that, the Zimbabwean state now suits the strict 
definition of a competitive authoritarian state that is ‘competitive’ but authoritarian 
hence a major limitation to democratic advancement. Scholars like Hyde (2014) support 
Lindberg’s assertions saying, there are more democracies today than ever before as 
Freedom House estimates that at least 65% of the world is now democratic and this in a 
sense can be attributed to efforts of democracy promoters. So donors continue to aid 
elections for democratization in Zimbabwe.  
 
1. Competitive Authoritarianism 
There is a thin line between democracies and electoral authoritarian regimes on the 
outlook. The difference is in the levels of freedom throughout the electoral cycle; the 
fairness of the playing field for all parties and the fairness of the vote (levels of 
contestation against the result); the level of inclusiveness (Diamond 2002) of all 
stakeholders and citizens; and the meaningfulness of elections (Diamond 2002).  
 
Opposition and CSOs’ inability to fully prove electoral fraud seems to automatically 
validate incumbent victory claims. Feigned abidance to electoral rules complicates short-
term observer’s views of elections. Normally international observer missions provide the 
third ‘objective’ eye but the problem is, Zimbabwe does not allow international observers 
except those sympathetic to the incumbent (e.g., Pan-Americanists or regional groups like 
AU) and the African Union Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) for instance 
monitors elections according to AU principles for democratic elections (AU, 2013) or 
Zimbabwean electoral laws. Being in the country a week before Election Day limits the 
overall assessment. Since 1998, all non-Western observer missions have passed 
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Zimbabwean elections as “free and fair” against local and Western observer assessments 
hence the general view that they are superficial, premature, and politically driven 
(Diamond 2002). 
 
The more authoritarians participate in democratic processes or seemingly exhibit signs of 
relaxation the more the world will accept them as practicing a form of democracy. There 
has not been much change in rule of law practices in Zimbabwe, the laws and their 
custodians remain the same. However, because of internal struggles and the persecution 
of newly turned enemies of the state, the system seems just although the same with a 
change of victims — from opposition and civil society to factions from the ruling party. 
Dictators are increasingly emboldened by their accommodation. This then presents 
challenges in trying to measure the state of democracy, as non-democratic governments 
and leaders are stepping up strategies to imitate democratic arrangements and are sadly 
succeeding in doing so. 
 
Almost all respondents from the ruling party said Zimbabwe is a democracy and had met 
Western pre-requisites particularly peaceful elections. They said, the West and its 
domestic agents attack the government because Zimbabweans did not consider their desire 
for regime change. But, analyzing Levitsky and Way’s (2002) characteristics of 
competitive authoritarian or hybrid regimes, democracy promotion is failing to 
democratize Zimbabwe because of the current nature of its state. Elections are conducted 
on time and are seriously contested, albeit by a few opposition parties — actually one 
viable one, Tsvangirai’s MDC. Though opposition contention is allowed, its leaders are 
often detained. Domestic observers can monitor and observe electoral processes but not 
international observers. Vote verification is the domain of national election managing 
bodies and parallel vote counts are forbidden. Abuse of state power, biased and complicit 
in deceptive media coverage, (often violent) harassment of opposition candidates and 
activists, and an overall lack of transparency are challenges to democratizing competitive 
authoritarian regimes. This answers part of the puzzle why democracy promotion had 
succeeded in other Sub-Saharan states but not in Zimbabwe. 
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"Zimbabwe has a long tradition of despotic and oppressive government. There has always been 
some concern about the presence of a functioning opposition in Zimbabwe but the hard work of 
vote-riggers and brutal police has always made sure autocracy has prevailed”. 
(League of despots, 2008) 
 
The Zimbabwean State is intrusive and interferes in the affairs of non-state institutions 
and increasingly its citizens’. Where the affairs coincide, oppose or threaten the state, it 
responds ruthlessly. Hence, barriers are constantly formed and deepened between the state 
and its people. As long as non-state actors lack infrastructural power or influence over it 
(as is the case in mature democracies where institutions are independent and organizations 
and citizens can accept a fair judgement), democratization is far coming. There is an 
overwhelming presence of the state over weak institutions.  
 
1.1. Opposition parties  
Despite massive domestic support (votes) and foreign aid, Zimbabwean opposition is 
disadvantaged due to its disconnection from key institutions. It entered the political field 
with its competitor in full command of institutions meant to facilitate democracy. Political 
parties particularly opposition parties are key in Africa’s democratization. According to 
Crotty (1993), democratic governance is unlikely and may not be possible in the absence 
of competitive political parties. Multi-partism can be both a cause and consequence of 
democracy, enabling the participation of citizens in representation. Opposition parties 
keep a check on incumbent regimes and hold them accountable. This study considered the 
strength of opposition as having an effect on the effectiveness of democracy promotion. 
Opposition parties often work together and represent similar missions as CSOs and are in 
most cases heavily dependent on donor aid. This project found that Zimbabwe’s biggest 
and most viable opposition party the MDC has affected its democratization efforts.  
 
MDC was formed concurrently with the establishment of donor institutions in Zimbabwe. 
Previously, donors had mostly dominated humanitarian fields specializing in health and 
education. Since MDC was a conglomeration of trade unionists and student movements, 
local financial flows were low and foreign donations would allow for the faster 
institutionalization of opposition, (unfortunately few studies have been conducted on the 
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role of opposition parties in democratization). In Zimbabwe, the MDC was considered the 
hope for change as it was a party comprising young, energetic and open-minded 
academics, lawyers and professionals with new policy alternatives. Interest in politics was 
revived. The practice of never questioning ‘elders’ was defied through public debates, 
showing citizens that the regime could be held accountable (vertically) through regular 
elections and was not as ‘scary’ as it had seemed. Their participation in the 2002 elections 
gave rise to CSOs which we're just as energetic and demanded the participation of all 
citizens, educating citizens that their voices were worth listening to and educating citizens 
of their rights and the importance of their participation in political processes.  
 
Most respondents attributed opposition strength to international support (mostly 
financially) and enabled the young aspiring politicians to compete during elections. The 
MDC won in most urban areas, reviving hope in democratic processes. The entrance of 
the opposition into parliament threatened the incumbent (another form of ‘horizontal’ 
accountability — government to parliament) as the opposition asked them to account for 
their achievements during their tenures; and for those who had lost, the message was 
clearer: times were changing. The same happened during the 2008 and 2013 elections 
where the opposition won significantly in a number of polities including in 2008 where 
Morgan Tsvangirai President of the MDC won but without enough votes to be declared 
president, although the opposition has criticized the government of rigging and short 
changing them of their victory. 
 
Although democracy support has assisted in the development of a viable opposition, the 
MDC remains weak. In all major elections since its formation — in 2002, 2008, 2013, the 
opposition claims to have won all the elections but has been short-changed. It is too weak 
to defend its victory. Respondents said, other challenges explaining why democracy 
promotion through opposition support has not been effective are around ‘Internal party 
democracy’ within the MDC, as after the 2013 elections some members felt they needed 
a new leader with new strategies after suffering ‘stolen victories’ from ZANU-PF. The 
splits have weakened the opposition significantly and only made the possibilities of a 
coalition difficult. There is however hope that a future coalition in preparation for the 2018 
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elections would see the defeat of ZANU-PF. Additionally, horizontal accountability has 
been lacking as evidenced by allegations of corruption and misappropriation of funds by 
leaders and their lack of accountability. One MDC minister said the party was almost 
broke to the extent that it was failing to pay salaries and could not organize meetings or 
campaigns effectively anymore. He added, the party was suffering from donor fatigue and 
a significant reduction in donor funds after the 2013 elections.  
 
Issues of patrimonialism and clientelism were also highlighted as the opposition 
leadership was in many ways a “replication of the system they are fighting against”. 
Corrupt means of hiring or tendering — as leaders hired relatives or acquaintances for 
jobs or for tenders, demotivated others. Similarly, one opposition MP said, the democracy 
the party was fighting for had been replaced by gross nepotism for those in support of the 
party leadership, and any objections or disagreements resulted in side-lining or 
displacement. African opposition parties, similar to incumbent parties face the strong men 
versus weak institution problem. Unless African political parties shift focus away from 
party leaders to policies, the authoritarian challenge will remain. Respondents also 
mentioned the opposition leader’s character as a potential limitation as it points to the 
creation of more 'strong men' with dictatorial traits, unwilling to transfer power within the 
party and dismissing anyone who does not agree with them — as is the case with 
Tsvangirai. So, democracy might only be short lived. 
 
Nonetheless, respondents said the power-sharing period between the MDC and ZANU-
PF was refreshing as emerging from the hyper-inflationary period, the economy was 
revived, the MDC gained accesses into government apparatus and managed to lure 
investors as it was in charge of the Ministry of Finance, and the electorate according to 
ministers MDC interviewed, claimed they successfully represented their constituencies 
and effected various changes despite the bureaucratic limitations presented by the ruling 
party. The MDC motivated an interest in democratic processes according to two of the 
MDC respondents and has led the initiative of fostering a democratic culture (Lindberg, 
2006) saying, “Zimbabweans are now accustomed to democratic procedures”. The 
technical abilities that came with the MDC e.g. legal expertise to draft and interpret the 
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constitution have limited the incumbent’s ability to manipulate procedures unquestioned 
as well as enabled opposition and civil society to educate citizens on specific clauses and 
rights.  
 
Political arrangements of accommodation like power-sharing agreements have positive 
and negative effects. On one hand, they can strengthen the capabilities young forward 
looking opposition leaders but they might also be an opening for manipulation by 
authoritarian incumbents (Magaloni, 2008). In developing countries, material goods such 
as cars and houses can easily dilute and slowly replace the resilience of any leader. 
Respondents talked of MDC’s tenure in the Government of National Unity where they 
were allocated cars and other benefits (sometimes more than once in less than five years) 
and MDC president Tsvangirai was allocated a US$2million State house specifically built 
for him without rejection and without consideration of the suffering masses living below 
a dollar a day. Knowing their inability to refuse the ruling party (ZANU-PF) took 
advantage and ‘silenced’ them. All parties benefited, hence accountability was 
compromised and it became slowly evident, they were similar to the system they were 
fighting.  
 
Another weakness highlighted was the inability of opposition parties to break the elite 
mentality, as being ‘experts’ they have excluded the general citizens in discussions 
particularly those in rural areas. There has been marginalization to an extent as highlighted 
by one respondent who observed that while the incumbent focuses on the rural 
constituencies, the opposition has focused more on urbanites. She said it was ‘impossible’ 
to win a Zimbabwean election without focusing on ruralites. Van de Walle and Butler 
(1999) summarize challenges of African political parties as that of “weak organizations, 
low levels of institutionalization and weak links to the society that they are supposed to 
represent”. 
 
On the number of political parties and their competitiveness, An AU representative said 
multi-partism was strong in countries like the Republic of Congo, Senegal, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Chad and Cameroon with an average of about 40 parties competing in any 
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election meaning according to him, the importance of political rights is stronger than 
before. The downside is, most of them could be splitter parties indicating more complex 
problems of division and the inability to unite which in turn limits removal of repressive 
systems. Zimbabwe's seven well known parties are mostly 'irrelevant' when challenging 
the incumbent except three. They do not adequately explain the level of competitiveness 
except the MDC. So, quantity is not an adequate measure of competitiveness.  
 
Democracy is easier in a one party state spanning from electoral management to freedoms 
and justice. When competition increases (especially with viable opposition) — threat 
arises as loopholes cannot be easily bypassed. This is why it took twenty years to identify 
and introduce adjustments to democratic institutions there. Respondents highlighted 
opposition successes during the 2008-9 power sharing period saying it showed the ability 
of opposition to fight for itself; the power of the vote (in the incumbent’s failure to fully 
manipulate MDC’s victory); and the seemingly imperceptible but actual transfer of power. 
One respondent said the power sharing period was the “best thing that had happened to 
Zimbabwe in a long time” because, for the first time another party dominated parliament 
and caused notable socio-economic changes. Both opposition ministers said 
Zimbabweans through repetitively winning (though cheated), saw their ability to compete 
and meaningfully contribute to economy and parliament and so the electorate would 
continue to vote for them. Although Zanu-PF supporters said their ‘continued victory’ and 
failure of opposition to take over showed elections — although Western, simply showed 
Zimbabweans were ‘anti-Western’ rule.  
 
Some respondents pointed to global changes in responses to authoritarian leader’s failure 
to transfer power e.g. Burundi’s current conflict and other uprisings and coups, and their 
power in influencing Mugabe’s response to electoral outcomes. They said, these lessons 
motivate his manipulation of electoral outcomes and this signifies the power of electoral 
democracy. 
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1.2. Political party financing  
Issues around political party financing were raised and according to one opposition 
minister, there were no state provisions for foreign funding restrictions for political parties 
before MDC’s rise. But as MDC rose and attracted foreign support, the government passed 
the Political Parties (Financing) Act “prohibiting foreign funding, whether directly from 
a donor or indirectly through a third person…political parties are required by law to 
disclose sources of party funds and audited accounts” (ZESN, 2006). One donor based in 
Tanzania, having worked in Zimbabwe before pointed to the abuse of state resources by 
incumbents in elections in most African countries including Tanzania. He said campaign 
finance laws limit opposition parties from effectively participating as much as ruling 
parties, adding that Mugabe’s government corruptly redistributed farms for votes in the 
run-up to the 2002 elections for support. While a pro-Zanu-PF respondent said opposition 
also receives significant support from foreign donors “both camps are guilty of illegally 
financing their campaigns”.  
 
Another respondent said the government has started housing cooperatives corruptly 
distributed among supporters in urban areas for votes and to dilute opposition strongholds. 
Zimbabwean parties do not adequately disclose their financial sources as stipulated under 
the Electoral Act (2004) and this allows for corruption and the abuse of state resources by 
the incumbent. Normally CSOs are critical in highlighting flaws in campaign finance and 
lobbying for fairness, but this is only possible when the ‘advocates’’ financial sources are 
legitimate. Nevertheless, one donor talked of ERIS’ (a UK based pro-transparency 
organization) work with CSOs in Zimbabwe to train them on the importance and 
evaluation of campaign finance. Issues of financing affect smaller opposition parties 
which do not receive significant external support and limits their participation. Democracy 
assistance here can cause unequal participation as donors tend to favor dominant 
opposition parties (Smith, 2014). 
 
Also a dependency on donor aid by African opposition parties does not help the future of 
democratization in Africa as parties need to organize themselves to become more self-
sufficient to ensure their sustainability in the event that donor funds are reduced. This is a 
challenge the researcher observed in Zimbabwe, where the opposition has become almost 
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non-existent at a time when the incumbent regime has also suffered internal divisions; a 
period expected to be an opportunity to regroup and re-strategize. Hence, donor-fatigue 
has coincided with opposition weakness. Most of these weaknesses are internal that aid 
cannot solve but at times perpetuate. The same issues were highlighted for CSOs failures 
despite continuous efforts to advance their missions. 
 
1.3. Police and military  
The state should have a degree of monopoly of force in its territory (Weber, 1946) to deter 
external threats to its sovereignty and internal threats to social order through police and 
armed forces (Wang, 2002). There is little justification for force as necessary factors 
suggested by Wang (2002) are almost non-existent e.g. the threat of foreign invasion is 
for now non-existent to Zimbabwe. Due to ruthless repression in the past, possibilities of 
widespread deviant civilian or social unrest are slim. Internal rival groups relatively 
coexist, although the incumbent has permanent control but remains insecure. Zimbabwe 
has become a police state to an extent as government exercises power arbitrarily through 
the police and military. Violence and repression limits the successful functioning of 
democratic institutions especially CSO and opposition activity (Garcia-Ponce and 
Pasquale, 2015).  
 
Zimbabwe’s leadership is desperate to maintain power that intimidation has escalated to 
the abduction and killing of opponents. According to one opposition minister and human 
rights activist, these violations worsened after MDC’s formation and escalated in the run-
up to the presidential ‘run-off’ election in 2008. In 2015, Dzamara a journalist and 
opposition supporter known for publicly calling for Mugabe's resignation and 
demonstrating against and criticizing the government (often alone), was abducted from a 
hair-salon by five armed men who seized and shoved him into an unmarked truck and 
sped off (Aljazeera, 2015). Nonetheless, many other Zimbabweans have disappeared and 
one Director of a Human Rights organization said they were “overwhelmed” with reports 
of murdered, assaulted and abducted opposition members and supporters, but frustrated 
that a few of the incriminated faced justice — considering the record of state intelligence 
and its ability to catch perpetrators if they wanted to. 
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CSO directors like Mukoko of the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) have been abducted in 
the past, raids of CSOs and opposition offices are common, including the intimidation of 
opposition members, anonymous ‘hit list’ messages to opposition leaders, harassment, the 
disruption of public meetings and civilian beatings. The leadership has monopolized the 
state and its infrastructural power using legitimate means. It is in charge of key state 
institutions such as the judiciary and security sectors. Military commanders and police 
commissioners are appointed by the president and report to the president. The problem is 
most institutions supposed to guard democratic processes are too weak and under the 
control of a ‘strong man’. The executive reigns over key institutions without consultation 
or negotiation with other parties, yet power is supposed to be derived from a majority vote 
in parliament. Despotic power is extensively used over institutions and citizens and the 
power is not checked, therefore unlimited compared to mature democracies (Mann, 1986).  
 
“…We should stand behind our Commander-in-Chief. Soldiers are not apolitical … Only 
mercenaries are apolitical. We have signed and agreed to fight and protect the ruling party’s 
principles of defending the revolution. If you have other thoughts, then you should remove that 
uniform” (Herald, 2008) 
 
“This is up to you, if you want peace, you vote for us. If you vote for the MDC, we will go to 
war” 
(Mumbengegwi, 2008) 
 
According to Masunungure (2009), Zimbabwe currently has two key organs of authority 
the “ruling party and the security forces” arguing, “both ‘organs of authority’ were 
important in the last two elections but their visibility and significance differed 
fundamentally”. Security forces spearheaded Zanu-PF’s violent run-off campaign in 2008 
after receiving instructions from Mugabe, who was reported to have told his ZANU(PF) 
Politburo in April 2008 that, in order to win the run-off, the party must establish a ‘warlike 
and military-style’ or ‘bullet and ballot’ leadership to campaign in the ‘sink-or-swim’ 
election (Masunungure, 2009). It is evident, Zanu-PF carried its pre-independence 
“militaristic conception of the source of political authority: the bullet is supreme and the 
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ballot is subservient to it; and the gun which provides the votes, should remain its security 
officer, its guarantor (Mugabe, 1981 in Masunungure, 2009). Lately, security chiefs have 
been rewarded with involvement in policy design and implementation as leaders of 
strategic state institutions e.g. the Zimbabwe Prisons Service, Zimbabwe Republic Police, 
Central Intelligence Organization, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), and 
parastatals e.g. the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe, Grain Marketing Board and the 
Department of National Parks and Wildlife (Masunungure, 2009). 
 
The last harmonized elections in 2013 were under military control disguised under the 
“Joint Operations Command” meant to monitor and control citizens and opposition in 
every constituency (Cross, 2016). With an over-recruitment of intelligence officers similar 
to Ethiopia, everyone is watching everyone resulting in the erosion of liberties. There is a 
thin line between the military or police and the government. The state machinery is abused 
to safeguard and represent the interests of the president. The government has succeeded 
in subduing citizens and instilling fear in the uniformed citizens. In 2015, Zanu-PF 
confirmed the militarization of its structures proving the military's partisan nature when 
Defence Commander Chiwenga was introduced as the party's commissary by Vice 
president Mnangagwa (Nehanda, 2015). In recent ‘faction wars’ emanating from Zanu-
PF’s intra-party split over leadership ambitions, Chiwenga has been accused of backing 
the Vice president in his presidential ambitions against the first lady. 
 
According to Cross (2016) that was also Member of Parliament at that time, “During 
Zimbabwe’s power-sharing period from 2009 to 2013, the reality that the military and not 
politicians called the shots was painfully obvious. Zanu-PF simply maintained a cardboard 
front which reflected a civilian administration and a “democracy” that held regular 
elections”. The rule of law is compromised as authoritarians take control of military 
institutions and satisfy them to insulate themselves from displacement (Weeks, 2009). In 
Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, patronage in state institutions is high therefore it limits 
democratization.  
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1.4. Judiciary  
The routinization of elections which would normally perfect them, is a formality for legal 
protection. Following electoral guidelines, Zimbabwe has a clear legal framework guiding 
electoral processes. It went through a referendum and the last constitution was drafted and 
passed in 2012, legislation guiding the conduct of democratic institutions was passed, 
electoral systems and boundaries were drawn with all parties in agreement. The president 
legitimately nominated members of the electoral body who swore to abiding by legal 
proceedings governing them and electoral codes of conduct were agreed to.  
 
However, these institutions are not utilized adequately. The constitution is amended 
according to the executive’s desire. The constitution protects selected interests and 
remains flawed and unable to substantively promote and protect the human rights of all 
the people of Zimbabwe today. All amendments made have been in favor of entrenchment 
of state power and have compounded the attack on, rather than the protection of, civil 
rights and liberties as confirmed by the courts and otherwise (Zimbabwe Lawyers for 
Human Rights, 2007). Civil society, opposition and donor operations are limited by its 
provisions. Since Independence, the constitution has been amended seventeen times and 
almost all amendments “sought to reverse judicial rulings which have set standards for 
constitutional conduct by the state” and “others have been a direct and unadulterated 
assault on the very liberties espoused in the Constitution” (ZLHR, 2007). 
 
“Amendment No. 7 (Act 23 of 1987) abolished the system of a Ceremonial President and a 
Prime Minister and instead introduced the Executive Presidency which subsists today. Executive 
power of the presidency was entrenched by this and concomitant amendments in the following 
years, leading to the current crisis in which the country finds itself today”. 
(ZLHR, 2007) 
 
“The Amendments have become an everyday method by which judicial decisions can be 
subverted, human rights defenders increasingly repressed, the status quo maintained by way of 
political patronage and the rule of law and separation of powers subverted”.  
(ZLHR, 2007) 
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Judges are appointed by the president and sometimes dismissed by the executive at his 
mercy. One respondent talked of an incident where the Supreme Court wrote encouraging 
the president to respect the rule of law following three High Court orders to release 
arrested journalists and not use intelligence officers to hold civilians. The president went 
on national television in retaliation and attacked the judges before challenging them to 
resign, because they had “no right to instruct him to do anything and that, because of their 
biased petition, the government could no longer trust them on any case involving the 
executive” (Shaoul, 1999). The judges have since been dismissed.  
 
Respondents said a strong legal system was required to protect the independence of 
democratic institutions from executive dominance but even the parliament has failed to 
uphold the rule of law. The state undermines civil liberties, breaches constitutional 
provisions of ‘hate speech’ and incites violence including intervening unconstitutionally 
in legal processes as also found by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2001). 
Respondents also highlighted the disappearance of opposition complainant’s files, the 
systematic loss of court cases by opposition members, the ‘rubbishing’ of issues and 
bureaucracy (to buy time until it ‘loses steam’). There is a need to revert to 
constitutionalism.  
 
1.5. Strong people and weak institutions 
Economic interests, power and dislike of Western influence or opposition came up as 
limitations to democratization efforts in Zimbabwe. Two pro-government respondents 
said he was “people’s choice”. Mugabe, widely known for his anti-West stance has 
increasingly been agitated by Western interference in Zimbabwean political affairs. All 
donors said the government was ‘welcoming’ on issues to do with humanitarian aid, 
although talks of political reforms had often “stalled talks”. They said Mugabe has 
retaliated against a pro-democracy push and imposed repressive measures on intervention 
guidelines. Local respondents pointed to his love for power and that he did not see anyone 
suitable replacement in his party. Mugabe in reaction to UN Chief, Ban Ki-moon’s call 
for African leaders to leave at the end of their terms in February 2016 said, though 92 he 
would contest the 2018 election and would remain in power till “God says come” (Reuters, 
104 
 
2016). Respondents pointed to Mugabe and his wife’s economic interests as limiting his 
possibilities of resigning because their interests and security might not be guaranteed. 
Ranked in 2015 as Africa’s eighth richest president, Mugabe was said to be worth around 
US$ 10 million (Africa Ranking, 2015) although respondents believe he is worth more 
due to diamond and gold mining.  
 
Also, Kpundeh (1992) in his study on democratization in Africa found, in Ethiopia - like 
Zimbabwe, personality issues challenge as rulers encourage personal cults, with portraits 
prominently and extensively displayed (Mugabe in April 2016 even bowed before his own 
portrait) and popularly called the “Father of the nation”. Kpundeh (1992) found, in Benin 
similar to Zimbabwe, local leaders ask why new leaders should be selected yet “the old 
one is still alive” (Mugabe at 93 years even declared he will die in power). Making 
presidents ‘irreplaceable, unchallengeable and above the law fathers’ who cannot entertain 
contestation or change. Furthermore, the ‘zero-some’ nature of Zimbabwean politics 
where the winner takes all limits continuous competition as after Zanu-PF’s victory, 
opposition is almost eliminated with the exception of post 2008 elections that led to a 
power-sharing agreement. Victory by one party should not equal total elimination of the 
other, multi-partism must be continuously encouraged to keep incumbents on check. This 
is a problem in Ethiopia especially where politics is seriously ethnically divided and 
victory of one party leads to unequal distribution of wealth and development. These neo-
patrimonial tendencies exist in Zimbabwe’s politically divided society where the 
incumbent constantly discriminately awards its supporters. According to Kpundeh (1992), 
bargaining and compromise is necessary.  
 
2. Democracy by Elections  
 
Paya takatambwa asi tinoramba tichirwa. 
(They cheated us that time but we will keep fighting) 
 
Kunyangwe vakaunza dziri mombe, hatirambe asi tosangana mu box. 
(Even if they give us cows, we won’t refuse, but we will meet in the ballot box) 
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“This is why they invest so much in these Israeli firms, vanoziva kuti election yakapenga” 
(This is why they invest so much in these Israeli firms (NIKUV), they know how powerful an 
election is)  
(CSO respondents) 
 
This study found significant trust is placed on elections for Zimbabwe’s democratization. 
During an interview with one of Zimbabwe’s prominent CSO Director, the researcher 
asked if elections were still significant in democratizing Zimbabwe. He talked of how 
Zimbabweans are excited each time they visit both rural and urban communities for 
outreach programs mostly for civic education “but the discussion always turns to Mugabe, 
politics and elections”. He said, Zimbabweans still believe in the power of the ballot to 
change their circumstances. He added, not only the citizens but the incumbent too as the 
Registrar Generals’ office paid US$ 10,578,335 to manipulate central records systems and 
voter registration information for the 2013 harmonized elections (Independent, 2013). 
Adding that, citizen’s participation during elections gives people a voice in a country 
where people are subdued and silenced on political discourse.  
 
When asked about the effectiveness of democratization by elections, most respondents 
said elections remained the only “sensible” “peaceful” “participatory” forms of 
democratization. Donors on one hand did not indicate any intentions to change strategies 
although acknowledging implementation aspects needed modifying. The majority of 
donors interviewed in all three countries indicated, progress observed through the last 
decades could eventually lead to successful democratization based on the willingness of 
all stakeholders. Similar to Lindberg’s argument, continuous emphasis was made on the 
need for ‘time’ considering the countries’ histories. Significant hope was placed on the 
existence of constitutions in almost all Sub-Sahara African states and their ability to guide 
political processes and maintain a degree of the rule of law. In both Zimbabwe and 
Ethiopia, respondents pointed to the state as the biggest challenge, although maintaining 
that, positive changes they had witnessed in Zimbabwe - though flawed elections are 
increasingly instrumental in entrenching the culture of accountability as the authoritarian 
regime is now aware of the ‘real will of the people’.  
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Elections in authoritarian regimes empower citizens to speak and hold government 
accountable (Schumpeter, 1942). Electoral practices contrary to present day pessimism is 
not in decline in Sub-Saharan Africa as representative democracy including participatory 
and contested elections still exists — perceived as the legitimate procedure for translating 
rule by the people into workable executive and legislative power (Lindberg, 2006). It was 
interesting to note; Zimbabweans remain hopeful they will oust the regime in every 
election without success.  
 
Because of elections’ “self-reinforcing power” (Lindberg, 2006), their constant promotion 
makes them a sustainable option for Africa’s future. Constant elections develop a 
democratic culture necessary for accountability and participation in authoritarian regimes. 
Elections are a constant reminder for authoritarians that, ‘time is up’ (term limits) and that 
they have to perform for re-election. Electoral cycle events from constitutional making, 
planning, education, to Election day — each phase allows for participation and 
competition whether it results in power transfer or not.  
 
Electoral assistance promotes democracy due to its “self-improving quality” (Lindberg, 
2006). Lessons are learnt with each round of elections. Most respondents said, democracy 
promotion efforts promoted democratization and although time, money and energy 
consuming, electoral conduct in Zimbabwe keeps improving. They pointed to the 
challenge being that, authoritarians keep growing sophisticated and advancing their 
fraudulent techniques. From ballot stuffing, to ballot transportation incidents, to results 
fixing, to voter registration manipulation, to the bussing of voters — election monitoring 
and observation needs to change move the times and catch up. Also, looking at relapses 
in West Africa where coups have displaced democratically elected governments, it is 
important to note, successful electoral transitions do not mean their completion but are a 
stimulant for greater liberalization. Because the authoritarian culture has been rooted for 
too long in African politics, it might take long for consolidation so consolidated 
democracies should not relax as is being witnessed in South Africa’s reversal (Bratton and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2015).  
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2.1. Electoral conduct  
 
“Even with four duplicated offices and one commission guarding our votes, they are still stolen. 
They are all Mugabe’s puppets.” 
(CSO representative) 
 
Zimbabwean Presidential elections have been consistently held in 1990, 1996 and 2002, 
2008 and 2013 whilst Parliamentary in 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 as stipulated by the 
constitution. EISA (2015) in its study on challenges to democratization in Zimbabwe 
found the executive to have “enormous powers” over electoral processes including “the 
capacity to change electoral laws by proclamation after the announcement of an election; 
issue statutory instruments and regulations in relation to the conduct of elections; institute 
regulations that have the potential substantially to affect electoral competition or 
participation.”  
 
2.1.1. Vote rigging 
 
2.1.1.1. Electoral managing bodies  
The degree of autonomy of electoral commissions in all three countries the researcher 
conducted interviews is very limited (Mozaffar, 2002). Although scholars like Mozaffar 
classify Zimbabwean Election Managing Bodies (EMB) as “autonomous” general 
sentiments were, EMBs lack constitutional independence due to their strong ties and 
accountability to the executive. It is understandable however as mentioned earlier, 
competitive authoritarian structures are seemingly autonomous or independent yet they 
are not (Slater, 1999). With the state controlling EMBs, credibility is low requiring 
vigilant and strong willed monitoring to ensure transparency. 
 
The president and government designated the Registrar General of elections (RG), 
Delimitation Commission, Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and Election 
Directorate, supported by the Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) that actively handle 
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all election maters. Among the sectors, confusion and imbedded mistrust limits their 
operation (EISA, 2015). Their independence is questionable given their close ties to the 
incumbent. The commissioners and staff often appear at ruling party functions, take 
instructions from the incumbent and maintain close ties with him. Nonetheless, the RG 
and ZEC are the popularly known as the main election managing bodies.  
 
The RG is supposed to conduct elections in accordance with the Electoral Act (EA) and 
according to Section 15(2) of the EA “shall not be subject to the control of any person or 
authority other than the Election Directorate” (EISA, 2005), but realistically, it is under 
the executive. It is responsible for voter registration, preparing the voters’ roll, presiding 
over the nomination court, providing ballot papers, setting up polling stations, providing 
electoral staff, proclaiming election results and protecting election materials. Respondents 
said these dynamics limit the possibilities of an objective and bias free electoral process. 
They complained of duplication between the sectors (e.g., both supervise elections, voter 
registration and report to the president) but the boundaries are not clear (the ESC is 
provided for under the constitution but the RG is under the Electoral Act and their 
functions are similar). This results in constant tensions between them.  
 
The ESC “has no powers to intervene or conduct the actual polls but report on the conduct 
of elections and make recommendations about legislative reforms” (EISA, 2015). To do 
this, the ESC must access reports on registration and other electoral matters from the RG. 
But, legally the RG is not obliged to pass any information to the ESC. The ESC in 
exercising its responsibilities, shall not be subjected to ‘the direction or control of any 
person or authority’ but at the same time does not give it the power to access information 
necessary to permit it to exercise its functions. Respondents said, though both groups 
received and reported to the executive, if ESC executions were not limited, the electoral 
process could have been more credible as each sector would check on the other. But, the 
ESC and its commissioners lack the authority to order the correction of any irregularities 
that might be identified” (EISA, 2015). The ESC must supervise the RG, but the RG now 
dominates due to strong alliances with the executive. One respondent said, “The Registrar 
General is a civil servant, has held the title since independence and often dines with the 
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president. What do you expect?” The RG should report to the ESC of any changes e.g. in 
voter registration, but he bypasses it and reports to the president leading to the resignation 
of ESC chairperson, Hatendi (EISA, 2015). The institutions are meant to be nonpartisan 
but are actually close to the incumbent who allocates their budgets and according to one 
respondent “allocates those farms” (patronage). 
 
“They told them there were cameras in each ballot box”  
 
“Chiefs had books to show who had voted or not, they also said they had voter slip numbers and 
they would check who had voted for whom” 
(CSO respondent) 
 
Almost all CSO and opposition respondents in Zimbabwe pointed to the election 
management process as the biggest limitation to the credibility of Zimbabwean electoral 
processes due to the following observed vote rigging strategies. 
 
2.1.1.2. Manipulation of constituency boundaries 
A donor specializing on elections and democratization in Africa said, “The Zimbabwean 
case is more complicated because from my experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
delimitation of constituency boundaries, which is a necessary process in elections is done 
in consultation with election managing bodies with the knowledge of voter’s roll statistics. 
But here state institutions do it alone. This is why you see more polling stations in remote 
areas than urban areas which should not be. They conducted a national census before, 
which should have informed their mapping. We offered to assist with the technical 
expertise we have but we got no response. I suspect it was deliberate because the statistics 
I have show a systematic decrease in urban polling stations and an increase in rural areas. 
This is surprising because the populations of Harare and Bulawayo alone have almost 
doubled.” EISA (2015) found the same strategy had been used for the 2002 elections with 
an increase of polling stations in Zanu–PF strongholds, where for the year 2000 elections 
244 stations were reduced in Harare to 167 in 2002, compared for example to an increase 
in Mashonaland East Province where 378 stations in 2000 were increased to 542 in 2002.  
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Some CSOs and donor respondents noted weaknesses in their observation strategies, as 
past irregularities they were concerned about were improved and replaced by the above. 
They confirmed ZESN’s (2013) findings that ballot boxes were confirmed empty before 
sealing, most voters’ fingers had no indelible ink signs, all names were checked against 
the voters roll before voting, ballot papers were stamped with ZEC stamps, there was no 
campaigning within polling stations, no incidents of disruption, intimidation or 
harassment near stations, all voters in line before voting ended were allowed to vote and 
counting processes were clear. These irregularities were common in previous elections, 
confirming this study’s earlier proposition that: the more authoritarians grow desperate 
for power, the more sophisticated their tactics become. To date, ZESN observers observe 
the continuous use of two voter’s rolls in by-elections (the main roll and a supplementary 
roll, based on the previous ward based voters’ rolls) as this compromises electoral 
transparency and integrity including the use of marker pens to mark voters’ fingers instead 
of the stipulated indelible ink (ZESN, 2016).  
 
“It was surprising to many that E-Day (Election Day) proceedings seemed clean, but little did 
we know we had lost the election before it even started”. 
(Opposition Minister) 
 
2.1.1.3. Voters and registration  
In 2002, 2008, 2013 the RG went ahead with the production of a Supplementary roll 
without notifying competing parties, neither were stakeholders informed of registered 
voter statistics. Electoral democratization cannot effectively advance without 
transparency on central tools like the voter’s roll, considering it is a public asset with 
respect to the Electoral Act. Concerning the right to participate, modifications made under 
the Electoral Act - Notice 2002, according to a legal CSO representative, was an 
intentional move by the president to limit postal votes from Zimbabweans in the diaspora 
— considered opposition supporters as a sizeable number claimed asylum in South Africa 
and other Western countries. She said the move was unconstitutional and strips citizens 
of their voting rights. Issues were raised by one opposition minister of previous limitations 
on the participation of approximately 200,000 “aliens” (those born of foreign parents in 
Zimbabwe or migrated to Zimbabwe, who later naturalized especially from the UK, 
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Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique) (EISA, 2015). Zimbabwe’s Citizenship Act had 
barred them from voting before 2013 presuming they supported the opposition as a result 
of frustrations from internal displacement, land invasions and the fast-track land reform 
program (EISA, 2015). Most ‘aliens’ did not have national identity cards before the 2013 
voter registration exercise which ran concurrently with a national identity processing 
program. 
 
2.1.1.3.1. Voter’s roll issues 
The voters roll is heavily guarded by the RG despite the new Electoral Act entitling 
constituencies to electronic copies. 8 out of 10 CSO respondents pointed to voter’s roll 
fraud, claiming the roll is a key electoral tool supposed to be availed in time for inspection 
by all Zimbabweans. However, the RG’s office has refused to avail the 2013 roll for 
inspection to date and stakeholders had problems accessing it in 2000, 2002 and 2008 too. 
Zimbabwean constitutional lawyer Mavedzenge, in 2014 filed a High Court application 
that sought to pressure ZEC to publicize the roll after it had insisted its inability to "retrieve 
it from its system as its machines have broken down". The roll containing names, dates of 
birth, national identification numbers and residential addresses, should be availed to 
paying political parties, candidates and observers, within seven days of the calling of an 
election (Booysen and Toulou, 2009). One donor said, from his experience in more than 
28 Sub-Saharan Africa elections, “the voter’s roll was the election and actions by 
Zimbabwean EMBs indicated the process was biased”. Another respondent said, when 
available, the roll is expensive and opposition parties are given limited time to inspect it; 
in 2008 it was provided in PDF making it difficult to search for ‘ordinary people,' CSOs 
were banned access and opposition complained about its manipulation (Booysen and 
Toulou, 2009).  
 
 
 
Rural vs. urban voter bias 
In 2002 similar to 2013, voter registration opened a few months before election. The 
Zimbabwe Election Support Network reported “The voter registration process was 
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systematically biased against urban voters. The voters’ roll of 19 June as provided by the 
Office of the Registrar General clearly showed that urban voters had systematically been 
denied the opportunity to register to vote. A total of 99.97% of rural voters were registered 
while only 67.94% of urban voters were registered” (ZESN, 2013) because the incumbent 
has its stronghold in rural areas. 
 
 
Source: ZESN, 2013 
 
According to ZESN (2013), more than 750,000 potential urban voters were missing from 
the voters’ roll compared to 1,223 rural voters. On Election day, voters were 
“systematically disenfranchised and at 82% of urban polling stations many potential 
voters were turned away and not permitted to vote for reasons including names not 
appearing on the voters’ roll and turning up at the wrong ward for voting, contrasted with 
rural areas where only 38% of polling stations turned away many potential voters” ZESN 
(2013). ZESN (2013) alone deployed over 7,000 observers comprising “mobile teams, 
stationary polling station observers, constituency observers and a special group of more 
than 700 observers to a sample of polling stations in every province and constituency to 
provide national representative data in real time”. Opposition MDC-Tsvangirai had 
polling agents at 96% of polling stations and ZANU-PF at 98%, MDC (Ncube) at 48% 
Table 1: Comparison of Registered Voters with Estimated Eligible 
Voters by Rural/Urban Wards 
  
Urban/Rural  Voters Roll 
19 June 2013 
2012 Census 
Estimate  
Difference Per cent 
Registered 
Rural Wards 4,278,103 72.64% 4,279,336 64.33% 1,223 99.97% 
Urban 
Wards 
1,612,066 27.36% 2,372,522 35.67% 760,456 67.94% 
Total 5,890,169  6,651,858  761,689  
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and other political parties 46% combined. However, the full coverage of observers was 
not sufficient to deter fraud. Below are more irregularities noted: 
 
Deceased voters  
Deceased voters or 'ghost voters' on the roll have been contentious as the Electoral Act 
stipulates, constituency registrars must remove dead and disqualified voters from the roll 
based on a family member or descendant’s sworn statement - ZESN in 2011 reported, 
27% of names on the roll were of deceased persons, yet relatives upon registering or voting 
would report someone had voted in their place (Chikuhwa, 2013). Respondents also 
mentioned the duplication of names on the roll attributing it either to incompetency or 
fraud. 
 
Voters turned away 
 
CSO and opposition respondents complained 
about new tactics such as the “turning away” 
of voters in urban areas. At “49% of polling 
stations ZESN (2013) observers reported 25 
or more potential voters being turned away 
and not permitted to vote (39% rural and 82% 
urban) because they were not on the voters’ 
roll, despite voting in previous elections. 
They were now registered in the wrong wards (Chikuhwa, 2013) and their unauthorized 
movement on the roll from one ward to another is fraudulent. Some had registration slips 
and names not appearing on the voters’ roll” ZESN (2013). One respondent said, it was 
to limit opposition votes in their strongholds. 
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2.1.1.3.2. Voter intimidation 
 
“Assisted” voters 
 
ZESN (2013) reported that at 38% of polling stations 
25 or more voters were assisted to vote, with a sharp 
contrast observed between urban and rural polling 
stations. “At 49% of rural polling stations, more than 
25 people were assisted to vote compared to only 5% 
in urban polling stations. At 88% of polling stations 
assisted voters were allowed to be assisted by a 
person of their choice” (ZESN, 2013). One CSO 
representative said they were “shocked at how desperate the regime had become” as 
Zimbabwe was “ranked the highest in African adult literacy”. He said he was informed 
the elderly were forced to ‘ask for help’ from Zanu-PF aligned ‘assistants’ to ensure they 
vote for them. Other issues raised included the ‘bussing-in’ of voters across wards to 
double vote (as observers said the indelible ink used during the 2013 elections was not 
original and could easily be washed off) and the presence of police in 83% of the polling 
stations (ZESN, 2013) despite them being allowed only upon invitation by the presiding 
officer due to concerns of intimidation as they resemble the state. Issues were also raised 
against the Special Vote period were security forces were forced to vote for the incumbent 
under the inspection of their superiors and voted multiple times (BBC, 2013).  
 
2.1.2. Transition of power 
 
Democracy promotion has failed to a great extent considering post-election events. 
Normally characterized by citizen’s acceptance of results, Zimbabwe’s post-election 
periods for the past two decades according to respondents often start with opposition 
results contests. CSO and opposition respondents shared experiences of discrepancies 
between results posted at polling stations and those presented by ZEC during 
proclamation. Following the 2013 elections, 101 election petitions were lodged 
challenging 2013 election results in the Electoral Court, of which: 95 came from MDC-T 
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candidates and 6 from ZANU-PF. This is a significant number; most were either 
withdrawn by petitioners on various grounds or dismissed by the Electoral Court for 
procedural reasons. Many of the petitions were withdrawn because of the inability to raise 
security deposit (approximately US$ 10000 cash), non-availability of the Electronic roll, 
or petitions withdrawn for procedural reasons e.g. failure to provide contact details of 
persons accused of electoral malpractices or witnesses and legal fees.  
 
Respondents said, electoral petitions and appeals in authoritarian states require vigilant 
follow-up coupled with resilience against common judicial soft power tactics of ‘delay,' 
‘diversion,’ ‘suppression,’ ‘belittling’ or ‘bureaucracy,' as authoritarians thrive on 
frustrating opponents to their advantage. Democratic stakeholders need to be legally aware 
of and defend constitutional provisions limiting the arbitrary introduction and 
amendments of inhibiting laws. Astute opposition representatives must lead negotiation 
processes in processes like constitution making as the MDC did in 2013 in defense of 
citizen’s rights. Respondents mentioned the withholding of election results in 2008 after 
Zanu-PF’s loss to MDC for more than a month after vote counting and Mugabe’s 
announcement of his readiness for a run-off election before results were announced 
(Masunungure, 2010). The authenticity of the process was questioned. 
 
3. Contestation and Participation 
 
On the two main attributes of this research: contestation and participation, this study finds 
both are existent to varying degrees. Contestation, one of electoral democracy’s attributes 
is existent in African authoritarian states as evidenced by multiple parties, party splits and 
other fierce competitive forms for power e.g. internal displacements (coups). Participation 
based on the equality of citizens can be contested although in the case of Zimbabwe is 
allowed to a great degree when it suits the authoritarian’s needs e.g. incumbents can 
forcefully mobilize citizens to participate in a referendum furthering their interests or in 
areas they know they will collect the greatest votes (strongholds).  
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When asked about the attributes of political competition and participation, some 
respondents referred to the candidate nomination process saying it was a necessary starting 
point of investigation. To be fielded as a party or independent candidate in Zimbabwe, 
one is required to file for nomination with the courts. Another respondent said, they 
deployed local observers to observe the nomination court proceedings in provincial courts 
and found, opposition parties are free to register and run as long as they meet the legal 
requirements. The challenges are, candidates turned away due to nationality issues (e.g., 
migrants without formal identification particulars), also the complicated, bureaucratic and 
expensive nature of the process limits participation.  
 
“We affirm that nations cannot be built without the popular support and full participation of the 
people, nor can the economic crisis be resolved and the human and economic conditions 
improved without the full and effective contribution, creativity, and popular enthusiasm of the 
vast majority of the people. After all, it is to the people that the very benefits of development 
should and must accrue. We are convinced that neither can Africa's perpetual economic crisis 
be overcome, nor can a bright future for Africa and its people see the light of day unless the 
structures, pattern, and political context of the process of socioeconomic development are 
appropriately altered”. 
(African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, 1990) 
 
Respondents indicated, Zimbabweans have not fully understood the effectiveness of 
popular participation. According to Bratton (1998), popularly participated elections are 
difficult to manipulate. Another donor said, democracy activists do not put the people first 
in transition planning, apart from their voting role, they focus mostly on programming and 
reporting, yet he observed that all democratic processes can be solely pushed by a willing 
people (Peeler, 2009) and (Hagopian, 1993). Respondents also said, voter turnout statistics 
did not meet their expectations compared to the state of the economy and hardships. They 
expected economic decline to motivate voters to participate, for regime change (Resnick).  
 
While a Zanu-PF youth leader said, “Zanu-PF understands the electorate’s power, this is 
why it has strong grassroots structures yet the opposition focuses on urban areas. More 
than 50% of this country stay outside urban areas and we know they will vote for us”. 
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Zanu-PF has been accused of forcing citizens to participate (Newsday, 2016). The people 
are ‘objects’ used as a symbol of popular support by authoritarians (although forced 
mostly) for media projections. Kpundeh (1992) found, “There is ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
participation…’False participation’ has been used by many African governments to 
project an appearance of support for government policies, but actually tends to promote 
the cult of personality and to stifle individual and local initiatives. As such, critics of the 
government either are intimidated or absorbed. ‘True participation’ in contrast, constantly 
must seek to present the views of individuals from the grass roots level”. Two respondents 
said, areas of participation vary and are selective as the incumbent does not consult the 
public on policies that affect them. However almost all respondents in Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania and Ethiopia said democratization had failed due to legal and security 
restrictions on public participation.  
 
Zimbabwe’s historical transition from authoritarian dominant one party rule to multi-
partism in the 90s was not easy. Almost three decades down, this is an auspicious time to 
evaluate challenges and prospects. Prior to the mid-90s, Zanu-PF had not experienced 
viable political competition after co-opting post-liberation foes, the Zimbabwe African 
People's Union (ZAPU). Elections were commendable by international standards, 
freedoms were respected and the rule of law was strong. There was popular participation 
between stakeholders and government through dialogue. There were no term limits and 
Mugabe’s constant nomination ensured his rule without limit.  
 
3.1. Popular beliefs or culture  
The concept of opposition being a fairly new concept was not acceptable to many Zanu-
PF supporters, nationalists and Zimbabweans at large. Similar to Asian Confucianist 
values, hierarchy, loyalty and respect for elders and seniors is important - Mugabe was 
and is still considered by some as the ‘Father’ or ‘Jesus’ of Zimbabwe ‘Ordained by God’ 
(Southern Eye, 2016). It is not common to oppose the leader, thus multi-partism was 
received with a lot of suspicion as having been sponsored by external forces that did not 
understand the system (Western). Opposition was equated to rebellion deserving 
punishment. Citizens however have the right to form political parties and practice basic 
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political rights like campaigning. Although, respondents said, like CSOs, contestation by 
opposition parties was limited by strict registration requirements. These beliefs are 
popular, mostly deriving from socialization processes and often open to the abuse of 
authoritarian leaders like Mugabe. Recently, Mugabe invited critics from war veteran 
groups to come forward and make clear their desire or intention for leadership change. 
Opposition groups have often been invited to do the same. The calls have not been sincere 
as they have attracted state retribution.  
 
USAID has over the last decade promoted the re-establishment of the rule of law in 
Zimbabwe through the promotion of Free and fair political and justice systems, the 
protection of human rights, vibrant civil society and public confidence in the police and 
the courts. In the past seeking individual justice against individuals in positions of power 
has been difficult as elites abuse their positions to avoid the rule of law. Institutions of 
justice have often been abused by elites either through covert threats or the corrupt 
provision of benefits to presiding officers. So, the necessary climate for democratization 
has been negatively affected and so has public confidence in governance systems and 
subsequent economic growth. USAID’s objective in governance initiatives is to improve 
the relationship between civilians and state actors by directly linking those who are 
governed with those who are democratically elected to govern. USAID also works to 
support the rule of law by promoting legal and regulatory frameworks that improve order 
and security, legitimacy, checks and balances, and equal application and enforcement of 
the law (USAID, 2016). 
 
Too much respect for any individual has the potential to limit demands for accountability 
from the individual. Democratic principles particularly the electoral form are founded on 
demands and rewards for accountability. It is not until citizens are strong enough to 
question their leadership that real change can be delivered. There are exceptions however 
as since June 2016, Zimbabwean citizens have begun to mobilize among themselves to 
stand up against various governance ills. One main motivation was a movement initiated 
by a Zimbabwean Pastor - Mawarire, titled “ThisFlag”. According to Zeilig (2016), author 
of the Struggle reawakens in Zimbabwe, “a national shutdown, or “stay away”, in 
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Zimbabwe in July 2016 paralyzed the country, as for the first time in years, the country's 
ruling party ZANU-PF and the tenure of 92-year-old president Robert Mugabe, were 
seriously rattled”. To date various movements such as “Tajamuka” have given life or re-
energized opposition political parties to re-group and demonstrate.  
 
Opposition MDC-T has joined with the Zimbabwe People First’s (ZPF) party in country 
wide campaigns demonstrating against Mugabe failed regime. Being the two most viable 
parties with ZPF attracting former supporters of the ruling party following their leader’s 
fallout; citizens have re-gained interest in political participation as evidenced by increased 
online trends of current political events there as well as their physical participation through 
attendance at the coalition rallies. Slowly, the culture of docility, strict loyalty and respect 
of Zimbabweans is fading as fear in the ailing regime has significantly decreased. To say 
however that the traditional beliefs of the Zimbabwean locals affects the process of 
democratization would be an over statement. 
 
3.2. Election boycotts  
Election boycotting was raised as a challenge to democracy promotion as the MDC 
boycotted the 2008 and post 2013 by-elections. Respondents said the MDC is not 
proactive as a number of candidates and supporters had already been assaulted, abducted 
and killed over a long period. Opposition boycotts have not been effective in Zimbabwe 
as supported by Frankel (2010) and the MDC has not had widespread support in its 
boycott. When authoritarians force electorate to go and vote, voters have two choices — 
either spoil the ballot or vote for the next available option. Resultantly, Zanu-PF has won 
all uncontested seats. Even worse, coordination among opposition parties lacks as parties 
like the National Constitutional Assembly have continued contesting to date, though 
unsuccessfully.  
 
The relationship between parties and their supporters is based on trust. When the MDC 
announces it is boycotting until certain conditions are met e.g. availability of the voter’s 
roll, and then changes its position and decides to participate, potential voters are confused 
and lose trust. The MDC has said it will now contest the 2018 elections despite no electoral 
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changes having been made to address previous concerns (The Zimbabwean, 2016). 
Boycotting decisions have led to MDC splits in the past i.e. 2005 and 2013 (Chronicle, 
2013). Zanu-PF to-date either ignores MDC boycotts; ridicules them as a cowardly move; 
denigrates them for being too weak to challenge; cracks them down e.g. before the high-
profile run-off in 2008, where even the MDC president was arrested and supporters were 
beaten for not participating; or negotiates insincerely as Zanu-PF did following 
international pressure. Zanu-PF’s downplaying of opposition boycotts gives a false image 
that citizens approve of existing electoral conditions, citing high turnout. One respondent 
said, the challenge is donors like the US encourage participation even though the election 
is flawed for a representative election Frankel (2010), but this increases competitive 
authoritarianism.  
 
3.3. Mass action  
Opposition protest marches to date are constantly blocked for "lack of enough security 
detail" as and this inhibits participation. Some respondents insinuated democratization had 
a lot to with the local population and their will for change; indicating a correlation exists 
between a ‘pro-transformation’ society and the rate of democratization. One respondent 
said, “Zimbabweans are too peaceful and keep adjusting to a worsening economy. They 
will not rise up, if they did not rise when we were buying loaves of bread for a million 
Zimbabwean dollars, we don't force them rising up.” Another diplomat — donor gave 
reference to experiences in West Africa, where a Zimbabwean economic woes would have 
quickly resulted in uprisings. Another respondent said unity of purpose lacked among 
Zimbabweans with a "what effect does marching have” mentality. She said civilians had 
lost interest in mass action arising from previous arrests of civil society and activists as 
the government has succeeded in instilling fear and subduing citizens. Yet according to 
Resnick (2013), vertical accountability is enhanced by social movements as citizens have 
the ability to assess government performance and sanction or reward accordingly. 
Normally, when bad governance persists, a crisis emerges through mass action and if 
unsettled, a crisis of democracy should arise (Wang, 2002). This however has not been 
the case with Zimbabweans. Outside trade unions and NGO demonstrations, the general 
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masses have not collectively mobilized to demand executive accountability. When they 
try, they face retribution.  
 
3.4. Civil society 
Donors in Zimbabwe were happy overall with progress CSOs have made between the 
2000 and 2013 elections — lobbying, coordinating, educating, observing and reporting. 
CSOs on the other hand attributed several changes in public participation to their efforts, 
including demystifying falsehoods around ballot secrecy, emphasizing on voting as a 
human right and information on the availability of pro-bono lawyers for human rights 
issues or pluralizing flows of information (Diamond, 1999). On equal participation, CSOs 
said patriarchal dominance was slowly challenged by women’s participation especially in 
rural areas as they are now consulted in constitution making and civic education processes, 
as the country’s majority. They found women to be effective mobilisers and campaigners, 
often convincing their husbands, children and communities to attend CSO meetings and 
campaigns and also raise voter awareness, although the limitations around patriarchal 
dominance and poverty limit them. 
 
CSOs said their division of roles i.e. election monitoring, media, outreach, research and 
advocacy, they are more efficient. They said, following the incumbent’s re-election in 
2013, CSOs have suffered from reductions in funding, are fatigued and lack the creativity 
required to move forward. Lewis (1992), in his assessment of the problems of emerging 
civil society formations in Africa states that, civil society does not only consist of the 
above kinds of democracy-building groups and functions, it is also an arena of conflict 
(and often very intense conflict) between organized interests of various kinds—economic, 
social, and ethnic. Zimbabwean CSOs face the same problems of poverty, corruption, 
nepotism, parochialism, opportunism, illiberalism, and willingness to be co-opted that 
plague the society in general and limit their effectiveness. Learning from South Africa, 
Malawi and Zambia, when CSOs unite to overthrow autocracies, they are a force to reckon 
with, hence joint action is imperative. 
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Development NGOs and CSOs have become some the highest paying sectors in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Popular for per diems often received when employees travel for work 
related activities or when they attend workshops and conferences especially. The 
researcher found, a significant amount of funds is used for such purposes. Corruption is 
rife and CSOs tend to organize countless conferences and workshops on similar issues, 
with the same people. Some respondents said, their directors had become “frequent 
business class flyers” yet these funds could be used to fund grassroots. One respondent 
exclaimed, “How expensive should democratization be?!” Sentiments were raised on 
donor’s lack of effective monitoring and evaluation that has created these ‘elite clubs’. 
Furthermore, respondents said most donors publicly state their preference for certain 
causes over others, forcing recipient organizations alter their causes to qualify.  
 
Democracy aid requires modification, continuous aid inflows with the current situation 
increases dependency, and resultantly some said, some CSOs and donors did not want the 
situation to change as they stand to benefit from the stalemate and do not negotiate in good 
faith as they might not have the stamina to modify their missions and survive in fully 
democratic societies. A CSO representative in Ethiopia said, “Yes, democracy aid 
promotes democracy but it also creates dependency”. He said Ethiopia had been 
dependent on foreign aid since the 1950s due to civil wars and famine, but now the locals 
have become “lazy…even where they can fight for their cause, they want hand-outs” and 
some did not want the situation to change as they benefited from the crisis. The same can 
be said about Zimbabwe, where a decrease in aid after the disputed 2013 elections has led 
to the downsizing and closure of a number of CSOs. General conversations with 
Zimbabwean CSOs indicated a near end to their activism due to limited resources, yet one 
would expect the cause to escalate however resulting from their ‘suffering’. 
 
Other limitations raised were the inability of trade unions and CSOs to ‘move with the 
times’ and modify their strategies for an ever changing political system. Before, focus was 
on corruption, welfare and political rights issues — all issues relevant to Zimbabwe during 
the 90s, they managed to successfully expand their focus to political liberalisation 
(constitutional discourse) including human rights (EISA, 2015). However, governance 
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continues to evolve and internal revival strategies are necessary to avoid exhaustion. 
Another challenge with changing times was that, from around 1999 to 2013 CSOs and 
opposition received huge donations each year. One respondent said her organization 
would receive at least US$ 5 million and this has made democratization more of an 
“industry” than a “cause”. Some said extant democratic deficit and state repression meant 
CSOs had failed to facilitate democracy. While others commended CSO efforts for 
pushing for and constantly organizing advocacy campaigns and debates despite given state 
bureaucracy in seeking permission. They also complained about state exclusionary tactics 
against them in high level issues e.g. the SADC power-sharing negotiations given the 
wealth of civilian concerns they collected. CSOs are able to tie different facets of society 
if managed well for successful transition and Diamond (1999) in his analysis of 
democratic development in Africa stresses on their importance, almost to say — it is 
unavoidable to work with them in the process. Their democratic functions range from 
regulating the power of the state and challenging its abuses of authority to monitoring 
human rights and strengthening the rule of law Diamond (1999). 
 
3.5. Media  
Donors in Zimbabwe said they had extended their focus to media enhancement for civic 
education and participation, particularly from Rapporteurs sans Frontières, DFID and the 
Ford Foundation. Authoritarian regimes like Zimbabwe’s normally dominate information 
outlets with propaganda and do not allow alternative sources. Most independent media is 
opposition aligned — often facing hostility from government. One media related CSO 
representative said, they had successfully broken incumbent dominated spaces as 
independent newspapers such as the Daily News and NewsDay widen information bases; 
provide CSOs opportunities to include their opinions on democratic processes as well as 
advertise public awareness events; it does the same for opposition parties as they can sell 
their manifestoes or policies as well as information on party events. They however said, 
Zimbabwe was still far from accommodating independent media evidenced by the 
introduction of repressive anti-participation laws such as the Access to Protection of 
Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA).  
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Implemented in 2002 and 2007 respectively, the government legitimized extensive media 
control through Zimbabwe's main media outlets — radio and television and turned them 
to campaign platforms for the incumbent particularly following the contentious fast-track 
land reform program. AIPPA also limited contestation as only Zanu-PF could campaign, 
disadvantaging opposition parties as most rural areas were difficult mostly accessible via 
radio. Independent media houses like the critical Daily News were closed and journalists 
(VOA, 2014). Government also introduced the Private Voluntary Organisation Act (PVO 
Act) in 1995 obliging NGOs and CSOs to register as voluntary organizations under the 
Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare and restrict the abuse of funds and 
limit foreign interference. Due to massive backlashes, the Act was not fully implemented. 
Donors however noted great successes in Liberia and Congo where indigenous media was 
enhanced and countries like Ghana maintained high levels of press freedom, although 
Zimbabwe is among the eight countries that suffered the largest declines in 2015 (Freedom 
House, 2016). Zimbabwe’s main media outlets e.g. national television remains partisan 
and is used to indoctrinate and spread propaganda against democratization champions. 
Concerns were also raised on media’s lack of consideration of remote areas, 
professionalism and donor co-ordination. 
 
Access to information is an important component of democratization, so stakeholders aim 
for a free and reliable media. In Tanzania and Ethiopia too, donors said besides electoral 
technologies they have tried to upgrade electronic media. In Zimbabwe, they had provided 
small solar radios accessible to the international Voice of America (VOA) station before 
the government banned them. Becker and Vlad (2005) in their study on democracy 
promotion and media found, foreign commitments on media ranged between US $600 
million and US $1 billion a year. In Tanzania, remarkable progress has been made in 
accommodating independent media though very little in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe 
respectively.  
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External factors  
 
1. Donors 
Summarizing respondent views, democracy promoters are not the main limitation to 
democracy promotion's success. Dating back to the introduction of Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) by the IMF and WB, foundations were laid for “low-
intensity” democracy, through “‘good governance’ initiatives with very little or no effort 
at stimulating or forcing political changes” (EISA, 2015). But, improvements in 
governance and liberalization through an adherence to constitutional provisions, regular 
elections and an increase in freedoms were noted. Respondents said these developments 
unlocked opportunities for unions and other interest groups to protest and hold 
government accountable for unfulfilled promises, and with the assistance of foreign 
donors, momentum rose to mobilize across Zimbabwe and demonstrate against a failing 
economy and deteriorating governance. They said there was notable improvement in the 
efficiency of state institutions that also enabled electoral democracy’s improvement, 
although two respondents attributed this to Britain’s significant investments in Southern 
Africa before independence. They said the incumbent inherited a well-functioning system 
but the real test is now.  
 
The tripling of budgets by major donors like DFID, USAID and the European Union 
according to interview responses has facilitated the increase in the number of NGOs 
according to one respondent — from less than fifty in 1996 to over 700 today, and of those 
about a third focus on democracy related activities and the rest on humanitarian and other 
social issues. Donors have increasingly restructured their governance interventions. 
Realizing Zimbabwe required targeted US support, USAID introduced a series of strategic 
interventions focusing mostly on aiding civil society. Zimbabwean CSOs are better skilled 
and adept to participate in political decision making. 
 
Unfortunately, as will be expanded in the limitations section, actual data on each country’s 
aid commitments was a challenge to obtain due to strict restrictions on foreign financing 
by the Zimbabwean government. One donor however said, all major Western donors 
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committed at least US $30 million each year for democracy assistance and governance, 
he however did not disclose if these amounts were declared as ‘democracy’ for 
‘governance’ funds and he said there had been an increase in these commitments 
particularly in the run up to the 2008 and 2013 presidential and harmonized elections, 
although a decrease can be noted since 2014. Another donor said the EU’s commitments 
for Zimbabwe’s democracy and governance assistance increased and averaged about 
US$ 1 billion since 2009. In Tanzania, donors informed me the German government alone 
had increased its commitments from around US$ 350 million in 2001 to about 
US$1.4billion in 2012 and the UK from about US$ 680 million to more than US$ 2.2 
billion by 2009, saying a similar trend could be noted in Zimbabwe. 
 
In Ethiopia, both donors said aid commitments had notably increased particularly between 
1985 and 2009. Due to the sensitivity of issues around donor commitments, they were not 
willing to disclose the actual amounts, although they said food aid made up at least half 
of their commitments, although 'other programs' including government related funding 
had increased from about 200million in 1991 on average to a billion by 2009, although 
there has been a 'slight decline after 2011'. They did not have actual statistics of all major 
donors after 2013 therefore they could not say if the trend had gone up at the time of the 
interview. Ethiopia banned a number of NGOs and CSOs under the Civic Organizations 
Law in 2011 which control NGO and CSOs’ functions as well as monitors and controls 
their funding. From their work with the African Union and information collected across 
West and East Africa, they could confirm the same trend in increasing aid in most Sub-
Saharan Africa cases.  
 
“The ‘African way’ was quite foreign to us before we started operating here. Politically, we 
thought democracy was slowly taking roots although I must admit we were more concerned 
about civil wars. If maybe we had done our research into what had looked like the consolidation 
of democracy, we would have detected these problems a long time ago. Elections are widely 
practiced but the quality is low and there has not been any power turnover.” 
(Donor respondent in Zimbabwe) 
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All CSO representatives in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania attested to having benefited 
immensely from international support. One Zimbabwean CSO Head said, “My friend, 
without foreign aid we could have only dreamt of all this being possible. There is so much 
work to be done and because we are starting from scratch or negative in some cases, it 
takes a little longer. This government had never had anyone questioning its actions. They 
don't like us, we know! But it is not about them, it’s about the people. But, we are hopeful 
Zimbabwe’s story will soon change.” 
 
CSOs are increasingly prominent domestically and said their causes are receiving more 
attention particularly concerning legal and rights violations. Donors said they had been 
more successful in non-political projects e.g. humanitarian, gender and environmental, but 
experienced more bureaucratic challenges and were “frustrated with the distrust in other 
issues”. Two donors said their support included parliamentary reform where they helped 
assist in the appliance of Parliamentary Reform Committee recommendations, however 
executive control limited their involvement and it is “difficult to trust the government’s 
sincerity”. They however noted more progress during the power-sharing period between 
Zanu-PF and MDC as the dilution meant little dominance by one party and there was 
“greater understanding” of the need to reform parliament. They said the objectivity of 
most legislative processes after the MDC’s loss of parliamentary majority backslid as 
Zanu-PF tries to show ‘they are in charge’.  
 
One donor running a parliamentary project highlighted that, government is backtracking 
on provisions of the Cotonou Agreement between EU and African states, which besides 
poverty eradication also stresses on the promotion of criminal justice and impunity 
through the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Zimbabwean government does not 
subscribe to some of its provisions and Mugabe in his capacity as SADC and AU 
Chairperson is reported to have recently influenced South African President Zuma not to 
surrender ICC fugitive, Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir during his visit to South 
Africa. So, this is a common problem with governance intervention — donor states have 
to depend on the willingness of recipients, which is often a challenge when the issues 
threaten their authority which often forces compromise. Capacity building support and 
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training provided to key local democratic networks such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Association (ZimRights) and the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN) over 
more than a decade according to one donor has made them internationally competitive 
compared to other elections in his opinion.  
 
1.1. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 
The idea behind democracy promotion, as mentioned earlier is to elevate non-democracies 
to resemble mature democracies by a transformative process of ‘institutional modelling’ 
with naturalistic and self-reinforcing qualities, through peaceful gradual political change 
(Carothers, 1997). Carothers identifies US’ three main categories of institutions and 
processes: the electoral arena, governmental institutions and civil society. In the electoral 
arena, promoters aim for ‘free’ and ‘fair’ elections and provide technical assistance to 
electoral commissions and voter education. Donors said despite challenges with election 
credibility in Zimbabwe, they had succeeded in assisting CSOs in almost all aspects in the 
electoral cycle, with one donor saying: “Zimbabwe had never included opposition parties 
and CSOs in its constitutional making process. We helped them develop advocacy tools 
for negotiation and shared our expertise on inclusive electoral legislation terms”. Other 
CSOs said they had received assistance recruiting, training and deploying observers. 
Another CSO representative said, “Besides general observation procedures, I would want 
to believe most of us did not know about processes such as constituency mapping”. 
 
Respondents pointed to successful political party development to strengthen key parties’ 
thorough technical assistance and training. Through governmental institutions, where 
promoters believe a ‘top-down’ strategy is necessary, donors have provided expert advice 
e.g. on constitutionalism. Respondents said areas like parliamentary support and judicial 
reform, where promoters aim for an efficient and independent judiciary by training legal 
personnel and establishing arbitration mechanisms were less successful due to 
government involvement. They said civil society support had been successful as CSOs are 
able to amplify citizen concerns to government and media organizations have diversified 
and are more resilient. 
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Problems  
However, CSO representatives pointed to a number of challenges with donor aid which 
this study summarizes here. First, donors lack consensus on the model to replicate as some 
donor requirements conflict e.g. one donor encourages organizations to work with state 
bodies to penetrate and effect change while another strictly monitors to ensure none of the 
funds benefit the state due to corruption. They said there is need for coordination. Second, 
CSOs observed that some donors want to promote causes that protect their interests, 
mentioning the problem of ‘systematic dependency’ where, because election monitoring 
can be technical, some donors do not want to train locals to be independent but want to 
“remain the experts”. One CSO representative said the experts probably want money (per 
diems) and “expat benefits”. Third, corruption is rife among donors resident in Zimbabwe 
and their local employees, evidenced by the corrupt allocation of funds to CSO allies for 
their own benefit. One respondent talked of a CSO that was organizing a voter campaign 
program and needed to print more than 100000 t-shirts and a deal was struck to give the 
donor a dollar for each t-shirt when the funds were allocated.  
 
Forth, two respondents in Zimbabwe and Tanzania highlighted issues of ‘discriminatory’ 
funding — based on the size of the recipient CSO, saying it is difficult for smaller CSOs 
to get as much funding as bigger CSOs even when their proposed projects are the same. 
Fifth, an opposition minister said donors were rather reactionary and not proactive as they 
depended on inter-party progress to start funding yet “money could hasten the process 
instead”. Pointing to an increase in political party splits and their lack of cooperation, he 
said sometimes disagreements were around financing proposed processes e.g. cross-
country mobilization which is cost intensive rather than ideology and funding could hasten 
the process. Sixth, some donors and CSOs believe tension and polarisation between 
donor’s limited successful democratization as donors needed to engage the state more 
rather than focus on opposition and CSOs in non-democracies for progress. Seventh, in 
Zimbabwe as well as Tanzania and Ethiopia, CSO representatives said, there is a tendency 
amongst NGOs and CSOs to ‘follow the trend’. One respondent said, donors since 2000 
particularly focused on ‘people issues’ (affecting the populace) including political rights 
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and democratization, so every organization modified their programs to fit the requirements 
for funding.  
 
A common complaint in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Tanzania was, donors dictate on how 
they think democratization should be achieved learning from their experiences elsewhere 
without much consideration and incorporation of ‘local’ ideas. So, if the problem is 
context specific like Zimbabwe’s, the lack of ‘flexibility’ is a problem. Funding then goes 
to any organization with a well-written proposal without much focus on the cause. And 
one CSO representative said these developments led to the pugnacious relationship 
between them and the Zimbabwean government, which accuses them of being “Western 
puppets”. They said, before MDC’s entrance, NGOs’ relationship with the government 
was positive as most represented welfare issues but now even humanitarian organizations 
such as Christian Care have been accused of working with opposition community 
representatives to distribute food along party lines. So, Zanu-PF now distributes ‘state 
donations’ to its supporters as a counteroffensive.  
 
This research had proposed the nature of the donor affects aid effectiveness — multilateral 
organizations would record more successes in foreign political reform than foreign state 
representatives. Some CSO representatives said they had observed UNDP as being more 
successful due to its government cooperation strategy. One pro-government supporter said 
Westerners come with clear “regime change attitudes and expect to be received well?” 
Sometimes state engagement even when insincere might be necessary. Due to donor — 
opposition cooperation, conflict emerges so some level of neutrality is necessary. Another 
pro-government respondent said government was working with UNDP on certain projects 
and they “prefer UNDP rather than the British and Americans who simply want regime 
change”. The concentrated critique against the ruling party through the support of 
academics, student union and labour movements (EISA, 2015) hardens authoritarians.  
 
But then, respondents said, the possibility of CSOs remaining apolitical (though 
appealing) was not practical, similar to assumptions that donors can affect the political 
development of recipient countries without ever directly intervening in politics (Ottaway 
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and Carothers, 2000). Ottaway and Carothers (2000) also give examples of Peru, 
Romania, South Africa and the Philippines where Washington funds intensely politicized 
NGO communities deeply involved in struggles against authoritarian rule. The researcher 
observed, donors in both Zimbabwe and Ethiopia anticipated government retaliation 
hence their defense against government. Western donors need to loosen ties with 
opposition and CSOs and demonstrate their independence as well as demystify 
perceptions of Western propagandists. The UNDP claims to ‘impartially’ intervene 
through its Governance and Strategic Initiative and mediates between donors and the 
government (EISA, 2015); resultantly the Zimbabwean government asked for electoral 
assistance for the 2005 elections.  
 
1.2. DEVELOPMENT VS DEMOCRATIC AID  
That said, the initial separation between development and political or democracy aid 
(Resnick) due to the susceptibility of aid to corrupt administrations, diversified causes and 
made aid focused and effective. However, some respondents felt development aid has 
taken greater strides than political aid in Zimbabwe. Despite declines in Official 
Development Assistance as a share of gross national income from 6.2 to 4.9% since 1990, 
Africa remains the most aid dependent (Resnick, 2013). Resnick's findings in Sub-Saharan 
Africa indicate, “Development aid rather than democratic aid has played a stronger role 
in facilitating democratic transitions”. Some donor respondents also said their 
development aid programs were more successful than political aid in achieving its 
missions.  
 
However, the government began to ban humanitarian aid as well accusing donors of 
partisan disbursement. So donors might need to consider channeling funds through 
development rather than democracy programs as Resnick (2013) says, there are two 
possible channels: first, “Direct coercion” (conditionality), popular in the 90s where 
donors withheld aid in response to severe human rights abuses and coups. The problem is 
there is an increase in alternatives with Zimbabwe’s cooperation with the East. It was 
effective Malawi, Kenya and Zimbabwe too to an extent in the 90s and early 2000s with 
the unavailability of alternatives. Now China provides few conditions and Western donor 
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leverage is lower. Second and more ‘indirect’ — the imposition of structural adjustment 
programs, that normally lead to protests against high living costs, and have succeeded in 
Benin and Zambia (Resnick, 2013). They however did not work in Zimbabwe during the 
90s and were used by the government as an excuse for economic decline. 
 
1.3. CONDITIONALITY  
Donors have also employed contentious disincentives as democracy promotion means. 
Crawford (1997) carried out a case study on 18 cases of aid suspension (carrot and stick) 
between 1990 and 1995, in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results showed that political 
conditionality was only successful in two of the cases: Kenya and Malawi. International 
pressure on authoritarians for transformation made ‘modest’ or ‘significant’ contributions 
to democratization efforts there. In the other 16 cases, the contributions were either absent 
or unclear (Crawford, 2007). In another study on 25 cases of politically conditioned aid in 
Africa, Bratton and Van de Walle found that only eight of these resulted in democratic 
transition constituting a modest success rate (Van de Walle & Bratton, 1997). They found 
that domestic factors are far more important than international ones. 
 
The investigation of democracy assistance in developing countries or with regimes that 
do not value integrity can be complicated by dishonest recipient governments and 
institutions. They all want the carrot but are not willing to pay the price. Bratton and Van 
de Walle in their study of the impact of democracy promotion in Africa found out that a 
‘large number’ of authoritarian regimes pre-emptively enacted democratic reforms 
specifically to avoid a suspension of aid (Van de Walle & Bratton, 1997). Regimes or 
political institutions can put in place cosmetic reforms for international support. 
 
Withholding budgetary support, food aid and other development aid in Zimbabwe has 
only made the poor suffer as the government diverts blame on economic failure and bad 
governance on sanctions. The executive took advantage of discovered diamond fields to 
enrich themselves and fund their campaigns. Food and other goods were imported from 
neighboring countries like South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique who 
welcomed Zimbabweans for their business development and enrichment of their small 
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border towns. Neighboring countries have benefited from Zimbabwean’s educated 
workforce to grow their industries. Politically, the government was never really isolated 
as it found solace in regional powers, China and Middle Eastern powers for financial and 
development support. Travel bans to Western countries are not effective today as Asia and 
the Middle East provide viable alternatives for shopping, education and business. 
Economic sanctions and asset freezes only work when developed economies are united 
against lending or investing for sanctioned individuals. Without this, the West is made 
‘foolish’ as over the past five years, sanctions are being lifted gradually even though there 
isn’t much political change, but the West realizes it is losing hegemony and leverage. In 
short, conditionality has not worked. 
 
Pro-Zanu-PF respondents reiterated on the failure of sanctions or conditionality to effect 
political transformation in Zimbabwe. They blamed Zimbabwe’s bankruptcy, ill 
performing sectors and political discord on international sanctions led by the US and UK 
equating them to ‘bullies’. On the contrary opposition respondents and some CSO 
representatives said sanctions were used by the incumbent for his defense. They blamed 
Zimbabwe’s failing economy on massive fraud and the regimes routinely abuse state 
resources. 
 
Sovereignty  
 
 "So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe.” 
(Mugabe, 2002) 
 
Linked to conditionality challenges, Carothers (2006) sites democracy promotion’s very 
legitimacy as a major challenge resisted by authoritarians and citizens actively due to 
increased fear of its potency. Revolutions, strikes, sanctions, travel bans and the 
sovereignty threat that outsiders can promote, stir resistance to authoritarianism hence 
their unpopularity. As former aggressors, many African countries saw and still see 
Western states as disguising capitalist imperialism in the name of democracy promotion. 
Besides, Iraq and the War on Terrorism have hurt International Democracy Promotion’s 
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(IDP) legitimacy and widely drawn criticism that IDP policies do not promote democracy 
but reinforce powerful state’s interests.  
 
Democracy is having to “return to the challenge of engaging in global debates over its 
very value” resulting from the rise of alternative political models from the ‘third wave’ 
(Carothers et. al., 2007). Carothers considered the rise of China and the growth of 
“alternative” political models (competitive-authoritarian) as a challenge in that there is no 
longer global consensus on governance. China’s “authoritarian capitalism” and its 
assertiveness demystifies democracy as the ideal source of legitimacy, slowly replaced by 
the market and emulated by African authoritarians. He is however cautions that 
democracy promotion is not doomed but the initial generation of democracy aid has ended 
and a new generation is under way and the old generation’s advances should be 
appreciated before we quickly focus on emerging challenges. 
 
2. Chinese complications 
 
Initially, this study had not considered China as a factor affecting democratization in 
Zimbabwe. However, 15 out of 22 respondents in Zimbabwe, 1 out of 3 in Tanzania and 
4 out of 7 in Ethiopia mentioned China’s rise and its cooperation in Africa as affecting 
Western democratization efforts in Zimbabwe and Africa. Today, it is almost impossible 
to talk about African development issues without mentioning China. Summarizing 
respondents’ views: China’s minimal political conditionality principle enhance its chances 
of influencing political values in Zimbabwe faster than Western ones. The ‘carrots’ 
formerly incentivized by Westerners are now competing with Chinese types availed at 
minimum costs. Authoritarian regimes are looking ‘East’ for loans, aid and technical and 
political support. China compared to most Western countries does not put pressure on 
states to democratize.  
 
The sovereignty of a state is threatened normally by negative political conditionality. 
Authoritarian regimes in particular are not receptive or willing to trade-off, they intend to 
maximize their gains. The problem is, according to Hyde (2014) the Chinese development 
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strategy has become increasingly attractive to developing states and this is one of the main 
factors that could contribute to a decrease in international demand for Western democratic 
support and contribute to the rise of hybrid regimes. It has become apparent over the past 
decade that Chinese influence in Africa, South East Asia and elsewhere has made a 
number of countries less dependent on Western support and therefore less likely to be 
influenced by Western international pressure in favor of democracy Hyde (2014). An AU 
representative said, they had observed that, China was willing to support most African 
nations regardless of their political problems evidenced by its support of African civil 
wars in arms.  
 
“What distinguishes China from other donor countries is her guiding principle that 
economic aid must not bring economic profit to the donor” (Bartke, 1975). China’s White 
Paper on foreign aid is “guided by five principles: first, unremittingly helping recipient 
countries to build up their capacity to self-develop; second, imposing no political 
conditions; third, adhering to equality, mutual benefit and common development; fourth, 
remaining realistic while striving for the best; fifth, keeping pace with the times and 
paying attention to reform and innovation” (Zhang and Huang, 2012). Chinese aid’s 
consistency and coherence, distinguishes it from Western policies as it appears that the 
rules do not significantly change depending on the recipient country. It’s emphasis on self-
development makes it easier for states in transition to accept as states seem to favor any 
form of independence or at least feel in charge of their development. This in turn means 
less interference from the donor compared to Western strategies of constant monitoring 
and sometimes go to the extent of opening an office in the recipient country to actively 
monitor development.  
 
Hybrid democracy & China 
Complications arising from Jacques’ (2009) When China Rules the World indicate 
hegemonic hurdles for Western powers given China’s rise. US President Obama during 
the researcher’s field study in Ethiopia, referred to the Ethiopian government as 
‘democratically elected’: an indication that Western standards have been compromised or 
relaxed with changing times. To hold a ‘successful’ election despite domestic and 
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international concerns now seems to qualify a country as democratic — a notion this study 
does not agree with. As previously stated, democracy as a value is in decline or “is slipping 
back," and the validation of competitive authoritarians by powerful actors further 
strengthens illiberal democracy. If an increase in the number of countries with acceptable 
or ‘free and fair’ elections would be considered an ultimate and correct measurement of 
the state of democracy, it would be subjective as it eliminates other key principles 
including human rights and the rule of law. This study suggests validation or classification 
of ‘democracies’ based on all democratic values (inclusive of civil liberties and the rule 
of law) not elections solely.  
 
As authoritarians like Mugabe are shunned, criticized and sanctioned by the West for 
fraudulent electoral victories, corruption, undermining the rule of law and abusing human 
rights; they resort to adopting ‘look East policies’ where they easily trade, cooperation 
and borrow. But Western ideas of development are not independent of good governance 
and democracy; hence a powerful China threatens democratization as we have known it. 
With a negative human rights record, China perceives Western models of good governance 
as contentious and believes in the respect of the sovereignty of all states. China perceives 
Western democratization efforts, human rights diplomacy, humanitarian interventions and 
international criminal law ‘strategic gain’ strategies to “weaken rivals and expand their 
influence” (Nathan, 2015). Beijing has widely rejected both a move towards democracy 
and the acceptance of human and civil rights (Nathan, 2015). This is against Western 
expectations that as China rises it would embrace democratic ideals. With a foreign policy 
based on and driven by self-interest, China continues to challenge the Western 
International Democracy Promotion (IDP) mission. The main rationales of IDP - universal 
value and instrumental value stand against self-interest; of which China aims to maintain 
good relations with whatever regime is in power wherever it has economic, diplomatic 
and security interests (authoritarian or not), as “attempting to undermine a foreign regime 
would cost more than it would be worth” (Nathan, 2015).  
 
“Chinese model grows, even without Chinese efforts to propagate it, other authoritarian 
governments are encouraged by the idea that authoritarianism is compatible with 
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modernization and the try to adapt. China and Russia may represent a viable alternative 
path to modernity which in turn suggests, there is nothing inevitable about liberal 
democracy’s ultimate victory or future dominance”.  
Nathan (2015) 
 
This study uses Nathan’s (2015) findings on China’s challenge and the future of Western 
democracy promotion to frame respondents’ views. China encourages authoritarianism by 
the power of its example: Its successful rise demonstrates that authoritarianism can result 
in advanced modernization as Beijing has successfully created a ‘large middle class and 
co-opted’ it, ‘established a rule of law framework and used those institutions to outlaw 
authentic civil society’. The Chinese model like many authoritarians successfully co-opts 
its citizens and uses them to secure its position and sometimes provides gratification to its 
citizens and patrons. China also burnishes its national prestige abroad through the 
promotion of authoritarian values (by employing soft power offensives mostly through 
media), therefore the globalization of democracy is threatened Nathan (2015), via Xinhua 
News, China Central Television (CCTV). Also, in Africa especially, China plays a “key 
role in a circle of authoritarian states that pickup techniques of rule from one another”. Its 
‘rhetorical strategy’ of rebranding the regime not as authoritarian but a different form of 
democracy has been emulated.  
 
Authoritarian’s use of law to support repression exemplified by China’s criminal 
procedure contrasts democratic rule of law. Fear is instilled by means of abductions, 
arbitrary arrests, arrests without charge and sometimes death. The Zimbabwean 
government has announced proposals to restrict the internet inspired by China’s Great 
Firewall to punish government critics (TechZim, 2016). Chinas’ intentions to “roll back 
existing democratic institutions or stifle sprouts of democratic change territories where it 
enjoys special influence” Nathan (2015) e.g. in Hong Kong and Macau indicate the future 
of democratization might be endangered in authoritarian regimes cooperating with China. 
However, learning from Beijing’s reaction to Hong Kong’s 2014 Occupy Central 
Movement (Lo, 2015), chances are few that China would use its influence to encourage 
democratization in Zimbabwe.  
138 
 
 
Wiewei (2012), author of The China Wave dismisses possibilities of multiparty democracy 
ever prospering in China saying, “It is unimaginable that most Chinese would ever accept 
multiparty democracy”. According to Wiewei (2012), multiparty democracy is not 
necessary for political development and developing states can advance under authoritarian 
rule, adding that, non-Western states cannot successfully implement Western democratic 
political systems as doing so “ends up in two scenarios — either from euphoria to despair 
or euphoria to anarchy” e.g. Libya and Iraq. This however is not true with respect to the 
whole of Africa as democracy has been compatible with its established democracies like 
South Africa, Botswana and Ghana although imperfect and its resilience signals it does 
not automatically result in anarchy. This argument disincentivises authoritarians from 
adopting democracy, hence this project argues, China’s cooperation with Africa has 
negative political effects. 
 
3. Regional organisations 
 
African regional organizations would normally be expected to encourage and objectively 
monitor political processes in member states; the AU and SADC however have become 
patrimonial, and are limited by cultural values of loyalty and respect that limit their ability 
to emphasize on the need for transformation resulting from government and institutional 
separation or independence. Until regional organizations are led by a different crop of 
individual who value justice and freedom, regional missions and interventions will be 
'rubber-stamping' missions, legitimizing illegally elected leaders. They're opinions are 
important for restraining authoritarian's actions as witnessed by the AU's refusal to accept 
Burundian president Nkuruziza's third term. Democracy promoters might need to consider 
strengthening such institutions' election monitoring techniques (to avoid focusing on 
election day events alone as they do, but at the whole cycle).  
 
Recently, the AU was financially challenged with African states failing to honor payments, 
and Mugabe in his capacity as AU chair pledged 300 herds of cattle 'to avoid Western 
dependence' for funding. Whitehead’s (1996) theory on democratization by ‘contagion’ as 
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non-democracies are ‘contaminated’ by advanced democracies has not worked in Africa. 
Such regional platforms would have been an opportunity to spread democratic norms, but 
instead the opposite ensues as respondents said other African leaders cheer and emulate 
Mugabe instead of shaming him. Hence, reliance on African authoritarians limits the 
organization’s power to objectively hold them accountable. There are inefficient to an 
extent in their operations as during the time of this study, the researcher visited the AU 
more than once to no avail as representatives were often out of office or without adequate 
information.  
 
Effects of democracy promotion  
 
According to Lindberg, elections are most often a step in the transition towards democracy 
(Lindberg, 2008) and that, “In Africa democracy tends to take root after a sequence of 
three electoral cycles”. Despite the fact that Lindberg’s theory recommends the need for 
the international community to sustain support to transitional countries over an extended 
period, typically 12 - 15 years, this has however not been the case as Zimbabwe in its 
seventh electoral round still has not established democracy. According to CSO 
representatives, they have over the years improved in conduct and their understanding of 
the processes, however. One respondent said, because elections had not been observed 
professionally before as they are today, the practices take time to perfect but added 
“although the problem is, the more we try to better our observation, the more the 
government develops ways to cheat”. 
 
Freedom House ratings change  
 
“The process of holding an uninterrupted series of de-jure participatory, competitive and 
legitimate elections not only enhances the democratic quality of the electoral regime but also 
has positive effects on the spread and deepening of civil liberties in the society”. 
Lindberg (2008)  
 
140 
 
Pessimism surrounding the substance of African elections understandably comes from 
low turnovers and their repetitive imperfection. However, based on its findings, this study 
proposes a wholesome view of what the whole electoral cycle can do. Elections are 
important in in-culturing democracy. In Zimbabwe, they have enabled stakeholders to call 
for term limits and facilitated the revision of constitutional clauses that had long been 
ignored, though hindering public liberties. 2015 - 2016 changes in the Mo Ibrahim Index 
and Freedom House ratings — from a ‘not free’ status to ‘partly free’ are based on the fact 
that, Zimbabwe is “one of the six countries that made strides in addressing governance 
issues, despite its leader Robert Mugabe being one of Africa’s longest serving leaders” 
(Ibrahim Index, 2015); and “gains in citizens’ civil liberties in 2015…while the country 
continued to struggle with the internal factionalization of both its ruling and major 
opposition parties, the judiciary showed increasing independence by deciding against 
powerful political interests, including ruling party elites” (Freedom House, 2016).  
 
Arguably, Freedom house as of 2016 now regards Zimbabwe as "partly free" from a "not 
free" status between 2002 to 2015 saying, "Zimbabwe’s civil liberties rating improved 
from 6 to 5, and its status improved from Not Free to Partly Free, due to some gains in 
citizens’ civil liberties in 2015. While the country continued to struggle with the internal 
factionalization of both its ruling and major opposition parties, the judiciary showed 
increasing independence by deciding against powerful political interests, including ruling 
party elites” (Freedom House, 2016).  
 
This study disagrees with the assessment to some extent however, as jurisdiction on party 
factions is an inadequate measure of state legislature. It could be a sign of extended 
judicial factionionalism particularly on the part of the ruling party. In an interview with 
the Ibrahim foundation on Zimbabwe’s rating changes, Zimbabwean political analyst 
Ruhanya called the assessment “superficial in the sense that its analytic length is focused 
on civil and political rights. Whereas we agree that there has been a recession and some 
kind of stability, there is great abuse of civil and political rights. Because of the economic 
recession that the country is facing is that there has also been substantive violation of 
social economic rights. There is an appalling failure in the issue to do with the protection 
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of social economic rights stated in chapter four of the new constitution: the bill of rights 
that talks of issues of provision of clean water the right to health, the right to education. 
All those social economic rights are not being realized” (Ibrahim Index, 2015).  
 
Mozaffar (2002) says, the fact that authoritarians routinely attempt to manipulate election 
rules indicates their understanding of the significance of these rules in shaping and 
legitimizing election incomes. Advances in improving democratic capacities have been 
made, but the limited self-governance of state institutions from the incumbent and their 
ability to adjudicate electoral processes neutrally, remains problematic.  
 
On election observation, CSO representatives said their election fraud detection 
techniques had improved with each election aided by real-time reporting technologies, 
rapid response mechanisms were in place. Their increase in polling station coverage (at 
least on observer at every polling station due to CSOs joint fielding) has deterred potential 
fraud, saying electoral managing bodies increasingly know they are being watched and 
with the use of smart phones, information is relayed efficiently. One respondent said, 
“Before, Zanu-PF members would intimidate voters in polling station radiuses for votes, 
but now they can’t they know they are being watched”. They said, resultantly from their 
community surveys, voter confidence has improved motivated by observer presence in 
polling stations.  
 
Reprisals by CSOs and opposition have increased pressuring the incumbent to explain 
policy decisions. 2016 protests organized by opposition parties - MDC and People First 
across Zimbabwe and South Africa, on the disappearance of US$ 15 billion from 
government and Chinese joint diamond mining ventures have revived hope in mass 
mobilization (VOA, 2016). Opposition and CSOs have united since 2015 to protest against 
the disappearance of activists without much state limitation. These social movements are 
important for an embattled opposition to remind the incumbent and electorate of their 
viability and as a platform to share policy and revive distressed masses, since unionism 
and student movements are almost extinct due to a failed economy and company closures 
as well as disunity and partisanship respectively. Legal CSOs and student groups were 
142 
 
applauded for encouraging civil transformative action attributing national constitutional 
reform consciousness to CSO efforts, siting the “NO Vote campaign” rejecting a 
repressive and ‘partisan’ constitutional referendum in year 2000 although it was followed 
with violent attacks by the state (Mwonzora, 2010). Zimbabwean CSOs have nonetheless 
survived several derailing attempts by government through co-option and pre-emption 
(Raftopoulos & Savage, 2010).  
 
“Things are changing. It was impossible at one point to comment in newspapers or the internet 
as we do now.” 
(CSO Leader) 
 
Respondents said technological support had made operations easier and efficient while 
integrating Zimbabwe into the globalized society of democratic processes. Computers and 
smartphones were commonly mentioned as having enhanced reporting and result 
verification processes in ‘real-time’. This has an effect on electoral fairness as incidents 
could be reported and information would be conveyed to observers in the area for 
verification. Platforms such as Ushahidi (for citizens instantly report incidents or air their 
views about election related activities) supported by HIVOS and DFID were said to have 
broadened participation and enhanced monitoring during elections for transparency and 
accountability — although met with massive state backlash. In terms of popular 
participation, respondents said the internet has largely contributed by providing free 
access to information through news sites, instant messaging — mainly WhatsApp and 
social media. For political parties, it has been used to campaign and share evidence on 
abuses of power by the state. For CSOs, it is an advocacy tool especially. For citizens, it 
is an interactive platform to share opinions (especially anonymously considering fear of 
retribution). CSOs receive smartphones from donors for observation and have been crucial 
in sharing images and videos from remote areas. 
 
Regarding transparency, CSOs said through acquired knowledge of strategies like parallel 
vote tabulations for the verification of results (illegal but a common practice among 
Zimbabwean NGOs), they can now independently verify results using representative 
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random samples of polling station results. This is how they managed to raise alerts 
regarding vote fraud and challenge EMBs. Journalists through independent media 
increasingly expose fraudulent activities and raise awareness around state abuse. Others 
pointed to government restrictions in these areas and state unwillingness to invest in 
surveillance technology. 
 
Zanu-PF Internal Divisions  
Respondents pointed to Zanu-PF’s 2014 splits following the expulsion of Vice president 
Joice Mujuru on allegations of stirring “factionalism” or divisions to displace Mugabe, 
treason and corruption saying, it could be a sign of intra-party democracy as previously 
rare was the president ever opposed. She formed the Zimbabwe First Party in 2015 to 
challenge Zanu-PF in the 2018 elections together with other former minister dismissed 
from the party. According to media reports, Mujuru will form a coalition with other 
political parties including the MDC against Zanu-PF. These respondents recommended 
further investigation into democracy promotion’s effect on authoritarian regimes saying, 
it could potentially be a new strategy for democracy promotion — destruction from within 
rather than from without. Actually, the state newspaper accused Mujuru's entry into 
opposition as a clear sign that, “She was a pawn of foreign interests seeking to perpetuate 
Western hegemony on the country's economy” (Herald, 2016). 
 
The unpopular splinters are calling for the respect of the rule of law given a series of 
“votes of no confidence” passed on party members aligned to factions opposing the 
president (as was the case with expelled former vice president Mujuru). Vice president 
Mnangagwa who is under attack for leading one faction has queried the suspension and 
expulsion of members without investigation or adhering to constitutional disciplinary 
processes. Fear of expulsion and unfair action has led to constitutional reviews and the 
valuing of legal provisions within the ruling party. Even notorious state violence 
reinforcing instruments, war veterans, are calling for the rule of law given factional purges 
among their leaders for disagreeing with the executive. Based on the “spoiler effect” 
emerging from internal party divisions and their high political costs, splits in the 
incumbent party between significant party leaders. Splitting candidate could draw votes 
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from the incumbent resulting in opposition victory. Increasingly former staunch 
supporters of the ruling party have changed their thoughts and attitudes towards 
contemporary governance models and are prompted to leave old taboos (Kpundeh (1992). 
“The new insistence by external aid donors and creditors on good governance also has 
provided a window of opportunity for African democrats to push for transparency and 
accountability in their countries (Kpundeh, 1992). 
 
Democracy in decline? 
Zimbabwean findings both challenge and confirm Plattner, Fukuyama, Diamond and 
Carother’s (2015) propositions of democratic decline. Indeed, challenges of 
democratizations are more complex today with such institutional co-option to form hybrid 
democracies. Some respondents felt democracy had failed in Zimbabwe and events were 
indicating an opposite trend, while others felt the interest in elections through contestation 
and participation showed electoral democracy was gaining popularity as the democratic 
culture deepened. But lessons from Iraq and North Africa were raised as current 
challenges to democracy promotion by donors particularly, as they increasingly as they 
do not reflect positively on Western democracy promotion strategies. One AU 
representative added that previous hopes of sustainable democratic consolidation in Mali, 
Cameroon, Guinea Bissau and the stagnation in South Africa are slowly showing a 
negative trend. Zimbabweans continue to trust in electoral participation as the only 
legitimate and peaceful means of regime change.  
 
More and more citizens are challenging authoritarians' transformation to more democratic 
forms of governance. According to some respondents, the persistence of both opposition 
and CSOs that continues to force authoritarians in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia to maintain the 
practice of participation for pluralism has contributed to authoritarian’s accommodation 
of democratic practice. Some said the fact that authoritarians continue to hold elections is 
a sign that democracy promotion initiatives have succeeded in emphasizing the 
importance and significance of elections.  
 
145 
 
Elections are surprisingly significant in Zimbabwean politics. While some respondents 
said, some of the general public had lost hope in elections after their failure to translate 
their votes to regime change, the majority will continue to ‘try’ — according to on CSO 
director, “Africans believe in elections my friend…they symbolize change!” Adding that 
electoral practice is still strong based on the beliefs that, the incumbent will eventually run 
out of fraudulent tactics.  
 
United States’ record  
Considering current debates on democratic decline Fukuyama, Kagan, Plattner, Diamond, 
Carothers, Schmitter, Levitsky & Way, Stepan, Mungiu-Pippidi, Mainwaring & Pérez-
Li~nán, Gyimah-Boadi and Masoud. Democracy’s promoters especially the US has a lot 
do to revive hope in international democracy promotion and improve ratings of democracy 
as a key value. In a recent article titled “Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy 
in Other Countries,” Waltapril (2016) talks of discouraging trends in US foreign policies. 
According to Waltapril (2016), democracy promoters should realize democracy is more 
than constitutions or elections and as argued by this study, democracy promotion’s success 
is dependent on functioning internal systems including effective legal systems, a broad 
commitment to pluralism, a decent level of income and education, and widespread 
confidence that political groups which lose out in a particular election have a decent 
chance of doing better in the future. 
 
Waltapril (2016) like Lindberg and others argues, Western democratization took centuries 
and therefore, donors must be patient and even prepare for contentious and violent 
responses to the process. Building institutions and making them conducive for democracy 
requires time and money. And shortcuts through hard or military forms only worsen 
democracy’s record as well as the lives of those it hopes to preserve. Waltapril (2016) 
says, force for democracy promotion almost always triggers violent resistance in recipient 
states and also neighboring states whose interests are adversely affected by a transition, 
may try to stop or reverse it. Impactful peaceful IDP strategies like conditionality 
empower authoritarians who are good at manipulating facts. External actors do not “know 
enough to pick the right local people to put in charge, and even generous and well-
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intentioned efforts to aid the new government tend to fuel corruption and distort local 
politics in unpredictable ways” Waltapril (2016). 
 
“Creating democracy in a foreign country is a vast social engineering project, and expecting 
outside powers to do it effectively is like asking someone to build a nuclear power plant, without 
any blueprints, on an active earthquake zone. In either case, expect a rapid meltdown”. 
Waltapril (2016) 
 
Where “promoting democracy is desirable, but force is not the right tool, what is? Let me 
suggest two broad approaches,” Waltapril (2016) suggests democracy promotion through 
diplomacy and setting better examples. Unfortunately, both have not worked in 
Zimbabwe. Diplomacy works where recipient governments are willing to listen and admit 
change is necessary, the Zimbabwean government responds with pride and ridicules 
Westerners before attributing the tactics to Western interests in Africa or a ‘hidden regime 
change mission’ evidenced by the government’s response to sanctions. The ‘role model’ 
strategy works when the government could ‘potentially copy’. The Zimbabwean 
government witnesses the successful rise of its neighbors - South Africa, Botswana, and 
Zambia under democratic rule and emulates them, but does not model their example. 
Worse still, as argued by Diamond and Carothers et al. the US is no longer the “just, 
prosperous, vibrant, and tolerant society” (Waltapril 2016) it was known to be by the end 
of the third wave of democratization. Western democracy promotion examples over the 
decade are less attractive.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion and recommendations  
This study explored the puzzle that Zimbabwe has received significant financial and 
technical support for democratization, but instead of democracy consolidation, Zimbabwe 
has oscillated from a de facto one party state to an authoritarian, then to a competitive 
authoritarian regime. Relying on 32 interviews with civil society representatives, donors 
and government representatives in Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Ethiopia, the study explored 
the effectiveness of Western democracy promotion on democratization in Zimbabwe.  
 
Despite theoretical propositions that aid has a positive effect on democratization: hence 
the assumption that an increase in aid would guarantee Zimbabwe’s democratization 
(Lindberg, 2006), Western democracy promotion has not been largely successful in 
democratizing Zimbabwe. The study highlighted democracy promotion characteristics, 
concepts, aims, activities and actors with an investigation of other cases of successful and 
unsuccessful democracy promotion. As discussed in the previous chapter, some of the 
factors affecting democracy promotion in Zimbabwe include, the nature of the state i.e. 
competitive authoritarian, electoral conduct, recipient activities (civil society and 
opposition) and external factors e.g. donor practices, the rise of China and its 
complications and the role of African regional organizations.  
 
In conducting this research, the aim has been to contribute to research on democracy 
promotion in authoritarian regimes. This is an area that has received minimal focus from 
democracy and election scholars. As discussed in the chapter on findings, Western 
democracy promotion and its effectiveness on contestation and participation in Zimbabwe 
had not been largely successful because of lack of consideration of domestic factors such 
as the nature of the state. It can therefore be argued that the most effective strategies are 
those that are inclusive of internal dynamics of recipient states, ‘neutrally’ dispensed and 
benefiting all stakeholders.  
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Nonetheless, as discussed in previous chapters, democracy promotion efforts in 
Zimbabwe have not been all to waste. Zimbabwe has progressed from being a purely 
authoritarian to competitive electoral authoritarianism. Still it should be noted that this has 
been a result of efforts by external actors together with other domestic and regional actors.  
 
Recommendations 
 
Nature of the state and the executive  
Zimbabwe suffers from the problem of powerful individuals and weak institutions. Its 
political institutions are too weak to ensure effective governance and accountability. Basic 
mechanisms (for electoral democracy in this case) are existent, they however lack 
autonomy. With a power deficient state, efforts can be made to build and increase its 
capabilities and where it is too powerful; efforts should be made to limit it. The 
government should create a conducive environment for constitutional values to 
consolidate and thrive including a total separation of powers without interference. 
Transition from years of despotism to real independence in Zimbabwe might take time 
but it is worth pursuing. Basic rights of all citizens need to be respected, elitist mentalities 
need breaking down, accompanied by executive de-monopolization of power, there is 
need for decentralization on all levels.  
 
Continuous disregard for the guarantee of individual rights is undemocratic and worsens 
government legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. In Sub-Sahara African cases like Mali 
and Burundi where an accumulation of state abuses has resulted in war — the executive 
must revisit original commitments it swore by. But then, authoritarians prolong their terms 
because certain camps genuinely want them to remain in power. There is need to 
encourage the essence of power turnover within these camps. The judiciary requires real 
legal authority to manage and control the state. In this regard, CSOs need to conscientise 
citizens (particularly in rural areas) of their constitutional rights.  
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Executive constitutional powers must be limited to those stipulated by the constitution 
while acts such as the Presidential Powers and Temporary Measures Act are repealed as 
they are biased towards incumbent parties. Some level of devolution is necessary to 
transfer substantial amounts of decision making power to lower levels for effective 
governance and accountability (Schmitter, 2015) and reduce existing gaps between the 
executive and its citizens for inclusiveness. Given wealth disparities in Zimbabwe, 
devolution could also enhance wholesome growth. As long as the incumbent continues to 
use state resources for patronage "competitive clientelism” Lust (2009) will continue.  
 
Electoral managing bodies  
Electoral managing bodies (EMBs) must have the capacity to function independently from 
the executive according to the constitution and be apolitical. For efficiency, the bodies 
must be independent (run professionally) hence overhauling is necessary by reshuffling 
current veterans to maintain vibrancy and innovation. The institutions need to be re-
structured with clear boundaries (division of roles) and chains of command to ensure 
internal checks if they are to be independent. It is also necessary to improve reporting 
mechanisms and change current practices of executive control i.e. because the incumbent 
is an interested party. Processes such as voter registration and the update of voters’ roll 
must be done by one office i.e. the former by the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission 
(ZEC) as stipulated by the constitution and the later by the Registrar General. This will 
also reduce gerrymandering problems as the Registrar General’s office can consult census 
findings to define sensible and balanced polling centers.  
 
This study suggests that professional checks similar to financial audits be carried out to 
counter cases of duplication and missing names alongside the deaths registry, using 
modern technologies. Voter registrations and audits must be done in time to allow 
updating, checking and distribution. As long as EMBs are willing to rig elections, 
authoritarians will continue to use clientalist tactics to manipulate or co-opt them. 
Therefore, the revision of electoral laws is necessary to ensure electoral processes are 
improved in their objectivity. EMBs must strictly abide by key provisions such as availing 
the voter’s roll for inspection by all stakeholders in time. Regional organizations like the 
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African Union must continue to emphasize in essence the need of good governance and 
agree on disincentives for non-cooperating members. They must also ensure peaceful, free 
and fair elections that respect the people’s will. 
 
Elections and election cycle  
“Elections alone are not sufficient to make a democracy — yet “no other institution 
precedes participatory, competitive and legitimate elections in instrumental importance of 
self-government” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). But, not all election holding 
countries are or will be democracies. There is need to closely investigate structural 
arrangements necessary for elections before recommending them as key governance 
solutions. Elections in Zimbabwe have become a formality and while poorly organized 
and providing publicity opportunities for stakeholders, they might not yield to much. The 
deterrence of fraud must be prioritized in place of its detection and more pro-action than 
reaction is needed. Stakeholders could take advantage of a democratic culture imbedded 
in the routinization of elections and ensure all citizens contribute to deterring fraud. This 
requires the flexibility of election officials to look beyond traditional observation methods, 
focusing on the whole electoral cycle not just the Election Day and advance as 
authoritarians get sophisticated. This will help improve voter confidence as accountability 
is entrenched, although, large scale election observation has made it increasingly difficult 
for incumbents to rig elections and get away with it due to the spread of strategic 
manipulation (Hyde, 2014). 
 
Power transfer requires reinvestigation of constitutional provisions to ensure term limits 
are abided by. Mechanisms to investigate appeals and petitions must already be in place 
before Election Day to ensure effectiveness. Election CSOs need advanced reporting 
mechanisms to collect sufficient evidence of fraud to justify their findings e.g. using smart 
technology to record suspicious activity. For inclusiveness, financial and legal support 
must be provided for all candidates for appeals or the fees must be drastically cut. EMBs 
must permit and easily accredit CSOs to field observers countrywide, while ensuring 
ballot is secure. The rules for doing so must be easy to understand and unbiased. 
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More advocacy is required to allow international observers though there is need for them 
to observe the elections over longer periods to have a comprehensive and wholesome view 
of the process and possibly deter fraud early. Learning from Zimbabwean events, election 
fraud could start at the cycle’s commencement. There is also need for accommodation of 
local observer views by international observers and verification before the issuing of 
unified statements to avoid current conflict. 
 
Competitive authoritarianism  
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) assumed “any country moving away from authoritarian 
rule could be considered as transitioning towards democracy” however this is not the case 
with Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe over the decade has been slowly drifting away from the 
traditional authoritarian form of governance predominant one-party state that does not 
allow contestation or one that does not allow citizens to participate in public processes. 
The act of holding national elections can itself be unpredictable and riskier for incumbents 
even those experienced in vote manipulation (Hyde, 2014). Following Lindberg’s (2006) 
argument, the act of holding “elections even though flawed” may in the long run introduce 
much greater uncertainty for the leader to stay in power.  
 
Though on the other hand, “Repeating elections even though flawed works where genuine 
will for transformation exists. In the absence of transformative will, competitive 
authoritarian and hybrid regimes will continuously threaten the future of real democracy.” 
The risk is, “When long-time authoritarian rulers face serious challenges they may turn to 
extreme levels of repression, deploying levels of violence and intimidation that are 
unnecessary when political domination can be more subtly secured at the ballot box” 
Diamond 2002 but it is worth pursuing. This important to understanding complications 
and challenges to democratization in Zimbabwe and other authoritarian systems but to 
find possible solutions. Diamond 2002 found that, “If we are to understand contemporary 
dynamics, causes, limits, and possibilities of regime change, we must understand the 
different, and in some respects new, types of authoritarian rule”. 
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However, there is hope, as already, African authoritarians including Mugabe have 
difficulties justifying authoritarian rule and guaranteeing their tenure, hence the adoption 
of competitive authoritarian or hybrid democratic governance. More internal and external 
pressure is required as electorate take advantage of modern technologies to educate, 
mobilize, advocate and hold leaders accountable where physical demonstrations are faced 
with state retaliation. Possibilities for transformation though hazy are higher today ever.  
 
Democracy promotion efforts should not be limited to the election years alone but events 
throughout the electoral cycle because learning from the 2013 elections, most 
irregularities emanate from pre-election processes. Strict monitoring of state electoral 
institutions deters or complicates manipulation e.g. CSOs and citizens could constantly 
check their voter records as well as their family’s and insist on the removal of deceased 
persons or correct existing details. Long term support also prevents the institutionalization 
of election administration emanating from reliance on temporary rather than permanent 
personnel who often possess little experience (Resnick, 2013). Though costly, some CSOs 
have “Long term observers” who keep them updated on political developments in each 
constituency.  
 
A close look into democratization trends across Sub-Saharan Africa indicates a need for 
patience. Electoral democratic processes and institutions in Zimbabwe such as CSOs and 
election monitoring and observations are about a decade old. Meaning, active observation 
and advocacy has only been over approximately three main election rounds. And learning 
from Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia it is evident all countries might not democratize after 
the second or third round of elections (Lindberg, 2006) but require more time. Zambia 
from 1964 only became a consolidated democracy around 2000, Ghana became 
independent in 1957 but democratized in 1992, Nigeria in 1960 but fully democratized 
around 1999. It was however evident among donors interviewed that, even they do not 
know how long democratization should take. So future studies on democratization in 
Africa might consider focusing on the average length required for any transition before it 
requires attention. More consensus on what democracy means and the benefits for 
democratization would help strengthening democratization theories.  
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Donors  
External actors can influence the politics of a foreign state nevertheless, as the democracy 
promotion field grows in actors, scopes and strategies more unity and common grounds 
are fundamental to jointly and meaningfully impact foreign politics. Western governments 
could take advantage of the widened space, their shared relationships and resources to 
make ‘scientific’ or ‘laboratory’ like experiments with aid given the diversity of dependent 
variables. More than half of Sub-Saharan Africa continues to face governance problems, 
some ‘not free’ and pure authoritarians, some stateless, some ‘partly free,' some hybrid 
and some ‘free’ and consolidated democracies. Though prone to ethical dilemmas, similar 
and acceptable strategies could be applied to all cases to observe the different ‘reactions’ 
or effects. Learning from these, strategies could be modified next, and the whole process 
could be repeated over some time to find effective strategies. This study proposes this 
period as all countries are now independent with basic political structures in place.  
 
Because some countries use democracy assistance as an ‘instrument’ e.g. regime change 
while some institutions (neutral or transnational e.g. the UN), their success rates cannot 
be assessed in the same breadth. The recipient organization’s attitude or operations 
particularly CSOs i.e. the way the funds provided are used, can affect the effectiveness of 
democracy assistance. Donors may need to consider combining and channeling aid 
through such neutral agencies particularly for state institutions like parliaments and 
security forces. Nonetheless, existent overt donor bias towards the assistance of pro-
opposition encourages authoritarians to maintain a monopoly over state resources for 
finance and complicates accountability particularly when foreign party assistance is 
illegal. 
 
Current donor fatigue can only be solved by internal re-strategizing by both donors and 
recipients. A clear performance criterion from donors and its implications (i.e., what 
happens if an organization fails to perform over a period of time) is also necessary to 
motivate recipients to increase their capacity and effectiveness. This requires careful 
monitoring either by donors or external evaluators and auditors. Donors need to desist 
from dictating causes and strategies and allow for flexibility to reduce the ‘Jack of all 
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trades’ problem. The multiplicity of organisations should be replaced by active, focused 
and coordinated network. There is need for patience as the transfer of democratic norms 
and values takes time (Lindberg, 2006). UNDP’s continuous ‘neutral’ mediation between 
government and Western donors remains necessary. Also, given the development aid vs. 
political aid successes, donors might need to consider channeling more aid through 
development programs in poor countries. 
 
Yes, there are more democracies today than ever before but caution is required when 
evaluating the effectiveness of democracy promotion and attributing credit as the isolation 
of causal factors might be dangerous for future applications where the same conditions 
might not have the same effect — as in the case of Zimbabwe. Therefore, the ‘one size 
fits all’ strategy is not effective as political challenges differ across cases. Donors must be 
flexible to modify their ‘set tool boxes’ (Carothers 2004) and prepare for alternative 
effects. Furthermore, donor verification of democratic conditions in recipient states is 
necessary before committing to democracy assistance. Democracy promotion does and 
has promoted democracy to an extent as the concept of ‘good governance’ has received a 
lot of attention across Africa. It has given rise to citizen and institutional demands on 
governments to positively perform along with pressure for transparency and 
accountability. Political systems in Sub-Saharan Africa have begun to mirror Western 
ones. Today 48 of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 49 countries allow their citizens to select their 
leadership at various levels. Courts have been formalized with the institutionalization of 
frameworks under internationally competitive constitutions and citizens although limited, 
can express themselves. The Zimbabwean case provides lessons for future initiatives in 
modern authoritarian states and an impetus for democracy promotion to develop.  
 
On conditionality, foreign pressure through the imposition of conditionalities does not 
work where authoritarian incumbents have alternatives sources of cooperation. In the case 
of Zimbabwe, it has given the incumbent an excuse to divert blame for failed policies. 
Conditionality also improves incentives for countries to look and act like democracies for 
aid. Historical events are a factor especially previous relationships between the imposer 
and the recipient when investigating conditionality’s success. Where necessary, donors 
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must coordinate to avoid contradictions and duplications. Today, it is limited by the 
increase in alternatives given an increase in global powers especially China triumphing 
on contrasting governance models and “emerging democracies,” like India, Brazil and 
South Africa. However, while China continues to challenge Western dominance over 
Africa’s foreign partners, the West remains a valuable donor and partner in economic, 
welfare and politics. 
 
Opposition 
Zimbabwe’s opposition parties are too weak to defend their victory. Investments are 
necessary to enhance their capacities; otherwise authoritarians will continue to claim it. 
Opposition parties need to be proactive in identifying and advocating against pre-electoral 
violations to avoid election boycotts. Furthermore, investments in political party observers 
to gather sufficient evidence are vital for petitions and appeals. Where there are faced with 
dominant party systems, public debates are necessary to consientize the electorate and 
highlight incumbent failures. 
 
Existing disunity and conflict due to a myriad of splinter groups prolongs the ruling party’s 
tenure as the vote is divided. Coordination is necessary for meaningful representation and 
regime change.  
Issues of intra-party power transfer must be constitutionally addressed to avoid the 
creation of more ‘strong men’. Moreover, mismanagement and corruption motivated more 
by personal gain also limit the effectiveness and relevance of opposition, therefore, the 
revision of norms and practices is necessary.  
 
Civil society  
CSOs need to be independent so that they are not affected by aid decline. Because they 
had become elite societies, they need to reengage the grassroots for support and 
continuously mobilize to remain relevant rather than wait for the next election. CSOs must 
also be objective and non-partisan, this is necessary to possibly reduce repression from 
authoritarians and illustrate their aim for free and fair political participation.  
156 
 
Judiciary  
Civil servants including EMBs, security sector and judicial or legislative bodies should be 
adequately compensated to avoid a reliance on state ‘benefits’ and bribes to increase their 
independence. Repressive laws like POSA and AIPPA need repealing for free access to 
information, public participation and contestation before the next elections. Only when 
judicial powers expand in relation to the executives can we expect absolute rule of law.  
 
Police and military 
Security should be depersonalized to monitor and secure interests of all parties. 
Restructuring within security forces is imperative to regain public trust in their role as 
protectors of all. Constant training for both police and military could also improve their 
professionalism separated from preferences. Additionally, violence reinforcing systems 
and institutions like security forces, youth militia and war veterans need reform or 
purging.  
 
Future scenarios  
Zimbabwe’s coercion and repression of pro-democratic institutions and elements can only 
be solved by these scenarios: Either authoritarian strongholds are weakened from within 
e.g. intra-party splits, state institutions strengthen to defend themselves, or laws and state 
institutions become independent of executive influence. Power decentralization from the 
executive to institutions is required to restore public confidence. According to Geddes et 
al., “When the leader of an autocratic regime loses power, one of three things happens. 
Someone from the incumbent leadership group replaces him, and the regime persists. The 
incumbent leadership group is replaced by democratically elected leaders. Or the 
incumbent leadership group loses control to a different group that replaces it with a new 
autocracy.”  
 
A few predictions or scenarios were gathered from the interview on Zimbabwe's future 
and most drew closer to the first proposition: that internal splits within the ruling party 
between the first lady’s camp and Vice President Mnangagwa’s camp could result in 
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Mnangagwa’s military backed camp taking over, although some consider this would be 
moving from one autocrat to another. Some however said, the myriad of splinter parties 
could form a coalition against the dominant incumbent as the MDC alone against Zanu-
PF has become too divided to defeat the incumbent as it often unites against opposition. 
One opposition MP’s third scenario was that MDC’s president Tsvangirai steps down and 
opens his position for an election to illustrate his real commitment to democracy and not 
the ‘power hungry dictator’ he is accused of being — since he has not managed to defend 
his ‘victory’ against Mugabe since 2000. He said, this would revive hope and prove their 
democratic commitment to the electorate. He added that their motto or message needed 
revision as the decade long “Chinja Maitiro” (Change your ways) or “Mugabe Must Go” 
mottos had become “tired”.  
 
Based on Siegel’s (2007) four stages of state transition, like Lindberg (2006), Zimbabwe 
could be in the “10-15 years ‘transition’ phase” and its transition from a purely 
authoritarian state to a competitive authoritarian could be a sign of progress. We must 
remain optimistic, learning from Nigeria, dictatorial rule to a competitive electoral regime 
tends to lead to further democratization and eventually democracy. Following Carothers’ 
proposition, authoritarians fall in different ways for different reasons, aid may help 
improve contestation and participation but if the authoritarian is resolute at manipulating 
the people’s will to guarantee his interests, external support cannot do much, neither can 
internal transformative groups. International support however keeps the regime 
accountable to an extent and sustains hopes for democratization. Current complications of 
intra-party divisions and limited resources to maintain patronage networks that previously 
supported Zimbabwe’s incumbent maybe an alternative source for change.  
 
But, as argued in this research, there is need for investment in research for effective 
electoral democratic practices learning from academic studies conducted elsewhere. 
Practitioners need to come together with academics to marry theory and empirical findings 
from similar cases. When evaluating democratic progress, it is necessary to look beyond 
attributes like the transfer of power alone. Democratization involves varied aspects 
necessary for consideration. Following Tilly's approaches to democracy, regarding 
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constitutional laws CSOs need to advocate against state laws limiting their activities. For 
the substantive approach, CSOs and citizens must continue to fight for genuine promotion 
of civil liberties. Regarding Tilly's procedural approach, there is need for enhancing and 
encouraging contestation by encouraging multi-partism, conducting transparent and 
objective voting processes including a clean and efficient voter registration exercise with 
an acceptable and publicly accessed voter's roll, ensuring the independence of electoral 
managing bodies, eventually resulting in some transfer of power whether inter or intra 
party.  
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